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Abstract
Among agricultural produce, rice is still dominating the Myanmar’s agriculture
sector, as it is a staple food crop and a principal export crop. Although previous
market reforms and major investment in the agriculture sector have led to
an increase in rice production, there have been challenges, such as limited
availability of loans, poor infrastructure, application of farm inputs and the
quality of seeds. My thesis comprises three essays that, together, fill the gaps
in the existing literature on most of the key issues affect rural development in
Myanmar.
The first essay analyses the source and extent of potential productivity and
efficiency gains, and investigates how Myanmar can increase its rice productivity.
The data used in this thesis is taken from 634 farm households in the main rice
growing regions, specifically Ayeyarwaddy, Bago and Sagaing. The stochastic
production frontier and technical inefficiency models are applied to capture
which farm-specific factors determine efficiency gains. The findings show that
rice production in the selected regions can be improved through farm workers
with better education, agricultural extension services, and efficient fertilizer
and pesticide application.
This essay also analyses the impact of land reforms and market reforms
on rice production in Myanmar and Vietnam. Although there are differences
between the two countries, especially in terms of government policy and institu-
tions, both share some similarities when it comes to rice production. Vietnam
is a more efficient rice producer than Myanmar, due to its better irrigation
system, use of better quality seeds, higher application rate of fertilizers, and
more intensive cropping. There may be many lessons for Myanmar to learn
Vietnam’s to increase the quantity and quality of its rice production by applying
certified seeds and efficient use of fertilizers, and using sufficient irrigated water.
The second essay examines the impact of credit policy on rice production
in the selected regions. The provision of agricultural credit is used as a major
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tool to develop rural areas and reduce poverty in Myanmar. Despite the rapid
expansion of agricultural credit by the Myanmar Agricultural Development
Bank (MADB), there are some limitations on applying for credits, such as the
credit amount per acre and the landholding size. A fuzzy regression disconti-
nuity design approach is applied to identify the effects of agricultural credit,
making use of the MADB’s credit rule based on landholding size up to 10 acres.
Although the subsidized credit scheme shows little impact on rice output and
rice income, the credit program has some positive effects on total household
income, suggesting a positive spillover effect on other farm income activities.
The third essay assesses the determinants of income diversification from
different sources and its impact upon the rural economy of Myanmar. Despite
the fact that rice production still plays a major role in the rural economy, the
diversity of income from both agricultural and non-agricultural activities has
been part of an important strategy for rural livelihoods among farm house-
holds since the late 1980s. This essay analyses the factors determining income
diversification from different sources on rural households’ income and their
contribution to income inequality amongst farm households. The findings show
that household’s demographic characteristics, total land size, ownership of
assets are the main factors leading towards income diversification. The results
of the decomposition of Gini coefficient indicate that aggregate income from
non-rice crops, especially pulses and beans, helps to significantly reduce income
inequality among farm households in the Bago and Sagaing Regions. Overall,
the results reveal that the cropping patterns for producing rice and different
type of pulses and beans, as well as participation in livestock farming, are the
most important factors in decreasing income inequality.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
After decades of isolation, Myanmar has begun opening up and re-engaging
with the regional and global economy since 2011. While much of the economic
investment has been initiated in areas such as mining, telecommunication, gems
and tourism, interest in the development potential of the agricultural sector
has been growing in Myanmar. In fact, agricultural growth has played a crucial
role in economic growth and poverty reduction in Southeast Asian countries,
such as Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia, all of which have had the
experience of successful development in the agricultural sector (Christiaensen
et al., 2011). Agriculture in Myanmar, including livestock, fisheries and forestry,
accounts for roughly 43 per cent of GDP, and employs nearly 70 per cent of the
labour force (Haggblade et al., 2013). Due to its abundant natural resources
(land and water) and large labour force, agricultural growth in Myanmar could
be a major driver of economic growth and rural incomes. For example, the
average farm size in Myanmar is 2.57 hectare, which is the second largest among
the Southeast Asian countries after Thailand. The government of Myanmar
has given attention to the development of the agriculture sector, which is one of
the ‘seven key pillars supporting and enabling inclusive and sustained economic
growth’ (Ministry of Agricultural and Irrigation, 2015, p.1).
Among agricultural produce, rice is still dominating the Myanmar’s agri-
cultural sector, as it is a staple food crop of the people of Myanmar and a
principal export crop. Myanmar’s economy has been primarily dominated by a
monoculture rice crop. Rice production employs nearly 61 per cent of the rural
workforce and it contributes 75 per cent of rural income (Wong and Wai, 2013).
Rice production contributed 40 per cent of the gross agricultural product and
13 per cent of GDP in 2013-2014 (KPMG, 2015). The development of the rice
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sector is expected to contribute to ‘building a progressive agriculture sector that
will propel economic development in other sectors and eventually transform
Myanmar into a modern, industrialized nation’ (Ministry of Agricultural and
Irrigation, 2015, p.1). Increasing productivity in rice could help improve the
livelihoods of rural farm households. The Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation
(MOAI)1 is increasingly investing in the development of the rice sector to
promote agricultural productivity. Given the importance of rice production,
previous Myanmar governments have implemented various policies and reforms
during the last century that have affected rice production.
1.1 Background to Myanmar’s agricultural pol-
icy
Until the early 1960s, Myanmar was the world’s largest rice-exporting country,
accounting for nearly 75 per cent of the world’s rice exports (Young et al.,
1998). However, Myanmar has fallen from being a major rice exporter to being
a self-sufficient rice producer since the adoption of the socialist system in 1962
(Soe and Fisher, 1990). Previous literature has analysed government policies
and other factors that affect rice production. These factors include the land
policy, the procurement system and price policies, agricultural credits, and
research and extension services.
The socialist government (1974-1988) launched its land policy in 1974. Un-
der this policy, the state owned all natural resources and all land. Farmers had
tillage rights that had to be renewed annually. Farmers were prohibited from
selling or transferring their land rights or changing agricultural land use. Each
farm household could have a maximum of 50 acres (approximately 21 hectares).
Importantly, the government introduced a marketing policy in 1974-1975, which
included a compulsory delivery quota system at fixed prices for all major crops.
Farmers were required to deliver between 10 to 12 per cent of their produce to
the government at fixed prices, which was half of the free market prices. The
quota amount was based on the sown area and its yield (Soe and Fisher, 1990).
These two policies discouraged farmers from improving their land productivity
and rice yields. Rice production significantly declined during this period.
1The Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation was restructured as the Ministry of Agriculture,
Livestock and Irrigation (MOALI) in 2016.
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In the mid-1970s, the government introduced the ‘Green Revolution’ using
advanced technology, high yielding variety seeds (HYV) and subsidized chem-
ical fertilizer to increase rice production. This program was initially trialled
in a township in Lower Myanmar in 1975, and was expanded in the Whole
Township Rice Production Program (WTPPP) in 1978-1979. In this program,
agricultural extension services, which were introduced in 1927 (Cho, 2013),
played an important role in the distribution of HYV seeds and fertilizers and in
provision of technical assistant to farmers. Under this program, rice production
significantly increased between 1975 and 1985 at a 6.35 per cent annual growth
rate, mainly as a result of an increase in the rice yield per acre. In 1987,
the government implemented its first agricultural reform. Under this reform,
the government reduced the amount of crops that farmers had to deliver and
lifted restrictions on the export of some agricultural products, such as black
gram, green gram, maize and pigeon pea. Rice, however, remained under state
control. Subsidies on chemical inputs including fertilizer, seeds and pesticide
were gradually transferred to the private sector.
In 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) government
came to power. One of the economic objectives of the SLORC was the ‘Devel-
opment of agriculture as a base and all-round development of other sectors of
the economy as well’ (Thein, 2004). In 1992-1993, the government introduced
the summer paddy program (SPP) and expanded the area devoted to rice
and improved irrigation facilities to further increase rice production, which
resulted in a significant increase in rice production during this period. In 1997,
to further develop the agricultural sector, the SLORC government reformed
the Myanmar Agricultural Development Bank (MADB), a state agency that
provides agricultural credit. The MADB provides three types of agricultural
loan, namely, seasonal loans, term loans and area development loans to farmers.
Although there are other formal and informal financial institutions in the rural
credit market, farm households rely heavily on loans from the MADB as it offers
the lowest interest rate compared to that of other financial institutions. The
MADB has been increasing the amount of credit for rice cultivation since 2008.
The MADB provides 100,000 Kyat per acre for seasonal loans at a maximum
of 10 acres.
The SLORC government invested heavily in irrigation projects. The Irriga-
tion Department under the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation constructed
108 irrigation projects, including dams and reservoirs, between 1988 and 1999.
The irrigated sown area was 41,921 acres in 1990. As a result of dam irrigation
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projects, the irrigated sown area increased to 119,400 in 1999 (Thein, 2004).
In 2003, the SLORC government launched its second agricultural reform and
finally abolished the delivery quota system. Although agricultural land was still
under state control, farmers could choose their crops and agricultural activities.
In 2006, the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation established the Myanmar
Agricultural Service (MAS). The Agricultural Extension Division (AED) under
the MAS is responsible for training and extension services. In 1998-1999, rice
production in Myanmar was 17.08 million metric ton. After the introduction of
agricultural reform in 2003, rice production significantly increased from 21.81
million metric ton in 2003 to 28.32 million metric ton in 2014 (Department of
Agricultural Planning, 2014b).
Since 2011, Myanmar has been engaged in a process of political and economic
liberalization that helps improve the country’s economy development. In 2011,
a political reform was launched in Myanmar and an elected government came
to power. The FAO (2012) reported that ‘To support the rural development
and poverty reduction activities through development of agriculture’ is one of
the National Economic and Social Development objectives (2011/2012-2015/16)
(FAO, 2012). In March 2012, the government launched a new land law, namely,
the Farmland Law, Rule, and the Vacant Fallow and Virgin Management Law
(2012). Under this law, farmers can sell, transfer and mortgage land use rights,
although the state still owns all land. The most important feature of this
law is that land use rights now have an indefinite duration. Farmers can use
their land so long as they do not breach government conditions. The law also
encourages investment by rural co-operative associations and/or the private
sector for land development.
In 2015, Myanmar held another election, following which the National
League for Democracy (NLD) party formed government. The NLD govern-
ment also gave priority to the development of agricultural sector. In 2016, the
government restructured the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
(MOALI) by merging the previous three Ministries (Agriculture and Irriga-
tion, Livestock Fisheries and Rural Development and Cooperatives), aiming
to ensure food and nutrition security, increase foreign exchange earnings and
contribute to rural development. In the same year, the amount of credit was
increased from 100,000 Kyat (USD 100) per acre to 150,000 Kyat (USD 150)
per acre for rice production. Remarkably, the NLD government focuses on
the diversification of income and the development of the rural non-farm sector,
which are key elements in the process of the agricultural transformation of
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1.2 Current perspectives on the agricultural
sector
Although previous markets reforms and major investment in the rice production
sector have led to an increase in rice production, there has been just a little
improvement in the development of the rice sector in Myanmar. Challenges
include the limited availability of loans and limited access for farmers to tech-
nology, less efficient agricultural extension services, the improvement of seed
quality, application of farm inputs and low development of rural infrastructure
(particularly for rural roads, irrigation facilities and power). The average rice
yield in Myanmar is roughly 3.84 tons per hectare at the national level, which
is the second-lowest among the Southeast Asian countries (Raitzer et al., 2015).
In addition, the return on paddy cultivation tends to be low and this affects
farm household incomes.
Consequently, other non-rice crop production, other farming activities and
non-farm activities will all be part of a farm household’s decision-making pro-
cess. In more recent times, Myanmar has become one of the major exporters of
pulses and beans. Pulses and beans are increasingly important crops in Myan-
mar, and now are the second-most important crops after rice. Pulse production
increased by 9 per cent per annum after the SLORC government’s first reform
in 1987 had allowed free trade in these crops. Exports of major pulses (green
gram, black gram, pigeon pea, cow bean, kidney bean and soya bean) rose by
17 per cent per annum, comprising 60 to 70 per cent of agricultural exports
in the early 1990s (Okamoto, 2008). Pulses are currently Myanmar’s largest
agriculture export item, accounting for $1,152 million in 2015-2016 (MOALI,
2018). Myanmar becomes now the world’s second-largest exporter of pulses
and beans.
Pulses and beans are grown in many parts of Myanmar. The main producing
area is the Central Dry Zone, followed by the Delta Region, Hilly Region and
Coastal Zones (Raitzer et al., 2015). Farmers have more incentive to produce
pulses because they can plant them after paddy to benefit from the moist
soil after the rice harvest, and pulses have lower production costs, need less
water, and are rising prices compared to rice. Aside from rice, pulses and
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beans, and other crops (such as sesame, groundnut and oilseeds) also play an
important role. However, successive governments have provided more support
for rice production than for other crops. For example, the amount of loans
provided by the MADB for crops is relatively low compared to that of loans
for rice production. The government of Myanmar (GOM) has heavily invested
in irrigation: rice is grown in approximately 76 per cent of the total irrigated
area. The type and level of government support, such as irrigation services and
policies, places limits on which crops farmers can plant, and become important
factors for farmers in making decisions on household livelihoods, and on rural
income inequality. However, the literature on the contribution of rice and
non-rice crop income to income inequality in Myanmar is limited.
1.3 Thesis outline
My thesis comprises three essays that, together, seek to fill the gaps in the
existing literature on most of the key issues that affect rural development in
Myanmar, with a main focus on rice production, followed by non-rice crop pro-
duction. Given the absolute and relative importance of rice in Myanmar’s rural
economy, the first essay analyses productivity, efficiency and rural development
in Myanmar’s rice production. The objective is to examine how Myanmar
can further increase its rice productivity; this essay analyses the source and
extent of potential efficiency gains. A primary dataset, which is collected in
the most rice growing regions, Ayeyarwaddy, Bago and Sagaing is used in this
thesis. The total number of farm household in this study is 634 across 30 villages.
Myanmar has a substantial potential to further develop rice production,
due to its abundant natural resources including water and arable land, and
available labour force with the lowest minimum wage in the region. This first
essay, therefore, applies stochastic production frontier and technical inefficiency
models to capture which farm-specific factors determine efficiency gains. There
are many ways in which farm productivity can be improved by measures such as
training, lower transportation costs, provision of credit and land fragmentation.
Literacy of household members who are currently working in agricultural ac-
tivities is also important in improving rice productivity as it can allow farmers to
easily understand the application of fertilizers, pesticides and other techniques.
The majority of farm workers in Myanmar are not well-educated, and they do
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not know how to use chemical inputs and new technologies systematically. This
chapter also discusses the relationship between the education level of household
farm workers and rice production. In this case, the provision of education and
training is found to be one of the important factors in assisting farmers with
technical knowledge to improve rice production.
Better roads can boost rice and non-rice crop productivity by lowering
transportation costs for agricultural inputs and outputs. However, the trans-
portation system in Myanmar is one of the poorest of all ASEAN countries
(ADB, 2012). In this first essay, the distance from a village to a market nearby
a township is used to estimate the importance of access to better roads and
transportation in rice production and other business activities. To fill the gaps
in the previous literature, the first essay adds these variables to estimate their
effect on rice production efficiency.
The MADB has been increasing its seasonal loans; however, the amount of
credit per acre can cover about 20 per cent of production cost per acre. As a
matter of fact, land use certificates (LUC) could not be used as collateral for
borrowing loans until 2012. Due to the lack of collateral and the high risk of
default, informal sectors usually charge at very high interest rates. This chapter
analyses the availability of loans from both the MADB and the informal sector
and their effect on rice production.
Although land fragmentation in Myanmar has not previously been a sig-
nificant constraint on rural productivity, the number of plots per household
is increasing. The first essay estimates the effect of land fragmentation by
holding land size and number of plots for each farm. Several studies have
examined factors that determine the productivity and efficiency of Myanmar
rice production; however, none of them have investigated the impact of credit
and land fragmentation.
The second part of this essay analyses the impact of land reforms and
market reforms on rice production in Myanmar and Vietnam. Vietnam was
chosen as a comparison because two countries share some similarities when it
comes to rice production. However, the trajectories of rice production in two
countries are in marked contrast, especially in terms of government policies and
institutions. Vietnam has achieved a remarkable increase in rice production
due to land reform and trade liberalization in 1988. Land reform in Myan-
mar has lagged behind Vietnam by more than 20 years. Unfortunately, this
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review fails to conclusively examine the effect of land reform on Myanmar’s
rice production, as the Myanmar government was in the process of replacing
farmers’ old single-year land use certificates with new, unlimited duration ones
during my fieldwork. Vietnam’s DoiMoi reform took place one year earlier
than market reform in Myanmar. The agriculture sector employs 63 per cent
of the labour force in Myanmar (FAO, 2016) that is relatively lower than that
of Vietnam. Vietnam has been found to be more labour intensive compared
to Myanmar as over 70 per cent of population is involved in the agricultural
sector (Tran Toan Thang, 2014).
The other factor is the educational level of farmers. Myanmar ’s farmers
are lack of knowledge and less educated than other countries in the region. The
literacy rate in rural area of Myanmar accounts for 84 per cent (Zorya, 2016).
In contrast, the literacy rate in Vietnam ’s rural area is 88.7 per cent. It is
worthy to note that the definition of literacy used in Vietnam differs from the
definition in other studies. The Government of Vietnam has introduced the
first campaign of literacy in 1954 (Phan et al., 2004). A person is defined as
literate when he or she has completed at least grade 5 (primary education from
grade 1 to 5). In this case, farmers in Vietnam are found to have better educa-
tional achievement. Although both countries have similar land areas under rice
cultivation, Myanmar has lagged behind Vietnam in terms of rice production.
Vietnam’s better performance is due to its better irrigation system, use of
better quality-seed, the higher application rate of fertilizer, higher cropping
intensity, more educated farmers and more labour intensive. Myanmar could
increase its rice production by learning from Vietnam’s experience.
The second essay examines the impact of credit policy on rice production.
Although there are other formal and informal financial institutions in rural
credit markets, farm households rely heavily on loans from the MADB, due to
its low interest rate compared with that of micro finance institutions (MFI)
and informal sectors. The MADB provides the agricultural loan at an interest
rate of 8.5 per cent per annum (around 0.71 per cent per month). The other
financial institutions, in particular, microfinance institutions (MFIs) operated
by the Central Cooperative Society (CCS), PACT UNDP, World Vision and
Save the Children charge an interest rate of 2.5 per cent per month (30 per
cent per annum). An informal sector consists of money lenders, relatives, and
friends. Most of the money lenders charge at 10 to 20 per cent per month, while
friends and relatives charge various interest rates. The semi-formal sector is
composed of pawnshops, village revolving funds, and village savings and credit
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groups. The interest rate charged by pawnshops is 3 to 5 per cent per month,
but they deal in gold as a collateral (Duflos et al., 2013).
The MADB’s financial constraints limit its maximum loan to individual
farmers to 1,000,000 Kyat 2 (USD 1000) for a maximum of 10 acres. This
means that an average amount of credit per acre decreases with landholding
size. The MADB mainly provides loans to small farm holders. Large farm
households with holdings of more than 10 acres receive less credit per acre for
rice production. The lack of sufficient agricultural credit is a major constraint
on lower productivity. The literature on the effect of the MADB’s credit policy
on rice production in Myanmar is limited. In order to examine the credit
policy and its impact on Myanmar’s rice production, this essay uses the fuzzy
regression discontinuity (FRD) approach, making use of the rule of providing
credit based on rice landholding size up to 10 acres. This study analyses the
full sample, sub-samples with holdings of land 0-20, 5-15 and 8-12 acres to
estimate the effects of credit amount per acre on rice production, rice output
per acre, rice income and total income by controlling household’s demographic
characteristics (age, educational level, gender of a household head, a number
of family workers and dependency ratio), access to agricultural extension ser-
vice, irrigation facilities and regional effects. The distance from a village to a
township is used to estimate the relationship between rural infrastructure and
access to credit. Farm households that live far from a township branch bank;
have less incentive to apply for credit due to transportation costs.
The third essay focuses on income diversification and income inequality in
the rural economy. This essay has two parts. The first part identifies the factors
that constrain farm households from participating in different farming and
non-farming activities. The inverse Herfindahl index is used to investigate the
factors that lead farm households to diversify their production more towards
pulses, beans and other non-rice crops, and to measure the degree of income
diversification. This essay also examines the degree of diversification among
the regions due to the different soil types of the regions. In this study, the
soil type of the selected villages in Ayeyarwaddy region is appropriate for the
cultivation of rice. In contrast, the soil type of Sagaing in the Central Dry Zone
is more suitable for planting pulses and beans. Bago can produce both rice and
non-rice crops, especially pulses and beans. Most farmers in Bago and Sagaing
are engaged in the cropping pattern of rice and non-rice crops, while those in
2The exchange rate of 1 US Dollar was approximately 1000 Myanmar Kyat in 2014.
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Ayeyarwaddy are involved in a mono-rice practice. The agriculture of Myanmar
is still labour intensive 3. Most farmers cannot use tractors, because they have
limited finance for hiring tractors. This essay attempts to find out how the
ownership of a tractor is attracting farm households to become involved in
other business activities.
The second part examines household livelihood strategies, in which income
sources contribute to income inequality amongst farm households. The Gini
decomposition coefficient is used to measure income equality in the selected
regions. Due to the different characteristics of geographical location, this essay
analyses the Gini coefficient of each region, and examines the contribution of
each income source to income inequality among farm households. The compar-
ative advantage of each region is expected to suggest business activities that
help increase a farm household’s income in the selected areas.
The conclusion section summarises the key findings of this research related
to the research questions of each essay. This section identifies the implications
of the findings to increase rural income through improved rice productivity,
non-rice crop production and livestock production. This section also outlines
the limitations of this research that should be considered for further study.
3Approximately 16 per cent of farm households across the country use mechanized tractors
or tillers (Raitzer et al., 2015).
Chapter 2
Productivity, efficiency and
rural development in Myanmar
rice production
2.1 Introduction
Myanmar has a traditional agricultural economy based on rice production.
Rice is the dominant crop in the agriculture sector due to its being a staple
food of the people of Myanmar and a major export commodity. Myanmar is the
world’s sixth-largest rice-exporting country. Rice production contributed nearly
80 per cent to the total value of agricultural produce in 2010 (ADB, 2013).
Moreover, 75 per cent of people living in rural areas are primarily engaged
in the agriculture sector. Rice production employs the highest percentage of
workers accounting for 61 per cent of the total labour force in rural areas (Kyaw,
2009). Rice production, therefore, still plays an important role in Myanmar’s
economy.
As Myanmar grows more rice than it consumes, the surplus in rice produc-
tion helps ensure national food security. The food security of the country is
generally achieved by self-sufficiency at the national level (Shwe and Hlaing,
2011). However, like many other developing countries, Myanmar’s growing
population is increasingly challenging its food security goals: the population
is growing at an average annual growth rate of 1.1 per cent (Agricultural
Extension Division, 2013). This growing population is increasing the domestic
consumption of rice (Kubo et al., 2004). It also places increasing pressure on
available land, meaning that increasing rice production will rely on raising
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productivity (Sawaneh et al., 2013).
Given the importance of rice production, the Government of Myanmar
implemented two agricultural reforms in 1987 and 2003 to move from a socialist
economy to a market-oriented economy (Okamoto, 2005). The government
also promoted producing more rice by introducing a summer paddy production
program (SPP) in 1992, which expanded land and irrigation facilities (De-
partment of Agricultural Planning, 2012). Although these efforts significantly
increased total rice production, the average yield of rice paddy has remained
at 3.1 tons per hectare since 1995 (Denning et al., 2013). A major reason
for this low level of paddy yield is the removal of subsidies on farm inputs,
especially fertilizer, under the first reform (Aung, 2011). However, Myanmar
still has the potential to increase paddy yield by providing sufficient agricultural
loans, applying modern technology, improving irrigation systems and further
developing infrastructure.
In an effort to analyse efficiency in rice production, previous empirical
studies (Aung, 2011; Myint and Kyi, 2005; Naing et al., 2008; Nan Wutyi
et al., 2013) investigated a number of factors that impact upon the efficiency
of Myanmar’s rice production. These studies have shown the effects of the
age of the household head, the number of years of farming experience and
the educational level of this household head, access to agriculture extension
services on rice productivity, and the application of low level of fertilizer in rice
production. However, these studies have not observed the impact of the amount
of available loans on productivity. Further, previous studies have not analysed
the combination of farm size and number of plots, nor examined the effect
of distance from villages to market and infrastructure development in rural areas.
Therefore, the specific objective of this research is to analyse the productiv-
ity and efficiency of rice production of the selected Myanmar farm households
in the most productive rice growing regions, specifically, Ayeyarwaddy, Bago
and Sagaing. The data used in this research was taken from author-collected
farm survey data from 634 farms across 30 villages, in these regions. This
paper aims to fill the gaps in the literature by adding new variables of inter-
est in the rice production sector. The stochastic production frontier model
is applied to determine the source and extent of potential productivity and
efficiency gains and determine the factors that influence the efficiency of rice
production. Identifying these factors will give us insights into the effectiveness
of the government’s policy and strategies for improving the rice production
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sector. This, in turn, will promote the rural economy and reduce poverty, as
rice is the main source of rural income.
The rest of this essay is organised into seven sections. Section 2.2 explains
the background to rice production in Myanmar and agricultural market reforms.
Section 2.3 discusses the literature review. The data source and variables
are described in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 examines the methodology of the
stochastic production frontier model and the technical inefficiency model to
estimate the potential effects on rice production. The result of data set is
discussed in Section 2.6. The findings of research and some recommendations
are included in Section 2.7. The analysis of rice production between Myanmar
and Vietnam is analysed in Section 2.8 of Appendix.
2.2 Background to Myanmar’s agriculture
2.2.1 Rice production in Myanmar
Myanmar enjoys many natural resources including agricultural land, abun-
dant water resources and a favourable climate, all of which are suited to rice
production. The production of paddy accounts for 57 per cent of major crop
production, in particular, 26 crops reported as major crops in 2012 (Department
of Agricultural Planning, 2012). The cultivable land area for rice makes up 34
per cent of the country’s total sown area in 2011-2012 (Agricultural Extension
Division, 2013). Although rice is planted throughout the country, the major
rice growing regions are Ayeyarwaddy, Bago and Sagaing. The Ayeyarwaddy
and Bago Regions are located in the Delta Region whereas Sagaing is located
in the Central Dry Zone. Monsoon paddy is usually rain-fed in Ayeyarwaddy
and Bago while it is grown under irrigation in Sagaing (Agricultural Extension
Division, 2013; Department of Agricultural Planning, 2012). Ayeyarwaddy,
Bago and Sagaing respectively account for 27 per cent, 17 per cent and 10
per cent of the Myanmar’s total cultivated land, and 26 per cent, 17 per cent
and 12 per cent of total rice production (Agricultural Extension Division, 2013).
During the British Colonial Government period (1885-1948), rice was only
cultivated in the monsoon season. However, farmers in Upper Myanmar culti-
vated pulses and beans, followed by rice, when irrigated water was available
in the summer season (Win, 1991). In order to increase rice production, the
Department of Agriculture was established in 1906. An expansion of the land
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under rice cultivation increased production dramatically. Myanmar became the
world’s largest rice exporter and rice became the most important crop in the
development of the country’s economy (Oo and Kudo, 2003).
After independence in 1948, the parliamentary government (1948-1961)
implemented the Agricultural and Rural Development Five-Year Plan. Under
this plan, the government introduced advanced technology, promoted intensive
cropping, and land reclamation and distribution. The government supported
fertilizer, mechanization and irrigation facilities. However, investment in the
agriculture sector accounted for only 9 per cent of total expenditure between
1952-1953 and 1959-1960 (Thein, 2004). Although rice production had been
gradually increasing since the early 1940s, the growth of rice production was
relatively small until 1957 (Win, 1991). Under the Revolutionary Council
Government (1962-1973), the average growth rate of rice production was 1 per
cent, lower than the population growth rate of 2.2 per cent. This showed a
need to increase rice productivity to ensure food sufficiency. With the objective
of rice self-sufficiency, the government implemented high yield variety (HYV)
seeds with fertilizer, and new technology in 1966 and 1967 (Oo and Kudo, 2003).
The socialist government (1974-1988) introduced the Whole Township Paddy
Production Program (WTPPP) in two townships to promote increased rice
yield in 1977-1978. The program was extended to another 82 townships (of a
total of 314 townships) in 1985-1986. Under this framework, the government
mainly provided chemical fertilizer at a subsidized price to rice farmers in the
programme areas. The total sown acreage of these townships accounted for 52
per cent of the country’s total sown acreage of rice. Total rice production over
this period was more than 10 million tons (Win, 1991). Myanmar enjoyed the
surplus of rice with a 6.35 per cent average growth rate of rice compared to a
2 per cent population growth rate during this period (1974 to 1985) (Thein,
2004). In 1992-1993, the government introduced the Summer Paddy Program
(SPP) through the subsidies of chemical fertilizer and diesel fuel for pump
irrigation. Due to the SPP program, the sown areas of rice in Myanmar rose
from 5.13 million hectare in 1992-1993 to 6.45 million hectare in 2001-2002 (Oo
and Kudo, 2003).
In 1999-2000, rice production was 19.8 million tons, a remarkable yearly
growth rate of 16.5 per cent (Thein, 2004), 80 per cent of which was monsoon
paddy and 20 per cent summer paddy (Oo and Kudo, 2003). In 2013-2014, the
cultivable land area for rice increased to 7.28 million hectare (Agricultural Exten-
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sion Division, 2013). The expansion of land, the provision of irrigation facilities
and the introduction of the SPP were the main factors explaining this increase.
Although there has been a significant increase in the amount of rice produced
in Myanmar, the average yield per acre has not changed significantly since 1995.
Moreover, the growth rate of yield per acre has been slower than the ex-
pansion rate of the harvested area. This is known as ‘horizontal expansion’ in
a dynamic rice sector, when a country increases significantly its total output
by expanding available land for cultivation (Aung, 2011). The average yield
per acre was approximately 2.8 ton per hectare for monsoon and 3 ton per
hectare for summer paddy, with an annual growth rate of rice production of
approximately 1 per cent since 1989 (Myanmar Development Resource Institute
and Michigan State University, 2013). The slower growth in rice production
compared to that of the area under rice cultivation can partly be explained
by a decrease in the application rate of fertilizer. The average amount of
fertilizer (including nitrogen, phosphates and potassium (NPK)) used was 5 kg
per hectare in 2009 at the national level (Department of Agricultural Planning,
2013b). The average use of fertilizer was 75 kg per hectare in 1985-1986, but
the amount has ranged between 30 to 60 kg since the 1990s (Okamoto, 2008).
The average use of fertilizer was lower in Myanmar than it was in other Asian
countries (FAO, 2009).
2.2.2 Agricultural policies and reforms
Agriculture policy (1962-1988)
Prior to 1963, the government practised the state procurement system, and
allowed farmers to make their own decisions regarding crop choice, cropping
patterns and sales of their produce (Thein, 2004). However, the socialist
government (1974-1988) had a monopoly over agricultural trade: the private
sector was not allowed to trade agricultural products either domestically or
internationally. The objective of this policy was to ensure the sufficient supply
of food to meet food security at the low prices of agricultural products. To fulfil
this objective, the government introduced state control and intervention for all
food production activities. The government launched sales of a fixed quota of
food grains and a compulsory paddy procurement. Under this policy, farmers
had to sell a fixed quota of food grains (including rice) to the government,
and were prohibited from selling their produce directly to customers. The
delivery quota for each farmer was 30-40 baskets of paddy per acre (1.5-2.1
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tons per hectare) at low official prices (Okamoto, 2005). The government also
monopolized rice exports, the country’s main source of foreign currency.
During this period, the Revolutionary Council Government of Myanmar also
introduced a ‘Land Nationalization’ policy (Thein, 2004). Under this policy, the
government nationalised all private farm holdings, and the land holding rights
of farmers were reduced to land tilling rights that needed annual registration
and renewal. Farmers were strictly prohibited from transferring their land
tilling rights, including through the division, sale, lease or mortgage of their
land. The maximum amount of paddy land per farm household was set at 50
acres. Under this framework, large amounts of agricultural land that exceeded
the maximum limit of 50 acres were taken and redistributed to tenant farm
households followed by smaller land holders and landless labours (Okamoto,
2008). A ‘Pillar Crops’ policy introduced a system that classified cultivated
land as ‘planned crops areas’ (in which farmers had to grow planned crops
for supporting the compulsory delivery system) and ‘non-planned crops areas’.
Land tilling rights were tightly connected with the both compulsory delivery
system and the planned cropping system. Farmers that did not fulfil the re-
quirements of either system, could lose their land tilling rights (Soe et al., 2004).
As a result of these systems, farmers lacked motivation and incentives to
invest in both land improvement and productivity. Although the government
provided fertilizer subsidies, there was no significant improvement in production
from 1962 to 1973. The first reason for this was that the government could
provide only 20 per cent of the required amount of fertilizer, leading farmers to
purchase the remaining amount of fertilizer at prevailing market prices. This
pushed up production costs and decreased farmers’ incomes. Another reason for
no improvement in rice production was that there was no motivation for farmers
to increase their production levels because the quota amount that they had to
sell to the government would also rise (Soe et al., 2004). Consequently, there
was a gradual decrease in productivity that resulted in the slow development
of the rural economy.
In September 1987, the government implemented the first agricultural re-
form and introduced advanced technology to develop the agriculture sector.
The government also lowered the delivery quota for paddy to 10-12 baskets
per acre (0.5-0.6 tons per hectare) compared to that of 30-40 baskets per acre
under the socialist period (Fujita et al., 2009). In the 1990s, the delivery quota
of paddy usually accounted for 10 to 12 per cent of the produce. In September
2.2 Background to Myanmar’s agriculture 17
1988, the military government, the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC), lifted restrictions on the private export of some agricultural crops
such as black gram, green gram, maize and pigeon pea. However, rice remained
under state control through the Association of Myanmar Agricultural Produce
Trading (MAPT). In addition, subsidies on fertilizers, seeds and pesticides were
gradually transferred from the Myanmar Agriculture Service (MAS) to the
private sector. On the positive side, farmers could freely decide the types of
crops to plant and sell their produce in any market without restriction.
Agriculture policy (1988 to present)
In 1992-1993, the government initiated the summer paddy production program
(SPP) with the expansion of land and irrigation facilities to further promote the
production of rice. The area under rice cultivation expanded from 12.114 million
acres in 1985-86 to 15.528 million acres in 1999-2000. To support the SPP, the
Irrigation Department constructed 108 irrigation projects including dam and
reservoir projects between 1988 and 1999 (Thein, 2004). The government also
provided subsidised inputs, especially diesel fuel and fertilizers, and agricultural
extension services in the planned areas.
Moreover, other crops, including pulses, sugar-cane and cotton, were also
identified as ‘pillar crops’ to develop the agriculture sector. Rice and the other
main pillar crops accounted for 64 per cent of total sown acreage in 1999-2000
(Thein, 2004). Rice production significantly increased from 14.09 million tons
in 1985-1986 to 19.81 million tons in 1999-2000. Similarly, the production
of pulses dramatically increased from 0.61 million tons in 1985-1986 to 1.88
million tons in 1999-2000 (Thein, 2004).
In 2003, the government launched a new policy, the so-called ‘second agri-
cultural reform’, which abolished the restrictions of the old procurement system
and liberalised both domestic and export markets for agricultural produce.
Farmers could freely cultivate crops and sell their produce in markets. As a
result of the 1987 and 2003 reforms, and the SPP, rice production increased
remarkably from 13.83 million tons in 1989-1990 to 32.58 million tons in 2010-
2011 (Department of Agricultural Planning, 2012). Similarly, there was a
significant increase in pulse and bean production, accounting for 4.27 million
tons in 2006-2007 compared to 0.37 million tons in 1988-1989 (Zaw et al., 2011).
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The government has also implemented other programs to boost rice produc-
tion including the provision of extension services and agricultural loans, and the
expansion of irrigation. The Department of Agriculture (DOA) has provided
extension services since 1927 including educational activities, distribution of
seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. The Central Agriculture Research Institute
(CARI) and Myanmar Agriculture Services (MAS) have taken responsibility
for research and extension activities. The Irrigation Department, Ministry of
Agriculture and Irrigation (MOAI) constructs dams and reservoirs throughout
the country. In 2014, the Irrigation Department completed the projects of 240
dams, 327 river pumping stations and 12,258 groundwater projects (Department
of Agricultural Planning, 2014b).
Since 1953, the Myanmar Agricultural Development Bank (MADB) under
the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MOAI) has been the main financial
institution providing loans to farmers at subsidised interest rates. The MADB
provides banking services across the country to develop the agriculture sector,
including livestock and fishery, and rural socio-economic enterprise across the
country. The MADB mainly provides seasonal loans for crop production, term
loans and loans for area development. In 2012-2013, the bank lent nearly 570
billion Kyat to improve rice production (Win, 2013). Farmers can borrow
up to 100,000 Kyat (100 USD) per acre, up to a maximum of 10 acres from
the MADB at an interest rate of 8.5 per cent per annum (around 0.71 per
cent per month). However, the scheme excludes landless farmers who do not
have the requisite land use certificates needed to be eligible for the MADB
agricultural loans. Between 25 to 50 per cent of rural farmers are unable to
access credit due to the lack of land use right certificates (Haggblade et al., 2014).
Further, despite the subsidy, the MADB’s loans are insufficient to cover rice
production costs, which are estimated to be around 200,000 Kyat (200 USD)
per acre (De Luna-Martinez and Anantavrasilpa, 2014). In this case, farmers
make up the difference from other sources, such as friends, relatives, landlords,
neighbours, money lenders, pawnshops, traders and suppliers of agricultural
inputs and loan sharks. Among the informal sources, borrowing from family
and friends are the most common sources of loans. According to the Household
Living Condition Survey reported by Dapice et al. (2011), the percentage of
farm households in debt was 30 per cent in 2010. LIFT (2012) found that 42
per cent of their sample households borrowed money from family and friends,
and 31 per cent took loans from money lenders. However, the interest rate
charged in informal markets is relatively high at 5 per cent to 20 per cent
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per month, which increases the cost of loans on farmers (LIFT, 2012). Their
findings showed the highest interest rate in one village of Ayeyarwaddy that
charged by money lenders was 8 per cent per month. Consequently, many
farmers cannot afford agricultural inputs such as seeds, chemical fertilizer, and
labour, which contributes to low agriculture sector productivity (FAO, 2016).
Food Security Working Group (2015) also showed that a lack of access to credit
is the major constraint to buy the necessary inputs (fertilizers and pesticides)
at high prices, and hire labours at high wages due to shortage of household
labours in their study in Ayeyarwaddy Delta, Dry zone and Hilly areas. In
this study, 32 per cent of households also borrowed money from relatives at
an interest rate of around 5 per cent, 6 per cent and 8 per cent per month
in Sagaing, Bago and Ayeyarwaddy. Limited credit, therefore, is one of the
challenges facing Myanmar’s rice production.
2.3 Literature review
Rice plays an important role in the food systems and economies of many devel-
oping countries. Over 50 per cent of the world’s population depends on rice
for its staple food and their livelihood (Department of Agricultural Planning,
2013b). Although rice production has been increasing since the 1960s, the
growth rates of rice production have been slower than the world’s population
growth rates since the 1990s (Duwayri et al., 2000). To ensure the food security
of their population, governments in many countries are trying to raise rice
production to help ensure national food security. However, the efficiency of rice
production depends on many factors, including the education level of farmers,
soil quality, irrigation systems, farm sizes, agricultural extension services and
access to credit (Than, 2011). On the other hand, the technical efficiency of a
farm, especially small farm, is affected by other various factors including ‘demo-
graphic characteristics, farm’s characteristics, socioeconomics, environmental
factors and non-physical factors’ (Rahman et al., 2009, p.90).
In an attempt to examine which factors determine the efficiency in rice
production, a number of studies have used a stochastic frontier production
combined with the technical inefficiency model to investigate the determinants
of efficiency in rice production. In this approach, efficient farms can produce
the maximum level of outputs with given technology and inputs at a given
period of time. Those farms are able to operate on the production frontier
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function compared to those who inefficiently operate below the production
frontier function. By applying this approach, a number of studies have analysed
several factors affecting the efficiency of rice production in different countries.
Some studies have shown the importance of the educational level of household
head, access to agricultural extension services, farming experience and land
fragmentation in rice production. At the same time, others have paid attention
to access to credit, the availability of loans, and infrastructure including the
development of roads and irrigation systems, and their effects on productivity.
For example, Kompas et al. (2012) showed that farms with more educated
farmers, effective extension services and better irrigation systems could improve
Vietnamese rice production. Idiong (2007) and Rahman et al. (2012) found that
the educational level of household head had a positive impact on rice production
efficiency in Cross River State in Nigeria and Bangladesh respectively.
Although work has been focused on these factors in many studies, there
has been limited research on rice productivity and efficiency in Myanmar.
Aung (2011), and Myint and Kyi (2005) found a positive relationship between
educational level of household head and a farm’s efficiency in the selected areas
in Myanmar. They also demonstrated the influence of extension services on
Myanmar’s rice production including the provision of educational activities; the
collection of information on problems such as pests, diseases, soils management,
and the use of fertilizers; and finding the solutions to those problems. These
findings were consistent with those of Kompas et al. (2012) and Thangata
and Mequaninte (2011) who found that extension services significantly im-
proved farm household efficiency in producing rice in Vietnam and Ethiopia.
In contrast, Kyi and von Oppen (1999) argued that farming experience and the
educational level of household head had no impact on a farm’s rice production
efficiency in Myanmar, especially in the Delta Region.
Increased amounts of credit enables farmers to purchase more production
inputs including seeds and chemical fertilizers. In general, the credit market
consists of formal markets and informal markets. Informal credit markets play
an essential role in reducing financial problems for individual, small business
and farmers, especially in many developing countries, although the interest
rates of loans in informal markets are higher than that of in formal markets
(Tang, 1995). Akinbode (2013) demonstrated a positive effect of the availability
of credit from formal markets, for example, microfinance banks and cooperative
societies, on rice production in Nigeria. Adebayo and Adeola (2008) also found
that the availability of credit could raise rural living standards in Nigeria by
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increasing productivity. Duong and Izumida (2002) had similar findings on
the impact of credit markets in Vietnam. However, there has not been any
empirical research on the availability of credit for rice production in Myanmar.
This paper helps to fill the deficiency by explaining the relationship between
credit availability and rice productivity in the selected regions in Myanmar.
Similarly, there has been no literature that examines the influence of infras-
tructure on rice production, and the importance of its role in the development
of the rural economy in Myanmar. In general, good infrastructure contributes
to economic growth, poverty alleviation and environmental sustainability (Staff,
1994). Better transportation plays an important role in rural development,
as productivity and employment rely heavily on the provision of transport
infrastructure (Staff, 1994).
DeSilva (2011), Omondi and Shikuku (2013) and Sibiko et al. (2013) demon-
strated that distance to market had been an important determinant of pro-
ductivity efficiency in the Philippines, Kenya and Uganda respectively. They
suggested that improvement in rural infrastructure could improve the efficiency
of rice productivity. However, Schneider and Gugerty (2011), and Velarde et al.
(2013) argued that there was no significant effect of distance to market on
agricultural productivity in Bangladesh and the Philippines.
2.4 Data source and variables
In this study, primary field survey data collected in the most rice growing
regions, specifically, Ayeyarwaddy, Bago and Sagaing in 2014 is used for the
estimation of stochastic frontier production. The number of farm households in
this study totalled 634 farms across 30 villages in 6 townships. The sampling
framework is described in Appendix A.
In order to capture the farm-specific factors that have an impact on rice
production efficiency, variables such as total value of rice, land, capital, labour,
total costs of inputs including fertilizers, pesticides, and total cost of a variety
of seeds are analysed in this essay. In general, a higher price of seed may be
expected for good quality seed that produces high yield. However, the varieties
of seed and suitable areas of plantation should also be taken into account in
the efficiency of rice production. The varieties of seed can be mainly classified
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as hybrid variety, high yielding variety (HYV), high quality variety and local
variety (Agricultural Extension Division, 2013). High quality of paddy, namely,
Paw San, which was awarded the World’s Best Rice Premium at the World Rice
Conference in 2011 (Myint and Napasintuwong, 2016), and other high quality
rice paddy are planted only once in a year, especially in the Ayeyarwaddy and
Sagaing regions. Additionally, the price of high-quality seed is nearly double the
price of high yield varieties (HYVs) (Myanmar Development Resource Institute
and Michigan State University, 2013).
However, the average yield per acre of high quality seed is relatively low
in comparison with the average yield per acre of HYV and hybrid varieties,
accounting for 2.7 MT per hectare, 3.7 MT per hectare and 4.5 MT per hectare
respectively (Department of Agricultural Planning, 2013b). Approximately 50
per cent of farm households in the selected areas use the high-quality seed. To
take into account the heterogeneity in rice varieties, the value of rice is used in
this analysis. All inputs in the production function are also used in terms of
their value. The cultivated land size is measured in acre.
The factors that determine rice production efficiency are investigated in
terms of average years in school of household members who are engaged in
agricultural activities, farm size and number of plots, irrigation systems and
agricultural extension services in this study. The availability of credit includes
credit from formal and informal credit institutions. In this study, formal credit
institutions consist of the MADB and NGOs, while informal credit sources
include relatives, friends and pawnshops. Finally, the distance from village to
market nearby a township is also analysed for its impact on rice production.
2.5 Methodology
2.5.1 Stochastic Frontier Production Model and Tech-
nical Inefficiency Model
In an attempt to analyse the productivity and efficiency gains in rice production
in Myanmar, the stochastic frontier model is applied to determine the factors
affecting production efficiency. Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den
Broeck (1977) first developed the stochastic production frontier approach to
apply cross-sectional data. In this model, the deviation of actual observations
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from potential output is divided into two components. The first component in-
vestigates the set of determinants that prevented economic units from reaching
their maximum potential output given the data set of inputs, and the second
component represents the stochastic error. This model was further extended to
apply to panel data, following Battese and Coelli (1995). The model for the
cross-sectional data for the ith firm can be expressed as
Yi = f(Xi, β)e(νi−µi) (2.1)
where Yi is total value of rice of the ith firm, Xi is a (1xK) vector of explanatory
variables determining the level of output, β is a (Kx1) vector of parameters
to be estimated, and νi is the random error following the normal distribution
N(0,σ2). The error term µi is a one-sided non-negative disturbance term that
captures the technical inefficiency in production, identified by
µi = Ziδ + ωi (2.2)
where zi is a (1 x M) vector of the inefficiency explanatory variable, δ is a
(M x 1) vector of coefficients to be estimated, and ωi is a random variable to
ensure non-negative truncations (at zero) of the distribution N(Zi,σ2µ).
Battese and Corra (1977), and Battese and Coelli (1993) defined the vari-
ance terms as σ2 = σ2µ + σ2ν and γ = σ
2
µ
(σ2µ+σ2ν) .
The technical efficiency for the ith firm is defined as
TEi =
E(Yi/µi, Xi)
E(Yi/µi = 0, Xi)
= e−µi = e(−ziδ−ωi) (2.3)
Equations (2.1) and (2.2) are estimated by using Frontier 4.1 with details of
the estimations described by Coelli (1996). The value of technical efficiency
(TEi) must be between zero and one. If γ = 0 where there are no deviations
from the potential frontier due to inefficiency and γ = 1 then there are no
deviations from the stochastic disturbance. Therefore, overall mean technical
efficiency becomes
TE = {1− φ[σµ − (µ/σµ)]1− φ(µ/σµ) }e
µ+( 12 )σ
2
µ (2.4)
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where φ(.) represents the density function of a standard normal variable.
In order to test the influence of inefficiency effects, the generalized likeli-
hood ratio test is used to determine the specification of equations (2.1) and
(2.2) that are given by the test statistic
LR = −2{ln[L(H0)]− ln[L(H1)]} (2.5)
where L(H0) and L(H1) are the values of likelihood function under the null
hypothesis (H0) and alternative hypothesis (H1). The critical values for test
statistics are drawn from a mixed χ2 distribution as reported by Kodde and
Palm (1986). If the scalar parameter γ and all the δ parameters are equal to
zero (γ=0 and δi=0 for all i) then this suggests that there is no impact on the
inefficiency effects. In this regard, the ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression
can be used efficiently to estimate the model. On the other hand, if all the δ
parameters are equal to zero (δi=0 for all i>0), then the ordinary least-squares
(OLS) regression is not appropriate and a stochastic frontier can be applied in
this study.
Mutter et al. (2013) argued that there might be the endogenous explanatory
variables in the frontier or inefficiency functions of the stochastic frontier model.
The endogeneity would occur if the determinants of frontier or inefficiency are
correlated to error term. In this case, stochastic frontier model estimations do
not handle the endogeneity in the model. In order to control the endogeneity
in the frontier, or inefficiency or both functions, they provided a maximum-
likelihood-based approach. Furthermore, Karakaplan et al. (2017) has recently
developed the ‘sfkk’ command for fitting endogeneous stochastic frontier models.
2.5.2 Econometric model specification
The variables considered in the production model are total cultivated land
areas, total value of capital owned and rented, labour cost, seed cost, and
expenditure on fertilizers and pesticides. The owned capital includes both draft
animals and tractors that households use in their rice cultivation. The local
price of hiring capital in each village is used for the calculation of owned capital.
The cost of owed capital is calculated multiplying a number of working days by
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the local daily rate of hiring draft animals and/or tractors. The rented capital
is the total cost of hiring oxen, buffaloes, tractors and harvesters, as well as the
cost of hiring other equipment, such as water pumps and thresher machines for
land preparation and harvesting, and measured in thousand Kyat.
The variable for labour comes from both family labours and hired labours.
The total labour cost is the sum of labour cost (’000 Kyat) for family members
and that for hired labours from other households for land preparation, sowing,
planting and harvesting. The local daily wage rate for casual workers in each
village is used to compute the family labour cost. The number of working days
for family labour is multiplied by local daily wage rate of casual worker in each
village. Expenditure on agricultural inputs (’000 Kyat) is the sum of the costs
of fertilizers and pesticides. The variable for seed is the total cost of different
variety of seeds used by a household, measured in thousand Kyat. The dummy
variable for region is identified as 1 if farm households are located in the Delta
Region; otherwise it is 0.
Therefore, the stochastic production function is
lnYi = β0 + β1lnLANDi + β2lnKi + β3lnLABi + β4lnINPUTSi
+β5lnSEEDi + β6REGIONi + νi − µi
(2.6)
where Y is the total rice value measured in thousand Kyat, LAND is the total
cultivated area measured in acres for the annual crop production, K is the total
cost of both owned and rented oxen, buffaloes, tractors and harvesters, LAB is
the sum of labour costs for both family members and hired labours, INPUTS
is the total expenditure for all material inputs, SEED is the total value of seed,
and REGION is the dummy variable for farm households in the Delta Region.
The technical inefficiency model for the stochastic frontier production
function is
µi = δ0 + δ1Y EARi + δ2SIZEi + δ3PLOTSi + δ4CREDITi+
δ5IRRIi + δ6AESi + δ7ln(DISTi) + ωi
(2.7)
Other variables, such as average years in school of household farm workers,
the presence of irrigation systems, farm size and number of plots, agricultural
extension services, the availability of credit and distance to market are included
in the inefficiency model. YEAR is an average schooling years of household
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members who are engaged in farming activities, Land (LAND) is the total
cultivated land area (both owned and rented), land size (SIZE) is household’s
total landholding area (both owned and rented), and PLOTS describes the
number of plots for each farm.
Irrigation (IRRI) is the availability of water from natural and irrigated
water including creek, rivers, dams and reservoirs, and private channels defined
as dummy variable (1=good/very good 0=otherwise). Agricultural extension
services (AES) is defined as a binary variable if a farm household receives
services from different institutions for farming activities (=1) or otherwise (=0).
CREDIT is the total credit (’000 Kyat) that farms can borrow from formal
and informal financial institutions. Access to market (DIST) is defined as the
distance from each village to markets nearby a township measured in kilometres.
Additionally, the variable of credit in the inefficiency model is concerned
as endogenous variable. The source of endogeneity for credit comes from the
selection bias and the government’s targeting scheme. Although the government
provides more credit to small farmers, those farmers may not be as efficient
and may use credit for consumption instead of enhancing production efficiency.
To handle the endogeneity, the instrumental variable (IV) is needed to use in
the ‘sfkk’ command that developed by Karakaplan et al. (2017). In this study,
the IV takes the value of 1 if a farm household has a maximum of 10 acres of
land and IV is 0 if it is otherwise.
2.6 Results from the data
2.6.1 An analysis of the main specification
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for paddy production in the farm
household survey data. Due to the double-rice cropping pattern, especially
in the Delta Region, an average cultivated land size for each household is
13.71 acres. The average value of rice is seen as around 3,300 (’000 Kyat) for
household. Total cost for working capital is nearly 415,000 Kyat on average,
while total labour cost is around 900,000 Kyat. The expenditure on inputs
including chemical fertilizer and pesticide accounts for 256,000 Kyat. The
average cost of seed for each farm household is 205,500 Kyat on average. About
67 percent of total 634 farm households is located in the Delta Region, and 33
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per cent of households is located in the Central Dry Zone.
Table 2.1 Summary statistics for paddy production in the farm household
survey data
Variable Units Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Paddy Value(Y) 000 Kyat 3299.41 3638.79 250 24750
Land (LAND) acre 13.71 12.96 1 84
Capital (K) 000 Kyat 414.64 449.89 0 3840
Labour (L) 000 Kyat 894.86 926.44 16 6492.50
Inputs (INPUTS) 000 Kyat 256.71 427.83 0 3680
Seed (SEED) 00 Kyat 2055.52 2138.03 17.50 22400
Delta Region (REGION) yes=1 0.67 0.47 0 1
Schooling years (YEAR) years 6.51 2.42 0 15
Landholding size (Size) acre 11.64 11.31 1.37 70
Number of plots (PLOTS) number 1.72 1.17 1 10
Irrigation (good/very good) yes=1 0.82 0.38 0 1
(IRRI)
Agricultural extension yes=1 0.58 0.49 0 1
services (AES)
Amount of credit (CREDIT) 000 Kyat 1363.35 1287.71 0 9000
Distance to market (DIST) km 17.02 19.65 1.61 96.56
Number of farm households (N) 634
The average years of studying in school is approximately seven years showing
that household members who work in farming activities have attained at most
secondary school education. An average landholding size for each household in
the selected regions is 11.64 acres with holdings of 2 plots on average. Around
82 per cent of households are found to be satisfied with the availability of irri-
gated water. More than half of farm households receive agricultural extension
services. The availability of credit received by each farm household from both
the formal and informal sectors accounts for 1,363 (’000 Kyat). The average
distance from a village to a market nearby a township is nearly 17 km.
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Table 2.2 Generalized Log-Likelihood Ratio Test for the Stochastic Production
Frontier and Technical Inefficiency Models
Null Hypothesis Likelihood χ20.99 Decision
Ratio Statistic
1. γ = δ0 = δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = δ4 = δ5 221.50 20.97 RejectH0
= δ6 = δ7 = 0
2. γ = 0 68.84 5.41 RejectH0
3. δ0 = δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = δ4 = δ5 = δ6 97.61 17.76 RejectH0
= δ7 = 0
4. δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = δ4 = δ5 = δ6 88.99 22.53 RejectH0
= δ7 = 0
Table 2.2 reports the likelihood ratio (LR) tests. The likelihood ratio (LR)
test in this study is analysed for the specification of the technical inefficiency.
This likelihood ratio (LR) test has the distribution of mixed chi-square (χ2)
with restrictions. The critical values of the distribution are obtained from
Kodde and Palm (1986). In Table 2.2, the value of the log likelihood test is
calculated from the values of likelihood function under the null hypothesis
L(H0) and the alternative hypothesis L(H1) in Equation (2.5).
Firstly, the null hypothesis L(H0) implies that there is no effect of technical
inefficiency in rice production if the values of γ and δi are equal to zero ( γ=0
and δi=0 for all i). Secondly, the null hypothesis L(H0) for the value of γ is
equal to zero (γ=0 ) implying that there is no stochastic inefficiency effect.
Thirdly, the null hypothesis for δi=0 (for all i) indicates that all explanatory
variables in technical inefficiency model may not significantly contribute to any
explanation for the effects of inefficiency. Finally, if the value of δi is equal to 0
( δi=0 for all i>0), the null hypothesis L(H0) will suggest that there has been
no influence of farm-specific factors on technical inefficiency in Equation (2.4).
If the first null hypothesis is accepted, all variables in the technical ineffi-
ciency model should be included in Equation (2.3). However, the null hypothesis
(γ = δ0 = δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = δ4 = δ5 = δ6 = δ7 = 0) is rejected at the 1 per cent
significance level, as the value of likelihood is greater than the value of the
chi-square (χ2). The result, therefore, strongly suggests that there has been
no absence of inefficiency in this model. The second null hypothesis (γ = 0) is
also rejected. This result supports the hypothesis that technical inefficiency
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significantly affects rice production.
As shown in Table 2.2, all variables in the technical inefficiency model can
explain the inefficiency effects due to the rejection of the third null hypothesis.
Finally, the null hypothesis for all δi=0 (i>0) is also rejected. This finding
clearly states that there has been a significant influence of farm-specific factors
on rice production, specifically in the selected regions of Myanmar. Therefore,
all results indicate that stochastic effects and technical inefficiency are impor-
tant factors in explaining the production efficiency function and, therefore, that
conventional OLS estimates are not appropriate in this model.
The results for the stochastic frontier production model and the technical
inefficiency model are shown in Table 2.3 by controlling endogeneous variable
of credit with the IV variable. The coefficient for the cultivated land in the
stochastic production frontier model is 0.64. The coefficient of land is relatively
high compared to the coefficients of capital and labour. This is because most
people living in Myanmar’s rural areas rely heavily on agricultural land for
their livelihood, suggesting that land is a key factor in increasing rice production.
The coefficient of capital is relatively small and statistically insignificant.
One of the important factors for expenditure on inputs is the depreciation of
asset owned by households that should be taken into account in the analysis.
Unfortunately, this variable could not be included in this study due to the lack
of precise information for rural Myanmar. However, it may not cause a signifi-
cant concern for the context of Myanmar when the data was collected for two
reasons. First, the expenditure on capital is relatively small compared with the
total cost. Second, this study uses the cross-sectional data, therefore, it would
slightly underestimate the capital cost for all households in the sample. In
this case, the coefficient estimate of capital cost might be slightly over-estimated.
The coefficient of labour is 0.14 in the production function. The positive
and significant coefficient of labour suggests that there is a positive relationship
between labour and rice production. A 1 per cent increase in spending on labour
can significantly increase rice value by 0.14 per cent. Taking the results of
capital and labour together, it is clearly seen that rice production in Myanmar
is still labour intensive.
A number of empirical studies, for example, those conducted by Kompas
et al. (2012) and Rahman et al. (2012), demonstrated a positive relationship be-
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tween rice production and expenditure on fertilizer in Vietnam and Bangladesh
respectively. Consistent with their findings, the result of inputs (fertilizers and
pesticides) on rice production confirms a positive and significant effect on rice
production. The FAO (2009) has reported that the use of fertilizer in Myanmar
for rice production is relatively low at an average of 12 kg per hectare (5 kg
per acre) at the national level. However, recent studies by Lwin et al. (2014),
and Food Security Working Group (2015) have found in their studies that the
average use of fertilizer is 220 kg per hectare on average, approximately 125 kg
per hectare (52 kg per acre) for monsoon paddy and 290 kg per hectare (119
kg per acre) for summer paddy.
The average use of fertilizer in this study is 140 kg per hectare (57 kg
per acre) for monsoon paddy and 178 kg per hectare (72 kg per acre) for
summer paddy. Although the average use of fertilizer in these three regions
is approximately 141 kg per hectare (57 kg per acre), the amount of fertilizer
varies among the regions. In particular, the application rate of fertilizer is
173, 56 and 197 kg per hectare (69, 23 and 80 kg per acre) in Ayeyarwaddy,
Bago and Sagaing respectively. The amount of fertilizer used in Sagaing is
relatively larger than that of other regions. Based on this application rate,
expenditure on fertilizer is approximately 20,000 Kyat (USD 20) per acre. In
this case, most farmers spend 20 per cent of their credit from the MADB
for the purchase of fertilizer, as the credit provided by the MADB is 100,000
Kyat (USD 100) per acre. The result of fertilizer and pesticide on rice produc-
tion suggests the effective application of fertilizer in Myanmar’s selected regions.
The coefficient of expenditure on seed shows a positive effect on production.
Farm households usually use seed around 42 kg per acre although the use
of seed varies across regions. Among 634 farm households, 60 per cent of
households used less than 42 kg per acre. The coefficient of seed indicates
that those households who use lower than 42 kg can raise their rice value by
approximately 0.2 per cent if they increase the expenditure on seed by 1 per cent.
The dummy variable for region shows the benefits of growing rice in the Dry
Zone compared to the Delta Region. As explained in Section 2.4, Ayeyarwaddy
in the Delta Region and Sagaing in the Dry Zone are famous for Paw San rice.
However, farm households in Sagaing are found to receive higher rice value
than that of farm households in the Delta Region.
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Table 2.3 Endogeneous Stochastic Production Frontier and Technical Inefficiency
Model I
Variables coefficient standard
error
t-ratio
Stochastic Production Frontier
Constant 4.254∗∗∗ 0.218 19.54
Land (LAND) 0.642∗∗∗ 0.050 12.84
Capital (K) -0.001 0.003 -0.38
Labour (LAB) 0.139∗∗∗ 0.031 4.43
Inputs (INPUTS) 0.006∗∗ 0.003 2.35
Seed (SEED) 0.229∗∗∗ 0.031 7.50
Region (REGION) -0.220∗∗∗ 0.044 -4.99
Technical Inefficiency Model
Constant 0.283 0.387 0.73
School year (YEAR) -0.044∗ 0.025 -1.73
Land size (SIZE) 0.030∗∗∗ 0.010 -3.03
Plots (PLOTS) 0.022 0.061 0.36
Irrigation (IRRI) -1.146∗∗∗ 0.179 -6.40
Agricultural Extension Services (AES) -0.325∗∗ 0.140 -2.32
Credit (CREDIT) 0.005 0.025 0.19
Distance to market (DIST) 0.119 0.074 1.61
Log–Likelihood -1933.76
Mean technical efficiency (%) 0.67
Number of observations 634
Note: *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively.
Given the importance of better education in raising production efficiency,
the coefficient of education should be associated with production inefficiency. In
the previous studies, Sriboonchitta and Wiboonpongse (2000) found a negative
relationship between education and efficiency in rice production in the case
of Thailand. Contrary to him, Aung (2012) and Kompas et al. (2012) have
explained that better-educated farmers have a positive impact on production
efficiency. The result of this study is consistent with the findings of these two
authors (Aung, 2012; Kompas et al., 2012); this study also finds the strong
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indication that the average years in school of household farm workers has a
positive effect on productivity. The coefficient of schooling years indicates that
household workers who are engaged in farming activities with better education
increase production efficiency.
The negative coefficient of farm size shows that larger land size can signifi-
cantly decrease the inefficiency of farm’s productivity. This result is consistent
with Kompas et al. (2012) who found a negative relationship between landhold-
ing size and production inefficiency. The result confirms that farm households
with large farm size are likely to increase the efficiency of rice production.
Wan and Cheng (2001) argue that farms with a large number of plots have
a negative and significant effect on productivity. Unexpectedly, the coefficient
of plots show a positive relationship with production inefficiency, but the result
is not statistically significant. The average number of plots for each land size is
approximately 2 plots, while a maximum number of plots for holding land is
10 plots. In this study, the number of plots has little influence on rice value.
Consistent with the previous study (Kompas et al., 2012), the coefficient of
irrigation illustrates the positive impact of irrigation systems on efficiency in
rice production. This means that better irrigation system plays an important
role in reducing technical inefficiency. The coefficient value of AES is relatively
large and significant, showing that provision of effective services helps improve
rice productivity. This finding agrees with that of Myint and Kyi (2005), who
found a positive effect of AES on rice production. However, only 35 per cent of
total farm households were found to receive the extension services from Myan-
mar Agriculture Services (MAS) in this survey. This result clearly suggests
that the MAS should provide training and education through Farmers Field
Schools (FFS). The MAS should also prioritise the distribution of quality seed,
fertilizer and farm equipment, and training in production technology (Cho,
2013).
Generally, farms will grow rice efficiently if they receive more credit (Kompas
et al., 2012). In this regard, an analysis of credit shows little impact on rice
production as the coefficient of credit is not significant. One of the reasons
for that is limitation on the availability of loans provided by the Myanmar
Agricultural Development Bank (MADB). As previously described, farmers
can receive loans from the MADB up to a maximum of 10 acres (nearly 4.04
hectare). This implies that farm households holding more than 10 acres have
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insufficient credit as they cannot apply loans from the bank on the basis of
their land size. This credit system, therefore, fundamentally benefits those
farmers with a relatively smaller farm size rather than those with larger farm
size.
In general, there is a negative impact of longer distance to market on rice
production. DeSilva (2011) found a negative relationship between distance to
market and production efficiency in the Philippines. Good road access and
closer proximity to the market reduces the farm household’s travelling time
and cost of transportation, and allows them to buy inputs easily and sell their
produce at better prices (Sibiko et al., 2013). The coefficient of distance is
positively correlated with rice production, but, the result is not significant.
There is little impact of the distance from a village to the nearest market on
rice value in the selected region.
Table 2.4 shows the summary of the technical efficiency score of the selected
farm households. The estimated mean efficiency score lies between 0.05 and
0.95. The results shows that approximately 30 per cent of farm households
operates below the mean efficiency score, while nearly 55 per cent of house-
holds operates above the mean efficiency of 0.67. Overall, the mean technical
efficiency level of 0.67 suggests that Myanmar can increase its productivity by
33 per cent, particularly in the selected regions.
Table 2.4 Technical efficiency score of the selected farm households
Efficiency score Frequency Percentage ( %)
0.01-0.20 17 2.68
0.21-0.30 22 3.47
0.31-0.40 31 4.89
0.41-0.50 46 7.26
0.51-0.60 75 11.83
0.61-0.70 95 14.98
0.71-0.80 161 25.39
0.81-0.90 156 24.61
0.91-1.00 31 4.89
Total 634 100
Maximum TE 0.95
Minimum TE 0.05
Mean TE 0.67
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2.6.2 Econometric model specification with Township
Fixed-Effects
As is shown in Table (2.3), the coefficient of agricultural extension (AES) is
statistically significant at 5 percent levels. However, AES variable might be
endogenously determined if extension services are devoted to the location of
villages where they are much closer to the providers, and responsiveness to
extension services. The extension services provider might pay more attention
to provide services to areas where rice production is high. In this connection,
the service provision is positively correlated with the error term in the model
explaining rice production, and causing endogeneity problems. The greater
the distance to a village, the costlier it is for the service providers to get
that village. Farmers from villages with better connection to the Agricultural
Extension Department (AED) are likely to have access to extension services
and higher production efficiency. To address this problem, a dummy variable
for each village, so-called fixed-effects or the Least Square Dummy Variable
model should be applied.
However, this study uses the township fixed-effects (TFE) instead of village
fixed-effects (VFE), as it is not possible to control the endogeneity problems
for VFE. The effects of village-level variables, such as the distance and the
provision of AES cannot be estimated because the fixed-effect estimator uses
within-village variation, not between-village variation for its estimation. Since
there is no within-village variation for village-level variables, no estimates can
be obtained (Mundlak, 1978). The township fixed-effects, therefore, is included
in Equation (2.9). This survey was conducted in 4 townships in the Delta
Region and 2 townships in the Dry Zone. The variable for township fixed
effect is defined as dummy variable for each of the townships. The endogeneous
stochastic frontier production frontier model, therefore, is applied to handle
the endogeneity issue.
All variables used in main specification I are included in this technical inef-
ficiency model. Therefore, the stochastic production function for specification
II is
lnYi = β0 + β1lnLANDi + β2lnKi + β3lnLABi+
β4lnINPUTSi + β5lnSEEDi + νi − µi
(2.8)
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The technical inefficiency model for the specification II is
µi = δ0 + δiY EARi + δ2SIZEi + δ3PLOTSi + δ4IRRIi + δ5AESi
+δ6ln(CREDITi) + δ7ln(DISTi) + δ8TFEi + ωi
(2.9)
The results for the stochastic frontier production model and the technical
inefficiency model for specification II with controlling the endogeneity and
township fixed-effects are shown in Table 2.5.
The result of the stochastic frontier production model for specification II is
much similar to the main specification I. Although the coefficient of cultivated
land is positively and statistically significant at 1 percent level, the magnitude
is quite large. The coefficient of expenditure on capital is not statistically
significant as main specification model I. The expenditures on labour and
seed have a positive and significant impact on rice production. However, the
coefficient of input is not significant in this specification.
The coefficient of average schooling years of family members who are en-
gaged in rice production have negative signs as expected, but, the result is
not statistically significant. The coefficient of distance in this specification
demonstrates its negative impact on production efficiency. The result of credit
is found to be robust as its coefficient is insignificant. This result strongly
confirms that there is little impact of credit on rice production. Similarly,
the coefficient of AES has a negative effect on technical inefficiency of rice
production with or without control for fixed-effects. The results shows that the
coefficients are robust to differences between villages within each township.
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Table 2.5 Stochastic Production Frontier and Technical Inefficiency Model II
Variables coefficient standard
error
t-ratio
Stochastic Production Frontier
Constant 4.011∗∗∗ 0.223 17.99
Land (LAND) 0.721∗∗∗ 0.049 14.71
Capital (K) -0.003 0.003 1.00
Labour (LAB) 0.122∗∗∗ 0.033 3.70
Inputs (INPUTS) 0.004 0.003 1.33
Seed (SEED) 0.198∗∗∗ 0.035 5.66
Technical Inefficiency Model
School year (YEAR) -0.018 0.056 -0.32
Land size (SIZE) 0.022 0.018 1.22
Plots (PLOTS) 0.213 0.130 1.63
Irrigation (IRRI) -0.612 0.387 -1.58
Agricultural Extension Services (AES) -0.818∗∗∗ 0.304 -2.69
Credit (CREDIT) 0.049 0.040 1.23
Distance to market (DIST) -0.375∗∗ 0.167 2.24
Township 1 (TFE1) 37.629 840.11 0.04
Township 2 (TFE2) 1.341∗ 0.733 1.83
Township 3 (TFE3) 1.217 0.773 1.57
Township 4 (TFE4) -4.503∗∗ 2.110 2.13
Township 5 (TFE5) 0.135 0.769 0.18
Township 6 (TFE6) -2.538∗∗ 1.063 2.39
Log–Likelihood -1892.36
Mean technical efficiency (%) 0.85
Number of observations 634
Note: *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively.
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2.6.3 An analysis of the impact of credit on production
efficiency with the holding of different land sizes
The result of the main model shows a negative effect of credit on rice production
in the selected region. This section investigates the impact of credit on farm
productivity on the basis of their landholding size. In this study, it was found
that farmers could not receive the credit in excess land size larger than 10
acres (nearly 4.05 hectare), as farmers could seek loans from the MADB for a
maximum of 10 acres. In the selected region: 221 farm households had more
than 10 acres of land whereas 413 farm households did not. The results for the
stochastic frontier production model and the technical inefficiency models for
farms with more than 10 acres of land and less than 10 acres of land are shown
in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 respectively.
In Table 2.6, the coefficients of land, and the expenditure on seed are
significant at the 1 per cent level, while the coefficients of labour is significant
at the 10 per cent level. However, it does not show any effect of inputs on rice
production, as the coefficient of inputs is very small and not significant for farms
with larger than 10 acres of land. Similarly, the dummy variable for the region
has the negative and significant sign as unexpected. But the result of region is
consistent with the main specification model I. The result shows a strong impact
of region difference on rice value for farms with holding more than 10 acres of
land size. Out of 221 farm households, 14 per cent of farm households from the
Dry Zone (Sagaing Region) had larger farms. Farmers with holding large size
of land in Sagaing are more efficient than that of those farms in the Delta Region.
The results of average schooling years, number of plots, irrigation and
distance to markets from a nearby town do not show their impact on rice
production for large farms. The coefficient of land size is negatively related
with the production inefficiency, indicating the advantages of larger farm size
for rice production efficiency. The result of access to AES shows a positive
impact on production efficiency. The coefficient of credit is negative and it
has a significant effect on production inefficiency, showing that farms could
reduce their inefficiency if they had access to more credit. This result strongly
confirms that farms with holding 10 acres of land can increase their production
efficiency if they can have more available credit.
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Table 2.6 Stochastic Production Model for farm households with > 10 acre
Variables coefficient standard
error
t-ratio
Stochastic Production Frontier
Constant 4.987∗∗∗ 0.359 13.89
Land (LAND) 0.630∗∗∗ 0.094 6.73
Capital (K) 0.001 0.003 0.22
Labour (LAB) 0.109∗ 0.059 1.84
Inputs (INPUTS) 0.005 0.003 1.59
Seed (SEED) 0.230∗∗∗ 0.047 4.92
Region (REGION) -0.362∗∗∗ 0.080 -4.53
Technical Inefficiency Model
Constant 1.746∗∗ 0.800 2.18
School year (YEAR) -0.061 0.039 -1.56
Land size (SIZE) -0.051∗∗∗ 0.022 -2.37
Plots (PLOTS) 0.078 0.097 0.81
Credit (CREDIT) -0.142∗∗ 0.065 -2.20
Irrigation (IRRI) -0.218 0.402 -0.54
Extension Services (AES) -0.563∗∗∗ 0.257 -2.19
Distance to market (DIST) -0.135 0.145 -0.93
Log–Likelihood -64.49
Mean technical efficiency (%) 0.80
Number of observations 221
Note: *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively.
However, the coefficient of distance to market does not have a significant
impact on productivity. In this group, the average distance from village to
market is 6 km and 50 per cent of 221 sampled farm households are closer to
the markets. The mean efficiency of 0.80 suggests that farm households with
larger land sizes can increase production efficiency. Overall, the findings show
that farmers with larger farms, and better access to extension services could
increase their efficiency if they had more credit.
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The results for farms with landholdings up to 10 acres are shown in Table
2.7. The positive and significant coefficient of labour strongly confirms that
farm households with smaller land sizes had a labour-intensive practice for rice
production. The coefficient of capital shows no significant effect on rice produc-
tion. The coefficient seed shows a positive relationship with rice production.
Table 2.7 Stochastic Production Model for farm households with ≤ 10 acre
Variables coefficient standard
error
t-ratio
Stochastic Production Frontier
Constant 4.526∗∗∗ 0.245 18.47
Land (LAND) 0.576∗∗∗ 0.075 7.72
Capital (K) -0.002 0.005 -0.37
Labour (LAB) 0.118∗∗ 0.038 3.08
Inputs (INPUTS) 0.007∗ 0.004 1.89
Seed (SEED) 0.259∗∗∗ 0.044 5.83
Region (REGION) -0.117∗∗ 0.056 -2.02
Technical Inefficiency Model
Constant -0.204 0.567 -0.36
School year (YEAR) 0.009 0.039 0.24
Land size (SIZE) -0.185∗∗∗ 0.058 -3.20
Plots (PLOTS) 0.078 0.093 0.84
Credit (CREDIT) 0.066∗∗∗ 0.026 2.48
Irrigation (IRRI) -1.320∗∗∗ 0.225 -5.87
Extension Services (AES) 0.039 0.202 0.19
Distance to market (DIST) 0.185∗ 0.104 1.78
Log–Likelihood -205.223
Mean technical efficiency (%) 0.70
Number of observations 413
Note: *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively.
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The results are consistent with the main specification model I. The coef-
ficients of land, labour, the expenditure on inputs and seed are positive and
have significant effect on rice production. The coefficient of regional difference
demonstrates the benefit of growing rice in the Dry Zone. Out of 413 farm
households, 43 per cent and 57 per cent of farm households are located in the
Dry Zone and the Delta Region respectively.
The results for farm size and access to irrigation have a negative impact on
technical inefficiency. These results are similar to the results of main model
specification. It is not surprising to find the evidence of little impact of plots
on production efficiency. Approximately 70 per cent of the 413 farm households
have only 1 plot for their farm size, while only 4 per cent have more than 3
plots for their landholding size. However, the coefficients of the number of plots
and AES are not statistically significant. Nearly half of the sampled households
have no access to agricultural extension services (AES) in this group. The
result cannot strongly confirm whether there is a significant effect of AES on
rice production.
The positive and significant coefficient of distance to market shows that
the longer the distance, the higher the inefficiency of production. On the
other hand, the coefficient of credit shows that it has a negative impact on
technical inefficiency suggesting farmers could not increase their productivity
even if they had access to credit. However, the mean efficiency of this group is
0.70, suggesting that these farm households could increase their productivity
through mechanization, efficient use of inputs, access to agricultural extension,
education and training.
2.7 Conclusion
Although Myanmar has the potential to increase its rice productivity, rice
production has been constrained by several factors. This study has investigated
the key factors that determine the productivity and efficiency gains in rice
production, especially in the selected regions of Myanmar. The endogenous
stochastic production function has been applied to investigate the production
efficiency with or without control for township fixed-effects.
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The effect of labour is statistically significant, suggesting that rice produc-
tion in Myanmar is still labour intensive. There is little impact of capital on
rice production. Farm households are likely to increase their rice value if they
use fertilizer and pesticide effectively. Overall, better education of household
members who are engaged in farming activities has a positive effect on pro-
duction efficiency, showing that large farm household with better education of
household farm labours are likely to increase their productivity. The study also
confirms that agriculture extension services, such as education and training,
are important for improving rice productivity and rural income.
The impact of credit on the rice production of large farms highlights the fact
that those farm households improve the efficiency in rice production if they have
access to more credit. Farmers rely heavily on loans from the MADB, which
charges the lowest interest rates compared with other financial institutions. The
study found that farm households with better irrigation had higher productivity
in the selected areas. Surprisingly, the study finds that a longer distance to
market has no influence on farm’s total value of rice production. There is a need
to use fertilizer systematically with the provision of services by the Myanmar
Agriculture Services (MAS). The Government of Myanmar should prioritise
investment in research, training, and agricultural extension services. Also, the
findings suggests that the government should consider careful provision of credit
to farmers, and take measures to improve the efficiency of rural credit markets.
In summary, the study shows that Myanmar can increase its rice farming
productivity through measures such as expanding dry season irrigation, greater
use of fertilizer, use of modern technology, and further developing rural infras-
tructure. However, there are some limitations in this study that should be
considered for future research. First of all, although the number of plots is used
to measure the impact of land fragmentation, the distance from homestead
to each plot should be considered. Second, the impact of land use certificates
could not be taken into account in this paper. The government of Myanmar
has started to issue the land use right certificate after the introduction of new
land policy in 2012. Some farm households in the selected areas were in the
process of applying for new land use rights certificates, some areas were not
being proceeded yet during the survey period. The effect of land use certificate,
therefore, was excluded to study its effect on rice production to avoid incomplete
information. It is important that the impact of land use certificates under the
new land policy on productivity should be further considered in any future study.
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2.8 Appendix : An analysis of rice production
in Myanmar and Vietnam
2.8.1 Introduction
Myanmar and Vietnam share some similarities when it comes to rice production.
Although Myanmar and Vietnam grow a range of crops, rice is the most impor-
tant crop in between countries, being a staple food and a major source of foreign
exchange. The area under cultivation is similar: 7.05 (million ha) and 7.60
(million ha) respectively 1. The proportion of their population living in rural
areas is 75 per cent in the case of Myanmar (Kyaw, 2009), and 73 per cent in
the case of Vietnam (Kompas et al., 2002). Rice production contributes nearly
80 per cent to the value of agricultural produce in Myanmar (ADB, 2013), and
90 per cent of grain output in Vietnam (Kompas et al., 2012). The contribution
of rice to rural households for both countries is quite similar: approximately 67
per cent of rural income in Vietnam comes from rice production and nearly
75 per cent of rural income in Myanmar (Kompas et al., 2012; Wong and Wai,
2013). The contribution of primary income from agriculture in rural household
income in Vietnam significantly declined from 43.4 per cent in 2002 to 31.8 per
cent in 2012 (Jaffee et al., 2016).
However, the trajectories of rice production in two countries are in marked
contrast. There are differences between the two countries, especially in terms of
government policies and institutions. Myanmar was one of the world’s largest
exporting countries of rice in the late 1930s and early 1940s (Thein, 2004). Dur-
ing this period, Myanmar exported approximately 3 million tons of rice (60 per
cent of its total crop), mainly to Europe, India and Sri Lanka. However, since
the early 1960s under the “Burmese Way to Socialism” (1962-1987), Myanmar’s
position has fallen, and it now ranks the world’s sixth-largest rice-exporting
country. In the case of Vietnam, rice production has been dramatically increas-
ing since the introduction of the Doi Moi reform in 1986. It now ranks the
world’s third-largest rice exporter after India and Thailand with the annual
exports of over 5 million tons, in spite of its being a rice-importing country in
the 1980s (Kubo et al., 2013).
In 2013, the average annual yield of Myanmar was 3 tons per hectare, while
Vietnam was over 5 tons per hectare (Kubo et al., 2013). Indeed, the average
1The data is drawn from the World Rice Statistics online website
(http://ricestat.irri.org:8080/wrs/ Accessed on May 15 2015).
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annual yield of Myanmar is the second lowest of the ASEAN countries, including
Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia (Raitzer et al., 2015). Wong and
Wai (2013) have mentioned the cost of milling, loading and transportation that
is relatively high in Myanmar compared to other Asian countries. According to
Fujita et al. (2009), the main reason for the stagnant average yield in Myanmar
was the low rice price policy by the state. Furthermore, Kubo et al. (2013) also
explained that the annual average yield per hectare is the major reason of the
difference in rice production between Myanmar and Vietnam. They suggested
that an effective investment in production technology could improve the rice
yield level in Myanmar.
In addition, Vietnam uses more labour intensive than Myanmar, and Viet-
namese farmers are more educated compared to those of Myanmar. The
agriculture sector employs 63 per cent of the labour force in Myanmar (FAO,
2016) that is relatively lower than that of Vietnam. Vietnam has been found
to be more labour intensive compared to Myanmar as over 70 per cent of
population is involved in the agricultural sector (Tran Toan Thang, 2014).
The other factor is the educational level of farmers. Myanmar ’s farmers are
lack of knowledge and less educated than other countries in the region. The
literacy rate in rural area of Myanmar accounts for 84 per cent (Zorya, 2016).
In contrast, the literacy rate in Vietnam ’s rural area is 88.7 per cent. It is
worthy to note that the definition of literacy used in Vietnam differs from the
definition in other studies. The Government of Vietnam has introduced the
first campaign of literacy in 1954 (Phan et al., 2004). A person is defined as
literate when he or she has completed at least grade 5 (primary education
from grade 1 to 5). In this case, farmers in Vietnam are found to have better
educational achievement.
Previous studies on the difference in rice production performance mainly
focused on the difference in rice yields, pricing policies and investment in tech-
nology between the two countries. The purpose of this paper is to show that
how different government policies could lead each country to different positions
in terms of rice production and rice yield. This paper has two parts. The first
part discusses the background of agricultural reforms including land policies,
land reforms and market reforms due to difference in experience, especially
nature of land policy between these two countries. The second part examines
the impact of government policies including fertilizer, credit and irrigation
infrastructure. The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2.8.2 discusses
the background of agricultural reforms and rice production in the two countries.
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Section 2.8.3 gives the overview of rice production. Section 2.8.4 demonstrates
an average yield per hectare between Myanmar and Vietnam, section 2.8.5
discusses the government policy on agricultural inputs. Section 2.8.6 and 2.8.7
cover the credit policy and investment in irrigation infrastructure. Section 2.8.8
analyses the cropping intensity and Section 2.8.9 presents the conclusion.
2.8.2 Background to Myanmar and Vietnam
Given the importance of rice production, the governments of both Myanmar
and Vietnam have implemented various programs and policies to improve rice
production, especially land reforms and market reforms. However, the reforms
in Vietnam including Laos introduced more than 20 years before Myanmar
started its reforms (Odaka, 2015). Myanmar introduced its first agricultural
reform in 1987, and its market reform in 2003. In 2012, Myanmar launched
its Farmland Law and the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin land Management Law.
Vietnam launched output share contracts in 1986, and trade liberalization in
1988. This section explains how these reforms helped both countries to increase
rice production.
Agricultural reforms in Myanmar
Prior to 1953, residents and non-residents in Myanmar had the right to own
agricultural land. However, in 1953, the government of Myanmar established
the Land Nationalization Act. The objective of this policy was to nationalize
land ownership by non-residents who had large land holdings during the British
Colonial period. Under this policy, all farmlands were changed from private
ownership to state ownership. The state became the ultimate owner of land
and redistributed all agricultural land to farmers (UNHCR, 2011). Farmers did
not have the property rights for land as all farmlands were totally controlled by
the government. Instead, farmers were required to apply for an annual renewal
of the tillage rights, meaning that none of them had permanent rights to hold
and/or rent the land to the other people.
There was also a strict restriction to the transfer of tillage rights for the
purposes of sale, lease and mortgage of land. The maximum limitation of
land holding for each farm household was 50 acres (approximately 21 hectares)
(Okamoto, 2005). Indeed, the government redistributed agricultural land that
exceeded the maximum limits to tenant farm households followed by owners
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of small land and landless labours. However, there was no equal distribution
of land tillage rights among rural farmers. Most rural farm households, in
particular, over 61 per cent worked on farms with less than 5 acres.
The period 1962-1988 was known as the socialist regime period in Myanmar.
From 1962-1973, there was no significant improvement in the agricultural sector,
specifically as regards with technology, production levels, and research and
development. In 1963, the Land Tenure Law and Rules were enacted to protect
a farmer’s right from land confiscation. This law was replaced by the Tenancy
Law of 1965, under which farmers received the right to work (Thein, 2004). In
1972-1973, the government of Myanmar (GOM) launched the Whole Township
Rice Production Program (WTRPP) to increase rice production through using
chemical fertilizer and high-yielding variety (HYV) seeds. As a result, the
growth rate of rice production increased between the mid-1970s and early 1980s.
In 1974, the government launched the sales of fixed quotas of food grains
and a compulsory delivery quota system to the state. Farmers had to sell a fixed
quota of paddy to the state at a fixed procurement price that was half of the
prevailing market price. The remaining amount of paddy could be sold to Trade
Corporation No.1 (later changed to Agricultural Farm Product Trading Corpo-
ration (AFPTC)) within the township (Hudson-Rodd et al., 2003). If farmers
could not fulfil the requirement of either the quota system or the cropping
system, they could lose their land tilling rights. During this period, no private
sector was allowed to trade agricultural products domestically or internationally.
In September 1987, the first agricultural reform was implemented to develop
the agriculture sector. The government lowered the quota amount for paddy.
Farmers could sell the remaining paddy to four major agents at market prices.
In September 1988, the military regime government lifted restrictions on the
private export of some agricultural crops, such as black gram, green gram,
maize and pigeon pea. However, rice remained under the control of the state
through the Association of Myanmar Agricultural Produce Trading (MAPT).
To further increase the production of rice, the summer paddy program
(SPP) was initiated in 1992-1993. Under this program, farmers could cultivate
a second rice crop using irrigation facilities. In 2003, the government launched a
new policy, to so-called ‘second agricultural reform’, ending the old procurement
system and liberalizing domestic and export markets for agricultural products.
Farmers could freely decide which crops they grew and to whom they sold their
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produce. The inputs, including fertilizers, pesticides and seeds, which were
initially distributed by the MAS, were transferred to private sectors (Thein,
2004).
The government of Myanmar (GOM) enacted the 2012 Farmland Law to
fulfil the objective of securing access to land for rural development. Farmers
could now have land use certificates with no limitation on holding land size as
long as they did not breach the rules. Under this framework, farmers had more
freedom to choose appropriate crops to sell or transfer, or they mortgage or rent
their land use rights to other people. As a result of this new policy, farmers
could manage their land resources more effectively and improve production
efficiency (Department of Agricultural Planning, 2013b).
Agricultural reforms in Vietnam
Land tenure was collectivised between 1955 and 1988 in Vietnam (Men et al.,
1995). During the French Colonial period, French plantation owners and large
Vietnamese landlords occupied most of the farmland. In the mid-1940s, only
3 percent of the indigenous people owned 52 percent of the land, and over 60
percent of farmers were landless.
After independence of the country from the French in 1954, the country
was divided into two parts, North and South. Land reform was first carried out
in the North by distributing land and ownership rights. Due to this reform,
agricultural outputs and productivity rapidly increased. However, the policy of
land collectivization was introduced in the late 1950s. Under this policy, 90
per cent of paddy farmers worked in cooperatives by the mid-1960s. Individual
farm household held only 5 percent of farmland, and earned 60 to 70 percent
of their income from small plots (Cotula, 2009).
In the South, the government introduced the Land-to-the-Tiller Law in
1970, when it started the war with North Vietnam. Cultivators were provided
with the ownership rights, while landlords were allowed to hold no larger than
20 hectares. After the end of war in 1975, land collectivization was introduced
in the South. All farms activities were chosen by the State under the commune
system (1975-1980). During this period, farm households just received a share
of production depending on their working hours in the communal land. A
portion of rice had to be delivered to the state for which farmers did not receive
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any money. Farmers had to sell the remaining part of their produce to the
state at 20 to 30 per cent of the prevailing market prices. As a result of its
output control system, Vietnam imported rice from the Soviet Union between
1977 and 1980.
In 1981, Vietnam moved away from a de-collective agriculture system. In
1986, farm households could keep the surplus of output they produced after they
reached the contract output. Under this system, farmers still had to sell about
80 per cent of their output at low state prices, and could sell only the remaining
20 per cent in private markets at the prevailing market prices (Kompas et al.,
2002). The agricultural production was very low until 1985, and the country
became an importer of rice. Between 1981 and 1987, the Communist Party of
Vietnam (CPV) launched market reforms by designating the output contracts
to develop the agriculture sector. In December 1986, the CPV introduced the
program of Doi Moi and liberalized the economy. This reform introduced
the effective property rights for both land and capital equipment. Farmers
could freely sell their rice in private domestic markets and international markets.
In 1988, the CPV launched a new Land Law (Resolution 10) that expanded
land use rights to households for 10-15 years, although land remained under
state ownership (Marsh et al., 2006). Farmers were not allowed to trade, rent
or alter use or agricultural land. In 1989, the CPV moved to a market economy,
including rice and chemical fertilizer, and it decentralized production decisions.
As a result of these reforms and trade liberalization, there has been a higher
growth rate of rice output since 1986. Annual production increased by 26.1 per
cent, while the annual rice yield increased by 29.6 per cent between 1989 and
1992. Vietnam started exporting rice in 1989 and become the world’s second
largest rice exporters (Kompas et al., 2002).
The CPV established the new constitution and amended the 1988 Land
Law, namely the 1993 land law. Under this law, land use rights were extended
to 20 years for annual crops (initially 10 to 15 year) and 50 years for perennial
crops (Marsh et al., 2006). In addition, the land use certificates (LUCs) were
issued under the implementation of the law. Farmers were required to first
apply for the LUCs through the commune level People’s Committee. Second,
the Land Registration Committee distributed the application forms for land
registration to land users in the commune. To avoid the dispute about claim
on land, it was necessary to have the signatures of both land users and all
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neighbouring households on this form.
The Land Registration Committee checked these forms and decided to issue
the LUCs to eligible land users. Farmers could transfer, exchange, rent, inherit,
and mortgage land. Land holdings, however, were still limited to 2 hectare per
household in northern and central provinces, and 3 hectare per household in
southern provinces (Government of Vietnam, 1993). In 2001, the government
revised the Land Law, and allowed commune authorities to undertake the
plan of land used, allocation of land and the approval of land changes. These
land reforms brought the improvement of land policy and development of land
markets. In 2007, the government increased the ownership of land size from
3 to 6 hectare in the South East, MRD and Ho Chi Minh, and from 2 to 4
hectare in other cities and provinces (Kompas et al., 2012).
2.8.3 An overview of rice production of Myanmar and
Vietnam
Annual rice production of Myanmar and Vietnam
Rice production trends in Myanmar and Vietnam can be broken down into
two periods for each country: (i) 1960-1986 and (ii) 1987-2014 for Myanmar,
and (i) 1960-1980 and (ii) 1981-2014 for Vietnam. In 1987, the Government
of Myanmar introduced its agricultural market reform. 1986 was also distinct
in Vietnam as the CPV changed the contract system to a household-specific
production quota.
The data for rice production can be drawn from two sources: the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA). According to Odaka (2015), there was a large gap in
data between the two sources, especially in Myanmar, since the introduction
of “All Township Special Rice High-Yielding Varieties Production Program”
in the late 1970s. During the period of the late 1970s to the early 1980s, the
average yield in Myanmar was found to sharply increase from 2 to 3 tons per
hectare (Odaka, 2015). The author argues that the data from the USDA is
much more reliable than that from FAO that estimates based on the official
statistics of Myanmar Government. In this review, therefore, the data from
the USDA is mainly used to analyse for rice production and annual yield per
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hectare between two countries.
Fig. 2.1 The trend of rice production in Myanmar and Vietnam
Communal system (1975-80)
Socialist period (1962-87)
First reform (1987)
Second reform (2003)
Output contracts (1986)
Trade liberalization (1988-94)
0
10
00
0
20
00
0
30
00
0
40
00
0
50
00
0
R
ic
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
('0
00
 to
n)
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Myanmar Vietnam
Source: USDA data access from IRRI Statistics database
Figure 2.1 shows the trend of rice production in both Myanmar and Vietnam
from 1960 to 2014 using the data from USDA source. Rice production had a
lower growth rate under the socialist period (1962-1988) in Myanmar, and the
communal system (1975-1980) in Vietnam. Between 1960 and 1980, Vietnam’s
rice production was slightly higher than that of Myanmar. Rice production of
Vietnam, however, has dramatically increased since 2000. According to USDA
statistics, it was around three times higher than that of Myanmar between
2007 and 2014. In this regard, cropping intensity should be taken into account
as one of the important factors for both countries.
The cropping patterns in Vietnam are classified into dry season (spring), dry
season (autumn) and wet season (winter), whereas triple cropping is applied
in some areas of the country. The spring and winter seasons produce approxi-
mately 50 per cent of total production (De Luna-Martinez and Anantavrasilpa,
2014). In contrast, Myanmar paddy is mainly planted in monsoon season (May
to November) and the winter season (December to June). More than 70 per
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cent of total rice production comes from the wet season, while only 8 per cent
derives from the dry season (World Bank, 2014). Now this review will look at
the rice production trend for each country.
During Myanmar’s socialist period (1960 to 1986), farmers had little incen-
tive to increase production, as the quota amount was based on their cultivated
land size and yields (Thein, 2004). The rice production trend remained stable
between 1962 and 1987. Production fell between 1966 and 1968 because of a
severe drought (Soe and Fisher, 1990). Due to the severe effect of monsoon, rice
production significantly fell again in 1972 and 1973 (Win, 1991). As a result
of the WTRPP program, rice production markedly increased at an annual
growth rate of 6.35 per cent between 1975 and 1980 (Thein, 2004). There was
a dramatic increase in rice production from 8.448 million tons in 1974-75 to
14.146 million tons in 1982-1983 (Soe and Fisher, 1990).
Rice production increased gradually after the government launched the first
agricultural reform in September 1987 that permitted free domestic markets,
lifted price controls, and reduced delivery quotas to 10-12 baskets per acre
(0.5-0.6 tons per hectare) (Okamoto, 2005). Due to the SPP program in 1992-
1993, rice production dramatically increased until 1996. However, major floods
between 1996 and 1997 caused rice production to fall sharply. In 2003, the
second reform abolished the procurement system. The two reforms and the
SPP helped increase rice production from 11.4 million tons in 1987 to 18.98
million tons in 2014. This growth came mainly from the SPP with an expansion
of irrigated land. In 2008, rice production declined as a million acres of rice
paddy fields were affected by Cyclone Nargis.
In the case of Vietnam, the quota system and price policy discouraged
farmers from producing effectively or using resources efficiently which resulted
in the lower growth rate of production between 1960 and 1980. After the intro-
duction of an output contract system in 1986, farmers could freely sell their
output after they contributed the set quota of paddy to the state. Due to the
trade liberalization in 1988, rice paddy could be sold freely in the competitive
domestic markets. As a result of reforms, there was a significant growth in rice
production with the expansion of dry season cropping. As shown in Figure
2.1, the annual production increased from 13.24 million tons in 1981 to 44.48
million tons in 2014.
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Sown areas and harvested areas in Myanmar and Vietnam
In general, an increase in both cultivated areas and annual yield are also im-
portant factors determining the growth of annual rice production (Kubo et al.,
2013). The sown area of both countries gradually increased throughout the
period. Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 show the total sown area and harvested area
of Myanmar and Vietnam between 1990 and 2014 2.
Fig. 2.2 Sown area and harvested area in Myanmar
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Figure 2.2 shows that the GOM expanded land area under cultivation, with
the WTRPP in 1971 and the SPP in 1993. As a result of the land expan-
sion, the areas sown with high yield varieties increased by 66 per cent from
1972 to 2013. Overall, the available sown area rapidly increased from 7.39
2Since the data set for sown area and cultivated area for Myanmar is unavailable on
either USDA or FAO sources. There has been a concern over the quality of agricultural
statistics by Government of Myanmar (Odaka, 2015), but this is the only source that has
available information on sown areas and harvested. The data used in Figure 2.2 is drawn
from Ministry of Agricultural and Central Statistical Organization, Myanmar. In the case of
Vietnam, the sown area is drawn from FAO, while the harvested data is drawn from General
Statistical Office, Vietnam.
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million hectare in 2006 to 8.05 million hectare in 2011, although it fell slightly af-
terwards. Approximately, 90 per cent of sown areas were harvested in Myanmar.
Fig. 2.3 Sown area and harvested area in Vietnam
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In Vietnam, the sown areas significantly increased after the implementation
of the output contract system. The net cultivated area in Vietnam increased
by 40 per cent from 1981 to 2014 as a result of its reform process. As is seen in
Figure 2.3, there was a decrease in sown areas between 2001 and 2007. Similar
to Myanmar, approximately 90 per cent of sown areas have been harvested in
Vietnam.
2.8.4 An average yield per hectare between Myanmar
and Vietnam
Figure 2.4 shows the average yield of Myanmar and Vietnam between 1961
and 2013. Although the annual yield of paddy (ton per hectare) in Myanmar
was lower than that of Vietnam between 1961 and 1981, the difference was not
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significant.
Fig. 2.4 Annual yield per hectare in Myanmar and Vietnam
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The average yield per hectare in Myanmar under the procurement system
was steady at around 2 tons per hectare. As a successful program (WTRPP),
the average yield per hectare significantly increased between 1978 and 1983.
The average yield has been stagnant at 3 tons per hectare since 1995, although
the second market reform was launched in 2003. This amount of yield is the
lowest level of output among ASEAN countries (Dawe, 2013).
Vietnam’s annual yield per hectare has been sustained for more than 20
years. Prior to 1981, the average yield was 2.17 tons per hectare, gradually
rising to 3.04 tons per hectare in 1987 after the output contract system was
implemented. This amount of yield dramatically increased following the intro-
duction of trade liberalization in 1988. The average yield rose from 3.05 tons
per hectare in 1988 to 5.72 tons per hectare in 2014. As is seen in Figure 2.4, the
gap in yield level between the two countries has been large since the early 1990s.
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2.8.5 Agricultural inputs policy
Fertilizer Consumption in Myanmar and Vietnam
1. Myanmar
The use of fertilizer is a major determinant of yield in rice production. During
the socialist period, the Procurement and Distribution of Inputs Subcommittee
was mainly responsible for the distribution of agricultural inputs including
fertilizers and pesticides, and quality seeds to farmer at subsidized prices (Win,
1991). However, the government could provide only 20 per cent of the required
amount of fertilizer. The government stopped subsidizing inputs after 1995-
1996, and transferred responsibility to the private sector for the distribution of
these inputs. After 1997, state agencies were allowed to import and distribute
chemical inputs (Thein, 2004).
In 2002, the government introduced the fertilizer law and regulations, under
which private companies could produce, import or export fertilizer. However,
those companies needs a registration certificate, which is issued by the Fertilizer
Committee (Food Security Working Group, 2015). The government does not
set the price for, or distribute, fertilizers, and does not impose import tariffs
on agricultural inputs. Domestic producers could not meet the demand for
fertilizer due to a shortage of raw materials to produce fertilizers. Myanmar
fertilizer markets heavily rely on imports accounting for over 80 per cent of total
market demand or approximately 1.2 to 1.4 million tons per annum (Gregory
et al., 2014).
Fertilizer is imported mostly from China. The number of registered fertilizer
importers and distributors were 270 in 2014 (Gregory et al., 2014). About
90 per cent of fertilizer is imported by the large majority of those companies.
Wholesalers and retailers usually make a profit of 25 to 40 per cent on the sale
of fertilizer. Therefore, prices of fertilizer increase at a faster rate than the
prices of rice that leads to the inefficient use of inputs in paddy production.
In addition, farmers purchase fertilizer from traders at 3 to 5 per cent of the
interest rate per month for credit-based sales (Lwin et al., 2014).
The high price of fertilizer and interest rates push up production costs,
and then decrease farmer’s income. Farmers cannot use the optimum amount
of fertilizers due to limited working capital, insufficient credit amount and
higher interest rate in informal credit markets. The use of fertilizer per hectare
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remains still low where compared with neighbour countries. In particular, the
application of chemical nutrient fertilizer in Myanmar is just 10 per cent of that
for other South Asian countries and less than 7 per cent of that for Vietnam.
The use of fertilizer increased by 25 times from 1960 to 1985, however, the
application rate of fertilizer per hectare is still relatively low (Win, 1991). The
average amount of fertilizer in Myanmar was 15.7 kg per hectare in 2012 (World
Bank, 2015), while it was 190 kg per hectare 3 in Vietnam.
2. Vietnam
During the period from 1960 to 1989, the Vietnamese government controlled
production, import and distribution of fertilizer. Initially state production could
not satisfy the local demand of fertilizer. The shortfall was met by imports,
on which no taxes were levied. Similar to Myanmar, chemical fertilizers were
heavily subsided to promote rice production during this period in Vietnam.
The use of fertilizer increased rapidly from 57 kg per hectare (0.376 million
tons in total) in 1983 to 85 kg per hectare (0.544 million tons in total) in 1990,
in which 80 per cent of fertilizer was used in rice production.
From 1990 to 2000, the government partially liberalized and encouraged
private sector investment in the fertilizer sector. Fertilizer use was 180 kg per
hectare in 1996, more than double the usage in 1990 (Minot and Goletti, 2000).
In 2000, price controls were abolished. Fertilizer production grew significantly,
Vietnam became a fertilizer exporter. The increase in domestic fertilizer pro-
duction together with multiple cropping intensity are the major reasons for the
rapid increase in fertilizer use.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the application rate of fertilizer in both countries
from 1961 to 2011 4. The gap in fertilizer application between Myanmar and
Vietnam started in the early 1990s. It is not surprising that there had been
a widespread use of fertilizer in Vietnam, after the output contract system.
In Myanmar, the use of chemical fertilizers started in 1957, and increased at
a steady growth rate of 10 per cent until 1970. The total value of fertilizer
consumption of Myanmar was 170.07 (’000 ton), while that of Vietnam was
1901.12 (’000 ton) in 2012. The use of fertilizer in Vietnam has been higher
3The use of fertilizer was 297 kg per hectare as reported by The World Bank.
4Since the data set for fertilizer is unavailable on the USDA source, the data used in
Figure 2.5 is drawn from the FAO data access.
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than that of Myanmar throughout the period (Tran Toan Thang, 2014).
Fig. 2.5 Fertilizer consumption in Myanmar and Vietnam
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Seed distribution in Myanmar and Vietnam
1. Myanmar
The Myanmar Agriculture Services (MAS) under the MOAI provides extension
services and seed multiplication, promotes hybrid rice seed, and undertakes agri-
cultural research and development and plant protection (ADB, 2013). Although
the Department of Agriculture (DOA) has initiated programs to produce and
distribute certified seed since 1987, lack of funding has restricted its research
into new seed varieties. The government of Myanmar has introduced the Seed
Law in 2011, and managed the rules for seed breeding, production, registration,
and quality control. This law encourages the private sector and non-government
organizations (NGO) to engage in the development of seed production, and
cooperate with other international organizations. In 2004, the National Seed
Committee (NSC) has been established to take responsibility for the quality
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assurance of seeds throughout the country.
The seed sector can be designated by three different systems. First, the
informal seed system in which most farmers reproduce their own seed from
previous harvests. Over 95 per cent of seed including rice used by farmers
mainly comes from the informal seed system. Second, the intermediary seed
system in which improved varieties are produced by individual private seed
growers and private seed companies. The third one is formal seed system in
which private companies produce the developed varieties, import and marketing
of seeds (Department of Agriculture, 2016). However, the formal seed system is
able to supply less than 5 per cent of the quality seed demand of farmers. The
focus of quality seed production by the formal seed system is rice, followed by
maize, legumes, and oilseeds (Van den Broek et al., 2015). In 2016, the govern-
ment approved the Seed Policy, Seed Regulations and Plant Variety Protection
Law, introduced the regulations of variety registration, seed production and
business. Under this policy, new varieties of all crops need registration, and
seed certification is compulsory for market sales (Department of Agriculture,
2016).
Department of Agriculture (DOA) took responsibilities for multiplication,
procurement, storage, and seed distribution until 2000. The Department of
Agricultural Research (DAR) under Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation
(MOAI) has become responsible for testing new varieties in research station for
the confirmation of potential yield, quality, genetic stability, local adaptability
and pest and disease resistance since 2000. The production of breeder and
foundation seed is also the responsibility of DAR. The Seed Division of DOA
produces the foundation and registered seed by using seeds made by DAR.
Although the Seed Division is the responsible for certifying seeds, the proce-
dures are not well established yet. Due to insufficient staff and facilities, seed
certification (filed inspection and laboratory testing) is not undertaken properly
by the Seed Division (Oo and Shwe, 2015). Van den Broek et al. (2015) also
mentioned that the inefficiency in performance of seed chain, reducing the
number of seed varieties demanded by farmers and overall seed quality were
led by the limited communication and collaboration between the DOA’s Seed
Division, DOA’s Agricultural Extension Division and DAR.
There are 56 research and seed farms throughout the country. The Seed
Division of DOA is responsible for the supervision of 32 seed farms, while
DAR has 24 research farms with a total of 450 technical people to develop
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hybrids of rice, sunflower, and maize. Research farms of DAR has developed
99 rice varieties and 112 crop varieties. In addition, the DAR also takes the
responsibilities to maintain both 12,000 samples of local land-races and genetic
seed bank for wild rice relatives. However, the major challenge for agricultural
research activities is insufficient funding that accounts for only 1 per cent of
total budget of MOAI in 2012-2013 (Oo and Shwe, 2015). According to the
report by MOALI (2018), spending on agricultural research and development
of Myanmar declined to 0.4 per cent of agricultural GDP in 2016-2017, which
is the lowest ratio in the region. Spending of Vietnam on R & D takes approxi-
mately 5 per cent of total agricultural GDP that is between 5 to 10 times much
higher than that of Myanmar.
After liberalization in 2000, seed distributed by public sector was replaced
by a system of contract farmers and public-private partnerships, namely rice
Specialized Companies (RSCs). Under this system, the procedure of registered
seed production by research farms of DOA was transferred to extension agents
to a total of 4,900 RCS in 530 villages with the aid of Agricultural extension
Division (AED). More recently, public-private partnerships have been set up
to distribute improved seed, though their distribution systems are still weak.
The distribution system of certified seed covers less than 10 per cent of the
estimated demand for rice and 1 per cent for other crops. This means that
farmers have limited access to high-quality seed. Dapice et al. (2011) described
using low-quality seed that might produce the broken rice at high proportion
during the milling process. The shortage of certified seed becomes a major
constraint to improve crop productivity in Myanmar.
In 2016, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation (MOALI) has
developed the Road Map for Myanmar Seed Sector, in collaboration with the
private sector, and international organizations such as Asian Development
Bank(ADB), Food and Agriculture Organizations (FAO), International Food
Policy Rice Institution (IFPRI), International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)
and the Netherlands Mission and United States Agency for International De-
velopment (USAID) (Department of Agriculture, 2016). The objective of Road
Map is to develop a strategic agenda for the period of 2017-2020 that highlights
the steps needed to transform from the current seed sector to competitive seed
sector, and to fulfil the needs of farmers in Myanmar.
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2. Vietnam
Vietnamese seed industry has been developed since 1960. Between 1960 and
1970, the seed industry was mainly undertaken by the public. However, private
sector and foreign companies were allowed to work in the industry after the
removal of output contract system in 1986. Since 1996, there has been a rapid
increase in the development of industry in collaboration with public and private
sectors. Over the 50 years’ period, Vietnamese’s seed industry achieved suc-
cess including the development of crop seeds with good quality, high yielding,
adaptable, and strong resistance to pests and diseases.
Between 1977 and 2005, the seed industry was able to produce 575 new
crop varieties, including 177 rice varieties, and 97 varieties for other crops
including maize, potatoes and cassava varieties. The adoption of modern
technology including methods for fertilizer application and high-yielding rice
varieties (MV) contributed to the remarkable growth rate of production and
average yield per hectare. A high-yielding rice variety, IR8, was adopted
in South Vietnam by Long Dinh Research Station in 1996, and in northern
Vietnam in 1998. The utilization rate of MV has increased from 17 per cent
in 1980 to nearly 90 per cent in 2000, indicating an increase in rice yield
was largely attributable to the rapid cultivation of MV. However, high quali-
fied seeds meet approximately 40 per cent of demand by users (Dung, 2014).
The Vietnam Seed Trade Association reports that 15,000 tons of hybrid rice
seed is mainly imported from China, accounting for 70 to 75 per cent of demand.
In the 1990s, the Cuu Long Delta Rice Research Institute (CLRRI), Southern
Agricultural Science Institute, Plant Protection Institute (PPI), the Agricul-
tural Genetic Institute (AGI), and the Vietnam Agriculture Science Institute
(VASI) developed new and different varieties. However, the Ministry of Agri-
culture and Rural Development (MARD) is the key player for the management
of national agricultural and forestry seed varieties. The average yield increased
to 4 tons per hectare, almost double that of traditional varieties (Tran Toan
Thang, 2014). It is worth noting that Vietnam’s research systems for rice
production have been developing the appropriate rice varieties for different
ecosystem around the country (Thi Ut and Kajisa, 2006).
Due to the report of Vietnam Seed Trade Association, 415 businesses have
been involved in the formal seed supply system in 2011. Of those businesses, 8
international/multinational companies produce hybrid maize, vegetable, and
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rice seeds. In fact, the government agencies are mainly responsible for research
activities related to seed at the central level, sub-regional level and the univer-
sities. There are 6 universities and 18 research institutions that undertakes
breeding and adapting improved seed across the regions in Vietnam. Of 18
research institutions, 15 institutions are under MARD. Since 2005, all research
institutions have their autonomy and self-management mechanism with regard
to research agenda, finances and organizational structures. Despite the policy
change, MARD still plays an important role for research and development
activities. MARD has approved 19 projects for seed with an investment of
VND 268 billion (US$12 million), however, the supply of seeds only accounts
for VND 16 billion from projects (Dung, 2014). The seed industry of Vietnam,
therefore, is still highly dependent on imported seeds although formal seed sys-
tem in Vietnam has many significant achievements during the period of 50 years.
2.8.6 The impact of credit on rice production in two
countries
Myanmar
This section briefly discusses the current situation of agricultural loans in Myan-
mar. The financial service sector in Myanmar remains largely underdeveloped.
The main providers of financial services are the MADB, commercial banks,
cooperatives, microfinance institutions (MFIs) (PACT, Proximity, Save the
Children, and World Vision), rice-specialized companies (RSCs), pawnshops,
informal money lenders, unregulated input providers.
Among the formal financial institutions, MADB plays a major role in rural
financial markets. PACT is the largest providers among MFIs, which services
approximately 74 per cent of MFIs clients. The focus of MFIs is mainly on
providing loans in towns and cities instead of rural areas. The main purpose of
loans is for business or small and medium enterprises on group basis. About
19 per cent of its borrowers is provided with agricultural loans. The size of
agricultural loan is 250,000 Kyat at an interest rate of 2.5 per cent per month
for five months period (FAO, 2016).
The MADB provides loans for monsoon and winter paddy, and other crops.
The MADB only gives loans to farmers who have a Farmer’s Registration Book
for land use rights and who have joined a group of 5 to 10 farmers. The MADB
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charges an interest rate of 8.5 per cent per annum, which is the lowest rate
compared with that of other financial institutions. In June 2014, the MADB
further reduced the interest rate to 5 per cent per annum (Thomas et al., 2015).
Farmers can borrow 100,000 Kyat (USD 100) per acre for paddy and 20,000
Kyat (USD 20) per acre for non-rice crops from the MADB. The maximum
amount for a loan that farmers can apply from MADB is 1,000,000 Kyat (USD
1000) for a maximum of 10 acres. By contrast, the estimated cost per acre
of rice is 200,000 Kyat per acre (USD 200) for low-quality rice and 400,000
Kyat per acre (USD 400) for high-quality rice. The loans from the MADB,
therefore, cover only 20 per cent of the production costs (De Luna-Martinez and
Anantavrasilpa, 2014). As a result, farmers mostly rely on the informal sector
including friends, relatives, landlords, neighbours, money lenders, pawnshops,
traders and suppliers of agricultural inputs who charge between 5 per cent to 20
per cent per month. A baseline survey results of LIFT showed that 42 per cent
of its sample households borrowed from family and friends, 31 per cent from
money lenders. Consequently, farmers cannot afford to purchase agricultural
inputs that would result in lower productivity of rice production in Myanmar
(LIFT, 2012). In this study, 32 per cent of households were found to take
loans from family and relatives, and 7 per cent from brokers in the three regions.
Vietnam
Vietnam also has formal and informal rural credit markets, although these differ
from Myanmar’s. There are three major state financial institutions, namely, the
Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD), the Vietnam
Bank for Social Policy (VBSP) and the People’s Credit Funds (PCFs). The
VBARD was established in 1988 to provide loans for agricultural production,
in particular, short-term loans to rural households. It had the largest market
share of 84 per cent of total formal credits (27,382 Billion Vietnamese Dong
(VND)) to 4 million households (Izumida and Duong, 2001). The interest rate
charged by the VBARD is under the management of the State Bank of Vietnam.
The VBARD provides loans at different interest rates based on the size
of the loan. For example, monthly interest rate charged by the VBARD is 1
per cent, 0.9 per cent and 0.85 per for loans up to 10 million (VND), up to
50 million VND, and over 50 million VND respectively (Marsh et al., 2006).
The VBARD provides loans up to 10 million VND without collateral to house-
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holds that are engaged in the agriculture sector (Marsh et al., 2006). Family
households or commercial farms can borrow up to 20 million VND from the
VBARD. However, there is a need for commercial farms or rural households
to provide their Land Use Right Certificate (LURCs) as collateral. The State
introduced the issuance of LURCs under the Land Law 1987 (Jaffee et al., 2016).
The collateral value of land, which is set by the government, is about 50
to 70 per cent of the land value. The State of Vietnam has given a priority
of completion of the issuance of LURCs nation-wide since 2006. Only 30 per
cent of farm households have LURCs, therefore, the remaining 70 per cent of
rural households are not eligible for the VBARD (Duong and Izumida, 2002).
The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment states that LURCs has
been issued to 80 per cent of total agricultural land (World Bank, 2012). On
average, a household borrows approximately 2.3 million VND for agriculture,
forestry or fishery production, of which 58.7 per cent is mainly received from
the VBARD. The period of reimbursement is from 12 to 36 months, and the
other type is from 36 months and above due to the loan structure. According
to Jaffee et al. (2016), the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
reports that LURCs have been granted to 80 per cent of agricultural land, 65
per cent of forestry land, and 75 per cent and 65 per cent of residential land in
rural and urban areas respectively.
There are no indications that the agricultural credit system of Vietnam is
superior to Myanmar’s. Although credit is constrained, however, small-scale
farm households can access more credit than can large-scale farm households
in both countries.
2.8.7 Investment in irrigation infrastructure
Myanmar
Although there has been potential growth in rice production as well as agricul-
tural sector as a whole, this sector has suffered insufficient investment in rural
roads, research and development, extension services, and financial support. In
contrast, the irrigation infrastructure has been dramatically expanded since
1988, especially in the most rice growing areas. Approximately 66 per cent of
MOAI ’s budget was allocated to irrigation infrastructure in 2010-2011 through
Irrigation Department and Water Resources Utilisation Department (IWUMD)
(OECD, 2014). According to MOALI (2018), 95 per cent of capital budget
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contributes to the main three departments: Department of Rural Development,
Irrigation and Water Utilization Management Department, and Agricultural
Mechanization Department. The recent revision of budget allocation for 2016-17
and 2017-18 reports that the share of IWUMD has slightly reduced from 33
per cent of the total budget to 26 per cent.
The Irrigation Department of MOALI is the main provider of irrigation
services including water distribution, maintenance and operation of facilities for
dams and canals. Most irrigated water is for rice production: rice is grown on
approximately 75 per cent of land and the remainder is used for pulses, sesame
and vegetables (Department of Agricultural Planning, 2013a). The Department
charges farmers for irrigation fees at the rate of USD 6 per hectare (1950 Kyat
5 per acre) for dam system and USD 26 for river pumping system (9000 Kyat
per acre) (Soe and Kyi, 2016).
Table 2.8 Irrigated area of Myanmar
Year Net sown area Irrigated area Percent
(millin hectare) (millin hectare)
1987-1988 7.99 1.00 12.5
1996-1997 9.28 1.56 16.8
1998-1999 9.67 1.69 17.5
2001-2002 10.65 1.99 18.6
2002-2003 10.82 1.87 17.3
2003-2004 11.04 1.96 17.7
2004-2005 11.41 1.93 16.9
2005-2006 11.94 2.14 17.9
2006-2007 12.61 2.24 17.8
2007-2008 13.22 2.22 16.8
2008-2009 13.49 2.28 16.9
2009-2010 13.64 2.33 17.1
2010-2011 13.75 2.29 16.7
2011-2012 13.58 2.11 15.5
2012-2013 13.30 2.12 15.9
2013-2014 13.33 2.17 16.2
Source: MOAI (2013), MOAI (2014)
Over 1988-2014, MOAI constructed 240 dams, 327 river pumping stations
and 12,258 ground water irrigation projects (Department of Agricultural Plan-
51 US Dollar is equalivent to 825 Kyat (Soe and Kyi, 2016).
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ning, 2013b). As indicated in Table 2.8, the land under irrigation rose from 1
million hectare (12.6 per cent of total net sown area) in 1988 to 2.17 million
hectare (16.2 per cent of total net sown area) in 2013-2014. Despite the in-
creased investment in irrigation projects, the proportion of sufficient water for
irrigated areas covered only 17.1 per cent of total net sown areas in 2009, which
was relatively low compared to neighbouring countries, such as Bangladesh
(57.5%), China (47.3%), India (33.8%), Vietnam (31.9%), Thailand (26.5%)
and Lao PDR (22.3%) (OECD, 2014).
Vietnam
During the 1980s, large irrigation projects went ahead in Vietnam, for example,
the construction of the Dau Tieng irrigation reservoir supported by the World
Bank with the aiming of support an irrigated area of about 172,000 hectares.
The irrigated areas accounting for 3.1 and 1 million hectare are mainly concen-
trated in Mekong and Red River Delta (RRD) respectively. Vietnam’s Ministry
of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) manages its water resources. In
1984, it set up district-level (sub-province). Irrigation Management Enterprises
(IMEs) manage government irrigation schemes. At the commune level, water
management groups (WMGs) manage irrigation services such as distribution of
water to farms and infrastructure maintenance. They charge fees for irrigation
services based on paddy output in kilograms, or USD 30 per hectare per annum
(Small, 1996).
Vietnam’s government has invested heavily in agricultural irrigation: ap-
proximately 50 to 55 per cent of the agriculture budget has been spent on
irrigation projects. Table 2.9 presents public expenditure for irrigation projects
(Barker et al., 2004). The proportion of irrigated area to total rice sown area
increased from 46 per cent in 1980 to 85 per cent in 2002 due to increasing
variety in cropping intensity (Kubo et al., 2013). To reach the target of 3
million hectare for irrigated water, more than 220 large irrigation projects were
completed in 2006. Of Vietnam’s total irrigated land, rice is grown on 2.50
million hectare, approximately 63 per cent of the total land area of the country.
Rapid expansion of irrigation facilities has led Vietnam to increase rice
production and other crops, such as coffee, pepper and high-valued crops,
especially in Mekong Delta. One of the reasons of Vietnam’s successful rice
production rests on huge amount of investment in irrigation, combined with
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improved infrastructure, such as better roads and irrigation facilities.
Table 2.9 Public expenditure for irrigation in Vietnam
Year Current Capital Total
Share of irrigation
in total agricultural
expenditure
(in 1994 billion VND prices) (%)
1992 123 551 674 51.2
1993 220 719 939 54
1994 302 1240 1542 77.8
1995 238 1251 1488 65.7
1996 173 962 1135 50.1
1997 107 1142 1249 48.9
1998 101 1435 1536 50.8
Source:Macro Policies and Investment Priorities for Irrigated Agriculture in
Vietnam (Barker et al., 2004)
Table 2.10 shows the agriculture public expenditure for irrigation in the
ASEAN countries.
Table 2.10 Agriculture public expenditure for irrigation in the ASEABN coun-
tries
Country Agricultural expenditure
Per capita
agricultural
expenditure
Ratio of agricultural
expenditure to
agricultural GDP
(billion 2005 PPP USD) (2005 PPP USD) (%)
China 211.3 155.2 24.3
Malaysia 6.3 226.6 17.7
Thailand 6.4 94 9.7
Philippine 3.3 35.1 8
Vietnam 3.3 37.5 6.7
Indonesia 3.9 17.2 3.5
Myanmar 0.4 8.6 1.4
Source: OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Myanmar 2014
In Myanmar, the lesser development of irrigation services is due to the
low budget allocation of public expenditure on agriculture. Myanmar has the
lowest expenditure on the agriculture sector. The share of agricultural public
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expenditure to agricultural GDP was 1.4 per cent which was the lowest value
among ASEAN countries. In contrast, Vietnam’s agricultural public expen-
diture on agriculture accounted for 6.7 per cent of agricultural GDP (OECD,
2014). Myanmar’s under-developed irrigation service might be a consequence
of its low public expenditure on agriculture. As a result, Myanmar could not
supply enough water to fully utilize existing irrigated areas to grow during the
dry season. In addition, approximately 15 to 36 per cent of irrigated areas
are used for double-cropping in Myanmar, compared to 50 to 60 per cent of
that in Vietnam. This shows that Vietnam is more efficient than Myanmar in
providing irrigated water (OECD, 2014).
2.8.8 The cropping intensity in Myanmar and Vietnam
Myanmar
Prior to 1992-1993, rice was only grown in the monsoon season (May to Novem-
ber). Farmers started growing a second crop in summer (December to May)
following the introduction of the SPP in 1993. Cropping patterns vary by
regional climatic and geographical conditions. Rice-rice or rice-pulse-rice crop-
ping dominates in the irrigated areas. Rice-rice cropping is widely practised in
the Delta region, especially in Ayeyarwaddy, the rice bowl of Myanmar. The
Department of Agriculture (DOA) reports that Ayeyarwaddy covers 28 per
cent of total rice production, which is the most double rice cropping region,
followed by Bago and Sagaing at 17 per cent and 12 per cent respectively in
2017-18 (USDA, 2018).
Rice-pulse-rice cropping pattern is mostly found in Yagon, Bago, Mon
and Ayeyarwaddy, which are located in Lower Myanmar. Monsoon paddy is
grown in many areas such as Bago, Tanintharyi, Mon, Kayin and Rakhine
Regions in lower Myanmar, and Sagaing, Mandalay and Magway Regions
in Upper Myanmar. These crops are also grown in other regions where irri-
gated water is available (FAO, 2009). Rice-pulse cropping pattern is mainly
practised in the Central Dry Zone, especially in Mandalay, Sagaing and Magway.
In recent years, there has been a decrease in summer paddy cultivation in
many parts of the country due to insufficient irrigated water. Many farmers now
cultivate pulses and beans in the dry season. Planting these crops following the
monsoon rice crop offers numerous benefits to farmers. They need less water,
can benefit from the moisture that remains after the harvesting of the rice crop,
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need less chemical fertilizer than does rice, and their prices are improving.
Vietnam
Up to sixty per cent of Vietnamese farm households grow rice (Yakub et al.,
2012). Vietnamese rice production generally involves multiple cropping, increas-
ing the use of chemical fertilizer, smallholders of irrigated farms, and is labour
intensive. Cropping intensity varies by region. Ethnic minorities in the Central
Highlands and the Northern Uplands generally grow a single crop. Double
paddy crops per year such as winter-spring and summer-autumn crops are
grown in the north, especially, in the Red River Delta (Minot and Goletti, 2000).
Triple paddy crops such as the winter-spring (around November-February),
spring-summer (around March-May) and summer-autumn (around June-September)
crops are usually grown in the irrigated areas in the south (Mekong Delta Re-
gion)(Hai et al., 2003). This region covers 50 per cent of total rice production
and contributes 90 per cent of the annual rice export (VAN et al., 2014).
Specifically, the winter-spring crop contributes 46.33 per cent of national rice
production, while summer-autumn and autumn-winter crops account for 26.39
per cent and 27.29 per cent respectively. Modern high yielding varieties of rice
are mainly planted in the irrigated and rainfed areas (Baulch et al., 2008).
2.8.9 Conclusion
This review has examined the differences in land reforms and agricultural
reforms between Myanmar and Vietnam, and their impact on rice production
in two countries over time. In Vietnam, land reform has contributed to a
dramatic increase in rice production. Although not enough time has passed
since the introduction of Myanmar’s land reforms in 2012 to asses its effect on
rice production, it is expected to deliver similar outcomes.
This review finds that the availability of irrigated water plays an important
role in boosting rice production in both countries. Myanmar has a smaller
irrigated area suitable for rice compared to that of Vietnam. Due to less
available irrigated water, many farmers in Myanmar, especially in the Dry
Zone, cultivate pulses instead of rice as a second crop. Vietnam, however,
has sufficient irrigated water to permit triple cropping in much of the area in
the country. This review also shows that the low rate of the use of chemical
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fertilizer and poor seed quality might be the main reasons of low yield levels
in Myanmar. Insufficient working capital constrains farmers’ use of fertilizer,
certified or quality seed.
Vietnam is a more efficient rice producer than is Myanmar, due to its
better irrigation system, use of better quality seed, higher application rate
of fertilizer, and more intensive cropping. Vietnam ’s investment in research
and development (R & D) is significantly higher than that of Myanmar. In
Myanmar, the higher portion of budget allocation is mainly contributed to
irrigation department compared with others, such as certified seed distribution,
agricultural extension services, and rural road infrastructure. Vietnam’s expe-
rience shows that Myanmar can increase the quantity and quality of its rice
production by applying certified seeds, efficient use of fertilizer, and access to
sufficient irrigated water. The government of Myanmar (GOM) should provide
sufficient agricultural credit and encourage the private sector to participate in
rural credit markets. The GOM should also support the cultivation of summer
paddy in the irrigated areas with soil suitable for rice cultivation. An area
for future study is the impact of land reform in 2012 on rice production, after
sufficient time has passed for the effects to become apparent.
Chapter 3
The impact of credit policy on
rice production in Myanmar: A
fuzzy regression discontinuity
design approach
3.1 Introduction
Agricultural credit plays a crucial role in increasing productivity and devel-
oping the agricultural sector in many countries. Access to credit is the key
determinant in improving productivity because farmers can purchase better
production inputs consisting of fertilizers and seeds, hire more labour and
use advanced technology when they have more credits. However, measuring
the impact of credit programs is challenging due to a self-selection bias. This
challenge is further complicated by the targeting nature of financial institutions’
and governments’ policies.
Over the last decades, Myanmar has relied on government subsidised credit
for household farms as a key financing policy to improve agricultural produc-
tivity. In many developing countries, such as Myanmar, agricultural credit is
used as a major tool to develop rural areas and reduce poverty. Rice is the
most important crop in the agriculture sector, as rice is a staple food crop of
the people of Myanmar and a principal export commodity. Being a traditional
agricultural economy based on rice production, rice production employs the
highest percentage of the total labour force and contributes 75 per cent of rural
household income (Wong and Wai, 2013). Rice production contributed 40 per
cent of the gross agricultural product and 13 per cent of GDP of Myanmar in
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2013-2014 (KPMG, 2015).
Given its important role in national food security, and in social and political
stability, the development of the rice production sector is the Government of
Myanmar’s top priority (Ministry of Agricultural and Irrigation, 2015). The
government, therefore, supports the rice production sector with the objective of
reducing poverty and developing rural areas. In an attempt to fulfil this objec-
tive, the government established the Myanmar Agriculture Development Bank
(MADB) and has provided agricultural credit to farmers at subsidized interest
rates since 1953. In addition, the MADB is the largest financial institution in
Myanmar providing agricultural loans to farmers, especially to low-income farm
households. The MADB has supported 1.87 million farmers through 220 bank
branches (24 per cent of branches of all banks in Myanmar all over the country)
(Win, 2013). The MADB, therefore, plays an important role in the development
of the agricultural sector among government organizations, non-government
organizations (NGOs) and other financial organizations in Myanmar.
Despite the rapid expansion of agricultural loans by the MADB to improve
the rural development of Myanmar, there are some limitations on applying for
credit from the MADB. The MADB only provides agricultural loans for major
crops including paddy, groundnut, sesame, beans, cotton and corn, and makes
only limited number of loans. The MADB bi-annually lends 100,000 Kyat per
acre (approximately USD 100 per acre) for paddy1, and 20,000 Kyat per acre
(approximately USD 20 per acre) for the production of groundnut, sesame,
beans, cotton and corn, for a maximum of 10 acres at an interest rate of 8.5
per cent per year. Furthermore, the MADB does not finance farmers who are
engaged in other agricultural business activities, such as livestock, fishery and
forestry activities.
The purpose of loans provided by the MADB is mainly for short-term
working capital in production, which is not sufficient to cover the costs of rice
production. Farmers, therefore, cannot afford to use better quality seeds and the
required amount of fertilizer, and this has a negative effect on rice productivity.
In addition, farmers cannot invest in the adoption of new technologies if they
are constrained by access to credit (Akudugu et al., 2012). Kubo et al. (2013)
demonstrates that Myanmar’s annual average yield has been stagnant at 3 tons
1The prevalent exchange rate at the time of the survey was 1000 Kyat=1 USD. In
terms of land measurement, the amount of credit per hectare is approximately USD 247/ha
(Department of Agricultural Planning, 2013a).
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per hectare in recent years. Due to insufficient working capital, farmers have
to borrow from informal lenders at higher interest rates that lead to increases
in production costs and decreases in their income.
Although access to credit contributes to high productivity and the devel-
opment of the agriculture sector, the impact of credit on farm households
is still controversial (Aktaruzzaman, 2013). Akinbode (2013) and Kompas
et al. (2012) found that there was a positive impact of credit on agricultural
productivity in Nigeria and Vietnam. Additionally, Guirkinger and Boucher
(2008) estimated a negative effect of credit constraint on rice productivity in
Peru. Conversely, Aktaruzzaman and Farooq (2016) analysed the impact of
microcredit on borrowers’ expenditure based on the size of land holding in
Bangladesh. They applied a fuzzy regression discontinuity design approach
(FRD) as the credit allocation did not strictly follow the rules laid down by
different microcredit programme. Their findings showed a negative effect of
credit on per capita expenditure for durable goods, while there had been no
impact on non-durable goods. Overall, their results indicated a positive impact
of microcredit on expenditure at the village level.
Previous studies have not analysed the impact of credit policy on rice pro-
duction using the fuzzy regression design approach. Similarly, little is known
about the impact of credit and its constraints on rice production in the case of
Myanmar. Previous empirical studies, for example, those conducted by Aung
(2011) and Nan Wutyi et al. (2013), have investigated a number of factors
that affect rice production. Nan Wutyi et al. (2013) argued that there was a
negative effect of access to credit on rice production, especially for large farms.
None of them, however, have presented the constraints of credit policy and its
impact on rice production in their studies. The objective of this research is,
therefore, to fill the gap by analysing the availability of the amount of credit
from the MADB to improve rice production of the selected farm households in
Myanmar’s most productive rice growing regions, specifically, Ayeyarwaddy,
Bago and Sagaing. The research question for this paper is, “What is the effect
of agricultural credit on rice production and rural income in Myanmar?”
With respect to analysing the impact of the MADB’s credit policy, this
paper addresses the relationship between availability of agricultural loans and
productivity, and how the government of Myanmar can support increased rice
paddy production in the selected regions. A fuzzy regression discontinuity
(FRD) approach is used to measure the impact of a large-scale long-lasting
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subsidised credit programme for rice production in Myanmar on a range of
possible outcomes including rice output, yield and income, and total income.
Identification relies on an arbitrary element in the credit provision rule, which
sets a threshold of 10 acres as the maximum for farmers to borrow a fixed
amount per acre that limits landholding size for rice production and cultivated
land size for other non-rice crops.
Due to the group lending system, the MADB’s subsidized credit programme
without collateral has higher repayment rates that differ from the experience
of most subsidized rural credit programs in other countries. The data used in
this paper is taken from author-collected survey data consisting of 634 farms
across 30 villages in these regions. Findings suggest the confirmation of the
validity of a discontinuity and different specifications in the robustness checks.
Although there is little evidence of the credit on rice output and rice income,
the MADB’s credit programme has the positive effect on total income in the
selected regions, suggesting that spillover effect on other farm income activities.
The rest of this research is organized in six sections. Section 3.2 explains
the brief history of institutional rural credit in Myanmar and background of
the MADB and it’s main task of provision for loans. Section 3.3 presents the
literature review. The data source and variables are described in Section 3.4.
Section 3.5 examines the FRD methodology. In this approach, 10 acres is used
for the construction of an instrumental variable. The results of data set are
discussed in Section 3.6. Finally, the detailed results of findings and concluding
remarks are provided in Section 3.7.
3.2 Brief history of institutional rural credit
in Myanmar
Until recently, Myanmar had been isolated from the world for decades due to
its inward-looking self-reliant policy in the form of “Burmese Way to Socialism”.
As a result, it remains an agricultural economy in which the agriculture sector
represents between 35 to 40 per cent of gross domestics product (GDP), up to
70 per cent of the labour force and generates between 25 to 30 per cent of total
export earnings (De Luna-Martinez and Anantavrasilpa, 2014). Rice dominates
the agriculture sector, being the main staple of the national diet, a primary
source of income for households and bringing important export revenues for
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the country. In this context, simulating rice production has been a key priority
for the Myanmar government (Ministry of Agricultural and Irrigation, 2015),
defining its rural finance policies. This section discusses the history of rural
institutional finance since the independence in 1948 until recently.
3.2.1 From the independence to the first reform in 1987
Since the early 1950s, the Government of Myanmar has implemented various
programs to develop the country’s agricultural sector, including the provision of
loans to farmers. The parliamentary government of Myanmar abolished private
money lending and lent agricultural loans through the government township
officers and cooperative societies until 1953. Despite the emphasis on providing
sufficient institutional agricultural credit to support the agricultural sector, the
government had met only 12 to 15 per cent of the need for the rural credit
(Steinberg, 1981). Since loans, which were provided at 6.5 per cent interest rate
per year, were not secured and supervised, the repayment was poor, leading
to outstanding farm debt being more than half of farm income (Steinberg, 1981).
In this connection, the government established the State Agricultural Bank
(SAB) in 1953 as Myanmar’s fundamental institution for rural finance. The
SAB was the main financial institution and took responsibility for providing
agricultural loans to farmers. Yet for the first five years, credit was channeled
to farmers via trained field workers and through cooperatives. Eventually, a
network of village agricultural banks was gradually developed. The number
of village banks increased from 1290 banks in 1958 to 11,207 banks in 1978,
with a presence in almost every village in the country (Steinberg, 1981). Each
village bank served one village tract under the management of a selected village
committee. From 1953 to 1960, agricultural loans provided by the SAB satisfied
just under a quarter of total demand. The SAB charged an interest rate of
6 per cent per annum to the village banks, which redistributed the loans to
the farmers at an interest rate of 12 per cent per annum (Win, 1991), while
reported repayment rates vary by source, ranging from 70-80 per cent to 92 per
cent (Win, 1991; World Bank, 1974). In this way, the village banks played an
increasingly important role as the main source of agricultural loans for farmers
until 1958. In particular, each village bank served one village tract under the
management of a selected village committee.
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From 1964 onward, the SAB introduced measures to increase loans repay-
ments. In particular, it reduced the total amount of new loans and provided
these only to farmers who had repaid their previous loans (World Bank, 1974).
Besides, it imposed a penalty charge of 1 per cent per month above the regular
interest rate charge to borrowers with overdue loans. Finally, from 1965 t0
1971, members of village banks were held collectively responsible for repayment
of loans. These measures initially improved loan repayments, up to 96 per
cent in 1969, but the deteriorated again in the early 1970s (World Bank, 1974,
p.36). During this period, the SAB charged an interest rate of 9 per cent, of
which village banks kept 6 per cent for thier operation and bore the burden of
unpaid debts. In 1970, the SAB merged (as the Agricultural Finance Division)
with the People’s Bank, to form the Union of Burma Bank (UBB), the only
bank in Myanmar under a mono-bank system.The provision of loans through
cooperatives had ceased since 1958. The village banks, however, continued to
provide banking services.
Although the high repayment rates in the late 1960s were commendable
given that the loans were unsecured, there were some issues with government
credit provision. First, loans that became delinquent were usually not followed
up and repaid in later years, which resulted in a growing number of farmers
ineligible to receive new loans (World Bank, 1974). Second, a severe short-
age of institutional credit led to a predominant role of illegal private credit.
With interest rates ranging from 40 to 400 percent per year, private credit
was estimated to be three times as much as institutional credit (Steinberg,
1981). Finally, farmers used up to 35 percent of crop production credit for
their subsistence expenses before harvest, a further amount spent on hired
labour, and only a small share of credit spared for seeds, fertilizers and other
productive inputs (World Bank, 1974).
Between 1973 and 1977, the leading operations of village banks reduced
substantially due to the implementation of an advance purchase system by the
cooperative societies. Under this system, farmers could receive an advance
of up to 70 per cent of the government procurement quotas in cash or in
kind (Steinberg, 1981). In June 1974, the government introduced another
advance purchase scheme only in rice surplus areas in Lower Myanmar, while
the Union Bank through village banks supplied it in other areas (Steinberg,
1981). In these rice surplus areas, farmers could get a further advance from
the government, contingent upon their landholding area, but were required
to sell their corresponding products to the state at the state price. Although
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the official interest was zero under this system, the effective interest could be
substantial due to the wedge between the state price and the market price,
resulting in farmer’s reluctance to participate. Private lending, though illegal,
was estimated to account for about 40 per cent of total rural credit provided at
interest rates of up to 10 per cent per month (Steinberg, 1981).
In 1976, the Agricultural Finance Division was separated from the UBB
to become the Myanmar Agricultural Bank (MAB). The separation followed
the 1975 Bank Law, under which the mono-bank system was dismantled; the
UBB became the Central Bank, and three specialised banks emerged under its
supervision. In addition to the MAB, these include the Myanmar Economic
Bank (MEB) and the Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB). The MAB was
in charge of providing seasonal, medium-term and long-term agricultural loans.
From 1978 to the early 1980s, the MAB had increased its disbursement
substantially to support the launch of the Whole Township Rice Production
Program (WTRPP) in 1978. Considerably increased the availability of agri-
cultural loans, especially after the introduction of the WTRPP in 1978 (Win,
1991). This WTRPP introduced modern high yielding varieties (HYV) of rice
to enhance production possibilities. As a result, the MAB’s lending increased
due to both the expansion of area devoted to HYV and the rise in lending rates
to satisfy a much higher need for fertilizer of HYV to generate high yields.
Farmers received loans via village banks at the interest rate of 12 per cent
and were required to save 1 per cent of the loan. Village banks enjoyed a margin
of 4 per cent interest rate, a 10 per cent commission on the loan principal recov-
ered plus 2 per cent of all interest recovered (Win, 1991). These incentives, as
well as increased supervision, contributed to smooth disbursement and recovery
rates over 90 per cent for seasonal loans. At the same time, the MAB’s lending
portfolio skewed heavily in favour of rice production, covering 85 to 88 per cent
of all crop loans and approximately 80 per cent of the credit requirement for
rice (Win, 1991).
But as the economy deteriorated in the mid-1980s, farmers again faced
severe credit constraints. With inflation around 20 to 30 per cent per annum,
money printing to finance budget deficits, the demonetisation of currency notes
in 1985 and 1987 and the removal of subsidies on agricultural inputs such as
fertilizer in 1987, agricultural inputs became less affordable for farmers. As
a result, fertilizer usage dropped to levels as low as before the launch of the
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WTRPP, reducing the effectiveness of the WTRPP in expanding the use of
HYV.
3.2.2 From the first reform in 1987-1988 to present
A market-oriented policy was adopted in 1988, followed by the promulgation
of new bank laws to open the financial sector to private and foreign investors.
This policy change also saw a restructuring of the MAB. The MAB was reor-
ganised as the Myanmar Agricultural Rural Development Bank (MARDB) in
1990 under the Central Bank of Myanmar Law. The MARDB was transferred
to the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MOAI) from the Ministry of
Finance and Revenue. With the aim of supporting the development of the
agricultural sector, livestock and rural socio-economic enterprises by providing
banking services, the MARDB was reconstituted as the Myanmar Agricultural
Development Bank (MADB) in 1997 (Thein, 2004). However, the reforms in
the financial sector that were initially planned in 1988 were implemented only
partially due to the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the banking crisis in early
2003.
The nation-wide network of about 11,200 village banks was replaced with a
system of branch banks between 1998 and 2000 (Fujita et al., 2009). Despite
the fact that the MADB mainly relied on the village banking system, the gov-
ernment replaced village banks with the branch banks system and introduced
the branches of farmers’ groups in 1998. Under this framework, only the branch
bank in each township is entitled to offer savings deposits and loans to farmers.
This branch network has 220 banks as of 2013, accounting for 23 per cent
of all bank branches in Myanmar (De Luna-Martinez and Anantavrasilpa, 2014).
The MADB is mainly provided with subsidized funding by the government
through the state-owned Myanmar Economic Bank (MEB). More specifically,
the MADB currently borrows funds from the MEB at a 4 per cent per annum
subsidized interest rate. Due to support from the MEB, the MADB can redis-
tribute those loans to farmers with an interest rate of 8.5 per cent per annum
(De Luna-Martinez and Anantavrasilpa, 2014). The MADB can finance in kind
or in cash or both to farmers in accordance with the law, however, the MADB
can only provide loans in cash to farmers. In addition, the MADB can only
provide loans for a limited range of crops such as rice, cotton, sesame, beans,
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groundnut and corn.
Since 2011, the MADB’s subsidised credit policy has been increasingly
out-of-date in the context of vigorous economic reforms. In particular, as the
economy is growing faster, the consumer price index (CPI) is getting higher.
This situation makes the interest margin enjoyed by the MADB shrink when
it maintains a fixed interest policy of 8.5 per cent per annum. By 2013, the
MADB has become dependent on government subsidies, causing a fiscal burden
of about 0.2 per cent of GDP (De Luna-Martinez and Anantavrasilpa, 2014).
This dependency and fiscal burden has forced the MADB to narrow its lending
portfolio to a limited number of crops, despite its mission of providing banking
services to support the development of agriculture, livestock, and rural socio-
economic enterprises.
Currently the MADB offers three types of loans, namely seasonal crop pro-
duction loans (SCPL), term loans (TL) and area development loans. However,
its lending activity is dominated by SCPL which in 2012 accounted for 98 per
cent of the total loans (De Luna-Martinez and Anantavrasilpa, 2014). SCPL
loans have been provided to the production of eight main crops, namely paddy,
which becomes rice after the removal of husk by threshing, groundnut, pulses,
sesame, cotton, jute, maize and mustard since 1998 (Win, 2013). Seasonal loans
dramatically increased from 122 billion Kyat in 2000-2001 to 570 billion Kyat in
2012-2013. In addition, the MADB has served approximately 1.6 million clients
with seasonal loans, with a total land area of 1.4 million acres in 2012-2013
(Duflos et al., 2013). Meanwhile, the marginalised TL loans are to finance
sugarcane plantation, tea processing and solar salt production. The MADB
finances long term loans for oil palm plantations and palm oil refineries, green
tea plantations and coffee plantations. According to the MADB’s annual report
in 2012, the MADB had total assets of 116 billion Kyat (USD 132.6 millions),
total deposits of 86.9 billion Kyat (USD 104.3 million) and total loans of 84
billion Kyat (USD 96 million).
As the demand for MADB loans is higher than the supply given the interest
subsidy, the MADB has also rationed the loans in addition to focusing only on
key crops. In particular, for each season, it lends 100,000 Kyat (approximately
USD 100) per acre for paddy production and 20,000 Kyat (approximately USD
20) per acre for other crops. And the maximum loan size is based on the
agricultural landholding area which the farmer has a land titling right, and
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capped at 10 acres per farm household.
To maintain high repayment rates while not requiring any collateral from
farmers, the MADB has some other lending rules. First, farmers-borrowers
need to have their loan applications approved by a loan screening committee
set up in each village. The committee comprises of the head of village and rep-
resentatives from the Land Record Department, the Department of Agriculture,
the Industrial Crop Department, and the farmers, thereby reducing information
asymmetry problems (De Luna-Martinez and Anantavrasilpa, 2014). Second,
farmers-borrowers are required to form lending groups of 5 to 10 members,
accepting liability for both their individual and other group members’ loans
(Fujita et al., 2009; World Bank, 1974). There are 300,000 farmer groups across
the country. The MADB only provides loans to farmers in townships with full
repayment history.
Finally, in addition to having a good credit history, farmers need land titling
rights to be eligible for MADB loans. These rights were required for annual
registration and renewal until 2012. Farmer Registration Books are issued
by the village authorities and are used to verify farmers’ land tilling rights
(De Luna-Martinez and Anantavrasilpa, 2014). Under the framework of land
tilling rights, farmers cannot use land tilling rights as loan collateral, because
those rights are strictly prohibited from sales, the mortgage of land and lease or
transfer. However, the government enacted the Farmland Law and the Vacant,
Fallow and Virgin Land Management Law (VFV Law) to fulfil the objective
of securing access to land for rural development in 2012. Under the Farmland
Law 2012, farmers have more freedom to sell, transfer, mortgage or rent their
land use rights to others and the duration of the right for farming is unlimited
as long as certain conditions are met.
To this end, the MADB has maintained high repayment rates unlike its coun-
terparts in many developing countries. Its non-performing loans represented
only 0.02 per cent of the total lending in 2012-2013 (Win, 2013). Furthermore,
group lending was implemented as early as in 1965-1966, well ahead of the
global renovation in microfinance in the 1990s, and has been fully implemented
since 1998. However, the downside of this achievement is that more than 3.5
million farmers, most of whom are poor, are not served by the MADB due to
the widespread lack of land titles (De Luna-Martinez and Anantavrasilpa, 2014).
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The dominant role of MADB started to reduce since the adoption of the
Microfinance Law in 2011 which opened the rural credit sector to other stake-
holders. Based on limited data, an estimate by Duflos et al. (2013) suggests
that the outstanding loans of MADB represented only 36 per cent of the total
outstanding loans by all microfinance providers in 2011-2012, but its clients
accounted for more than half of total clients served by these institutions. The
latter is due to the MADB having the largest bank network covering the whole
country.
Although the MADB becomes the main provider of agricultural loans, there
are some other institutions that also finance loans to farmers. Generally, the
rural credit markets in the Myanmar agricultural sector can be categorized
into three sectors, namely the formal, semiformal and informal sectors. Formal
financial institutions include the MADB, public pawnshops and legal private
pawnshops, and savings and credit cooperatives. Semi-formal credit markets
consist of local and international non-government organizations and microfi-
nance institutions (NGO-MFIs), and the welfare programme of the Human
Development Initiative by UNDP. Among these organizations, the United
Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Partner Agencies Collaborating To-
gether (PACT UNDP) program provides agricultural loans at an interest rate of
2.5 per cent per month, especially in the Dry Zone. Likewise, the international
NGO World Vision also provides loans at an interest rate of 2.5 per cent per
month in the Ayeyarwaddy Region (Duflos et al., 2013). Lastly, the informal
sector is composed of illegal pawnshops, traders, money lenders, friends and
relatives (Kaino et al., 2005).
Among these financial institutions, including the formal and informal sec-
tors in Myanmar, the MADB still plays an important role in supporting the
agricultural sector with the provision of significant loans accounting for 570
billion Kyat (USD 5700 million) in 2012-2013 (Win, 2013). Indeed, loans for
paddy production account for 88 per cent of the MADB’s loan portfolio. The
purpose of loans given by the MADB is to cover the cost of working capital
such as for the purchase of fertilizers, seeds, pesticides, and labour wages. The
MADB gradually increased its agricultural loans on a per acre basis, from 400
Kyat (approximately USD 4) in 1994-1996 to 10,000 Kyat (approximately USD
10), especially for rice production in 2009-2010. In addition, the MADB has
significantly increased the credit per acre to 100,000 Kyat (approximately USD
100) for rice production in 2013-2014. The MADB has further increased the
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credit per acre to 150,000 Kyat in 2016 (Htoo, 2016).
If farmers are eligible to apply for a loan, they can borrow 100,000 Kyat
(approximately USD 100) per acre for a maximum of 10 acres from the MADB
at an 8.5 per cent interest rate per year2. The MADB disburses loans for
monsoon paddy from May to August and collects loan payments between
December and March in the following year. Likewise, the MADB gives out
summer loans to farmers from September to January and collects loan payments
between February and June in the following year. The main crops cultivated
in Myanmar are paddy, cereals, pulses, industrial crops (cotton, rubber, jute,
oil-palm and coffee), other crops (such as chilli, garlic, onion, ginger, potato,
and turmeric), and tropical fruits and vegetables. As previously mentioned,
the MADB provides loans for limited crops due to the bank’s insufficient capi-
tal. There is also a requirement for the MADB to contribute 75 per cent of
its commercial profits to the government, which reduces the funds that the
MADB can loan out. Consequently, the MADB is not able to provide loans
for aquaculture, livestock, fruits and vegetables, and any other agricultural
products with high value, and cannot support medium and large farms or other
agricultural business (De Luna-Martinez and Anantavrasilpa, 2014, p.16).
Despite the fact that the aim of the programme is to finance rice production
costs, the availability of loans is very limited in rural areas. In particular, the
estimated cost of rice production is around 200,000 Kyat (USD 200) per acre
for low-quality rice and 400,000 Kyat (USD 400) per acre for high-quality rice
(De Luna-Martinez and Anantavrasilpa, 2014). Therefore, a loan from the
MADB covers only 25 per cent to 50 per cent of the production cost per acre
(Haggblade et al., 2013). Consistent with this finding, the production costs
including seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, labour and hiring capital in this research
was 150,000 Kyat (USD 150) per acre on average. The maximum production
cost per acre was around 400,000 Kyat (USD 400) in this study. To meet the
remaining amount of the production cost, farmers might borrow from friends,
relatives and other informal money lenders with interest rates of up to 10 to 20
per cent per month, which is much higher compared to that charged by the
MADB (LIFT, 2012).
The credit programme of the MADB restricts the availability of loans to a
maximum of 10 acres; therefore, small farm holders might be beneficiaries of
2The interest rate was dropped to 5 per cent in 2014 (Thomas et al., 2015).
3.3 Literature review 81
this credit program. Under this framework, farms with holdings of more than
10 acres can only receive 1,000,000 Kyat (approximately USD 1000) for their
first 10 acres showing that the credit per acre is relatively low compared to
those farmers who have up to 10 acres of land. There has been no empirical
study that reviews the relationship between access to amount of credit and rice
production on the basis of farm land size in Myanmar.
3.3 Literature review
Much of the empirical literature has investigated the access to credit as a
powerful tool to improve the well-being of the poor, increase expenditure and
savings at the household level, reduce poverty and develop an agricultural
sector in most developing countries all over the world. A number of studies
have used different methodological approaches in an attempt to analyse the
impact of credit on specific areas of interest. The effect of credit, however,
is still controversial. Some studies have found that there has been a positive
effect of access to credit on households and an increase in productivity in the
agriculture sector. Other empirical studies argue that there is a negative impact
of access to credit on households’ welfare as well as on agricultural productivity.
Karlan and Zinman (2009), for example, showed that an increase in credit
supply would help improve a household’s welfare. They used a household survey
to investigate the behaviour and outcomes of participants in a treatment group
and a control group from six months to nearly two-and-half years by applying
a field experiment in South Africa. Their estimates showed significant and
positive effects of the expansion of credit on economic self-sufficiency, household
well-being and food consumption. Similarly, Banerjee et al. (2013) examined
the impact of microfinance on consumption, the creation of new business and
household income, and showed the positive impacts of microfinance on house-
holds in India.
Aktaruzzaman (2013) examined the effect of microcredit programs on the
expenditure and savings of participants in Bangladesh between 2006-2007.
Under these credit programs, a household that owns at most 50 decimals3 is
eligible to participate in the program. Due to the lack of strict rules in the
allocation of credit in Bangladesh, the FRD was applied to examine the credit
3Agricultural land is measured in decimals in Bangladesh (50 decimals=0.5 acre).
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effect. An instrument variable in this research was the dummy variable and it
took 1 if the household owned 50 decimals of land and below, and took 0 if
it was otherwise. His findings suggested that access to credit could increase
household saving, the expenditure per school child, and help someone to start
a new business or to expand in the existing business and to reduce spending
for other durable goods. He also showed that the expenditure per school child
increased by 23 per cent if there was an increase in 10 per cent of the average
amount of credit.
A study by Meng (2013) evaluated the impact of China’s poverty allevia-
tion programme, namely the 8–7 plan on the income growth of households in
rural areas. The purpose of this programme was to develop the local economy
through financing subsidized credits during the period 1994 to 2000. In an
attempt to estimate the effect of the programme, the status of initial eligibility
for the program was used as an instrument variable in the FRD design approach.
His results strongly showed that rural households would increase their income
level by 38 per cent if they were included in the treated group between 1994
and 2000. Accordingly, this finding confirmed that access to credit played a
crucial role in China’s economic development.
Similarly, Ponce and Bedi (2010) also used the FRD to evaluate the impact
of conditional cash transfer programs (CCT) on students’ cognitive achievement
in Ecuador. They identified the Selben index score for the selection of eligibility
of households in this program. Under this program, the eligible household
would receive a cash transfer of USD 15 per month. Despite the fact that
this study used different specification models and sample sizes to identify the
effect of the credit program, there was no evidence of the impact of credit on
students’ test scores. Their result was consistent with Behrman et al. (2000),
who also showed that there was no impact of the cash transfer programs on
students’ test scores in Mexico. Adebayo and Adeola (2008) investigated how
the availability of credit in Nigeria could improve living standards in rural
areas by increasing productivity leading to more income for farmers. In addi-
tion, Akinbode (2013) demonstrated a positive effect of availability of credit
from microfinance banks and cooperative societies on rice production in Nigeria.
The expansion of microcredit could help increase the productivity and
efficiency of the agricultural sector, especially in many developing countries.
The availability of credit can generate a higher yield of production as farmers
can use better inputs consisting of fertilizer, seed and pesticide. Kompas et al.
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(2012) showed that more credit improved the efficiency of Vietnamese rice
production. In their research, stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) was applied to
the estimation of credit on rice production using the Vietnam Household Living
Standard Survey (VHLSS) data. Their finding was consistent with Duong and
Izumida (2002), who found a positive and significant influence of credit on
household production.
Duy (2012) used the VHLSS 2008 data to investigate the contribution of
credit to rice production efficiency in Vietnam. His study focused on access
to credit including formal and informal sources, and consistently revealed a
positive effect of credit on rice production as shown in Kompas et al. (2012)’s
work. In the case of Nigeria, Akinbode (2013) used the logit regression model
and estimated the relationship between access to credit and rice production.
Consistent with the previous literature, his study showed that farmers could
increase their production efficiently if they had more credit.
However, there has been limited evidence available regarding access to credit
and its impact on rice production efficiency in the case of Myanmar. Nan Wutyi
et al. (2013) applied stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to estimating rain-fed
rice production efficiency in Myanmar. Contrary to Kompas et al. (2012) and
Duong and Izumida (2002), Nan Wutyi et al. (2013) showed a negative effect
of credit on rice production efficiency in the selected main rice growing state,
specifically in Lower Myanmar.
Other empirical research, for example, conducted by Aung (2011), also
investigated the determinants of rice production efficiency in the selected two
regions, in particular, Yangon and Bago in Lower Myanmar. Aung (2011),
however, did not focus on credit and its effect on rice production. On the
other hand, Kaino et al. (2005) examined rural credit markets in Myanmar
determining the factors for credit demand, loans from the MADB (the formal
sector) and loans from the UNDP’s PACT, especially in the Dry Zone.
Kaino et al. (2005) investigated the relationship between the formal insti-
tution (MADB) and the semiformal institution (PACT) in selected regions.
However, the MADB mainly supports agricultural activities, while PACT
pays attention to poor people who are undertaking various business activities.
Kaino et al. (2005) showed that the average PACT loan size is larger than
that of loans from the MADB, and the promoting of PACT loans might be
strengthened as well as the development of the formal credit sector. His study,
3.4 Data source and variables 84
however, did not focus on the key characteristic of availability of credit from
the MADB that is tightly connected with the land size of farm households.
His findings also confirmed that the MADB and PACT were the major fi-
nancial institutions for the provision of credit in the Dry Zone. He argued
that both the formal and semi–formal financial institutions could reach the
targets of the various segments of credit markets in rural areas in Myanmar.
Since there has been no empirical research that pays attention to the impact
of credit policy on rice production, this study investigates the effect of the
credit policy of the MADB on rice production in the selected areas in Myanmar.
3.4 Data source and variables
3.4.1 Source of data
In this paper, primary field survey data across 30 villages in 2014 is used
to analyse the impact of credit policy on rice production in Myanmar. The
number of households in this survey totalled 634 farms across 30 villages in
6 townships. In particular, the number of farm households is made up of 215
farms in Ayeyarwaddy, 212 farms in Bago and 207 farms in Sagaing. The
sampling framework is shown in Appendix 1.
3.4.2 Rural credit markets
Table 3.1 provides the detailed information on crop credit received by farmers
in the selected regions. On average, the outstanding loans in sample farms run
for about six months, which suggests that these are likely seasonal crop pro-
duction loans. Loans for rice production dominate in all regions, and especially
in Ayeyarwady where they account for 100 per cent of all crop credit. The
MADB plays a dominant role in loan supply, providing 81 per cent of loans
in Sagaing, 58 per cent in Bago and 64 per cent in Ayeyarwady, mostly for
rice production. Farmers reported having to satisfy all MADB loan require-
ments: having land-use-right certificates, having a savings account at MADB,
and being part of a lending group in addition to being approved by a village
loan screening committee. They were charged an interest rate of 0.71 per cent
per month (or 8.5 per cent per annum) and could borrow for up to 10 acres only.
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The second primary source of credit is from relatives followed by NGOs and
other financial institutions, such as PACT and co-operatives. Loans from rela-
tives comprise 7 per cent of all loans in Sagaing, 22 per cent in Bago and 18 per
cent in Ayeyarwaddy. The monthly interest rates of this source are 4 per cent
in Sagaing, 5 per cent in Bago and nearly 8 per cent in Ayeyarwaddy, which are
higher than that of the MADB. The other financial institutions, such as PACT,
NGOs and co-operatives provide loans at an interest rate of 2.5 per cent per
month. However, NGOs and other credit institutions such as pawnshops play
a negligible role in credit supply for crop cultivation in the three study regions. 4
3.4.3 Description of variables and descriptive statistics
In an attempt to analyse the credit policy, the main variables used in this
paper are rice output, landholding size 5 and the availability of credit from
the MADB for each farm household. Rice output (OUTPUT) is the total
output of rice in kilograms, produced by each farm. Landholding size (LAND)
is the total holding size of each household (measured in acres), as well as the
total planted land (both owned and rented, measured in acres) used in annual
paddy production. CREDIT is the total credit (in thousands of Kyat) that
farms borrow from the MADB for summer paddy and monsoon paddy. Total
income is based on revenues from rice, other crops, livestock, fishery, horticul-
ture and non-farm household business activities per year. The key exploratory
variable of interest is total MADB credit for summer paddy and monsoon paddy.
In addition to these key variables, this study uses a number of independent
variables as controls in the regression analysis, as they may affect rice produc-
tion. The demographic characteristics of a household head are captured by the
number of household members who are currently involved in the business ac-
tivities, and the dependency ratio (the number of non-working family members
over the family size). The number of working family members determines both
farm production and other sources of income. The number of dependants in
a household is also required to consider its effect on rice production. Indeed,
4The survey data shows a slightly different picture of the credit market compared to LIFT
(2012) regarding the source of credit and interest rates. In particular, LIFT (2012) find
that the key source of credit for households is families, friends and brokers and the interest
rates are 10-20 per cent per month. This difference comes from different samples, with LIFT
(2012) covering all households who live in a broader geographical area, while our sample
includes only rice farm households from three regions.
5Landholding size is defined as total area of land owned by each household. The cultivated
land is defined as the actual land acre for cultivation of rice.
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households with higher number of dependants might produce lower levels of
rice yield compared to those households that have fewer number of dependants.
Proxies for the skill level of farmers are age and education level of the
household head. Education is categorised by three different levels: at most
primary school, secondary school, and high school or higher education. The
gender of household head is also included. GENDER is defined as the dummy
variable if the household head is male (=1) or otherwise (=2). The respon-
dent farmers were asked to self-assess the water availability from irrigation
or natural resources, such as creeks, rivers, dams and reservoirs, and private
channels (identified as 1= very good/good, 0 if it is otherwise). Availability of
agricultural extension services is defined as a farm household receiving services
from different institutions for farming activities.
The distance from a village to a township is considered to be an important
factor in applying for agricultural credit. Transportation costs might be more
expensive if a village is located far from a township compared to a village
that is closer to a township. Due to a lack of good roads and transportation,
travel time and transportation costs can pose substantial obstacles to credit
and diminish production efficiency (Tracey-White, 2005). According to Li et al.
(2011), households that are located closer to a township’s bank branch are
more likely to apply for loans compared to those households that are located
very far from a township’s branch. Sibiko et al. (2013) and DeSilva (2011)
have demonstrated the negative effect of distance to market and suggested that
the development of roads and infrastructure in rural areas might improve the
efficiency of farms in Uganda and the Philippines respectively.
The distance measured in kilometres is a proxy for the travelling distance
of the client farmers from each village to a township’s bank branch of the
MADB to receive their loans. In this study, it is found that households located
greater than 96 km from a township’s branch bank do not apply for agricultural
loans. In order to capture the regional effects on rice production, the binary
variable is identified as 1 if farm households are located in the Delta Region; it
is 0 otherwise. Ayeyarwaddy and Bago are located in the Delta region, which
has better conditions, such as higher annual rainfall and more fertile soils, for
agriculture compared to conditions in the Dry Zone. Previous literature (for
example, Kompas et al. (2012)) analysed the effects of region on rice production
in Vietnam and showed the benefits of the major rice producing region.
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Table 3.2 Summary statistics for the selected farm households
Variable Units Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Output(kg) (Y) kg 15831.26 16902.82 209 129580
Output per acre (kg) kg 1087.52 420.48 31.35 2382.60
Landholding size (LAND) acre 11.64 11.31 1.37 70
Total cultivated area acre 13.71 12.96 1 84
(owned or rented)
Household head
Age of household head (AGE) years 51.09 11.87 22 86
Gender (GENDER) male=1 1.04 0.21 1 2
At most primary education yes=1 0.62 0.49 0 1
(EDU12)
Secondary education yes=1 0.25 0.44 0 1
(EDU3)
High school/ higher education yes=1 0.13 0.34 0 1
(EDU45)
Farming experience (EXP) years 27.91 12.65 2 65
Number of household labour number 2.91 1.52 1 10
(HHLAB)
Dependency ratio (DEP) ratio 0.45 0.23 0 0.90
Irrigation services good/very good yes=1 0.82 0.38 0 1
(IRRI)
Agricultural extension services yes=1 0.58 0.49 0 1
(AES)
Region (REGION) Delta=1 0.67 0.47 0 1
Distance to township’s bank km 17.02 19.65 1.61 96.60
branch (DIST)
Rice income 000 Kyat 3299.41 3638.79 50 24750
Rice income per acre 000 Kyat 224.35 103.29 9 680
Total income 000 Kyat 4304.83 4223.84 120 38190
Credit per acre from MADB 000 Kyat 96.00 55.69 0 285.71
(CREDIT)
Total farm households (N) number 634
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Table 3.2 shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the selected farm
households used in this study. The average landholding size is 11.64 acres
and rice output is about 15,800 kg. The average cultivated area is 13.71 acre,
and average amount of credit from the MADB is 96,000 kyat per acre. The
summary of farms with land holdings of up to 10 acres and larger than 10 acres
are presented in Tables A1 and A2. Farms with land holding up to 10 acres
produce only 25 per cent of rice output that large farms produce (see Table A2).
3.5 Methodology
3.5.1 Regression discontinuity
Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) firstly introduced regression discontinuity
design (RDD) to evaluate social programs. Since the late 1990s, this approach
has been widely used for the evaluation of social assistance programs in Canada
(Lemieux and Milligan, 2008), the impact of the Reading First Program on
instructional practice and student achievement in the United States (Gamse
et al., 2008), and the effects of financial aid offers on college enrolment (Van der
Klaauw, 2002). This design is characterized by the treatment assignment,
which is based on whether an observed variable occurs above or below the
arbitrary cut-off point (Lee and Lemieux, 2009). The main assumption of this
design is that people who are below the cut-off point or who do not receive the
treatment can be compared to those people who are above the cut-off point or
who receive the treatment.
In addition, the difference between treated people and controlled (non-
treated) people is not great if people are very close to this cut-off point. In
order to test the validity of RD designs, the baseline (or predetermined) covari-
ates can be used to identify the randomization result. If there is a variation in
the treatment variable that is closely randomized around the cut-off point, all
those baseline characteristics below and above the cut-off point might have no
difference in outcomes. Alternatively, RD design can be shown with a simple
graph to visualize a relationship between the outcome variable and assignment
variable. This graphical presentation can clearly provide the evidence of a
discontinuity at the cut-off point. In addition, the RD design approach is
appropriate if the assignment variable is continuously related to all other unob-
served factors. Theoretically, there are two types of regression discontinuity
design, namely sharp regression discontinuity design (SRD) and fuzzy regression
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discontinuity design (FRD). The formal design can be applied when treatment
status and the cut-off point have a deterministic relationship. However, the
relationship is not likely to be perfect in practice as the treatment variable may
not be strictly determined by the cut-off point in the fuzzy design (Lee, 2008).
In the case of the fuzzy design, the treated and control groups are on both
sides of the cut-off point that consists of people who are assigned to the control
group with treatment and without treatment. Under the MADB framework,
the farms with holdings larger than 10 acres of land cannot receive loans based
on their large land size. In contrast, farmers with holdings of up to 10 acres
of land size can receive loans in accordance with their land size. Accordingly,
there is an imperfect relationship between the assignment variable (land size)
and the status of receiving certain amounts of loans. Under the assumption
made by Hahn et al. (2001), the ‘monotonicity’ that refers to Li (land size of
each farm household) crossing the cut-off point (Li ≤ 10) does not allow some
units to receive the treatment while others are rejected from the treatment at
the same time. In addition, there might be other unobservable factors that are
probably correlated with the outcome, suggesting endogeneity bias in treatment
status.
Theoretically, the two approaches, namely the local linear regression and
polynomial regression, can be used for estimating the fuzzy RD design. An-
alytically, two-stage least squares (2SLS) can be used to estimate the effect
of treatment in this design (Hahn et al., 2001). Following Lee and Lemieux
(2010), the model of 2SLS is carried out as follows:
First stage equation : Ti = α0 + γ0Di + γif(Li) + γiXi + ϵi (3.1)
Second stage equation : Yi = δ0 + β0Tˆi + βif(Li) + βiXi + µi (3.2)
Where Yi is the outcome variable for individual i, Ti is defined as 1 if individual
i receives the treatment or the MADB credit per acre, and 0 if an individual i
does not receive the treatment, Di is 1 if individual i is assigned to treatment
based on the cut-off rule, and it is 0 otherwise, Xi is an assignment variable for
an individual i, ϵi is a random error term for individual i, µi is random error
that is assumed to be identically and independently distributed, and β0 is the
marginal impact of the programme at the cut-off point. Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) regression is used to estimate the first stage equation and predict the
value of Tˆi. This predicted value Tˆi is used in place of Ti in the second stage
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of the equation, and then the parameter of β0 can be estimated by using OLS
regression.
3.5.2 Econometric model specification
As previously mentioned, the MADB is the main financial institution that
provide loans for farm households with the aim of developing rural areas. The
objective of this study is to identify the casual effect of the MADB credit scheme
on a range of various rice-related outcomes such as rice output, yield, and
income, as well as the total income for farm households. The primary threat
of endogeneity comes from potentially confounding characteristics that affect
both rice production and the amount of credit received. First, the targeting
design favours relatively more capable farmers that tend to have good credit
histories. Second, the scheme involves an element of self-selection by which risk
adverse, lower educated, or less motivated or confident farmers are less likely
to take up credit. Both these effects can lead to a positive bias, and hence an
overestimate, of the effects of providing MADB credit on rice yields and income.
Although considerable factors have been focused on the level of rice pro-
duction efficiency in Myanmar, there has been limited attention paid to the
credit policy of the MADB and its constraints on rice production. Under
the agricultural credit policy, the MADB provides loans for a maximum of
10 acres of land size. To address this problem, our identification strategy
exploits the targeting design of the MADB program. This program introduces
a discontinuity in eligibility around a threshold of 10-acre of rice land area
with right use certificates. Farms just below and just above this threshold
are not equally eligible for a loan. Obviously, small and large farms are not
a proper comparison, as land size is a key factor for production and income.
Yet, there is no reason to expect that farms close enough to the threshold
on both sides are different in any characteristics other than the MADB eligibility.
Note that this threshold is not a clear cut off being eligible to borrow 100,000
Kyat (USD 100) per acre per cropping season, and the maximum amount that
can be borrowed increase linearly with the land size. For farms larger than 10
acres of total amount is capped at 1,000,000 Kyat (USD 1000) per season for
their first 10 acres, which means the average credit per acre decreases as land
size increases above 10 acres. This set up, therefore, implies a fuzzy regression
discontinuity design (FRD): farms on either side of the threshold receive credit,
3.5 Methodology 92
but at the threshold, there is a discontinuity in the eligible amount of credit
per acre.
To estimate the effect of treatment variable or the MADB credit per acre,
the instrumental variable (IV) approach as suggested by Hahn et al. (2001)
is used in this study. The size of the household’s land is identified as an
instrumental variable to evaluate the influence of credit policy on farmers,
in particular, who have holdings of 10 acres of land size. Since the 10-acre
threshold is an arbitrary decision, we expect that conditional on actual land
size, D does not have an effect on the outcome variable other than through
the MADB scheme, satisfying the exclusion restriction. If the exclusion re-
striction holds, then we can interpret β as the casual effect of providing credit
of 1,000 Kyat per acre where β is the ration of the reduced-form effects of
D on Y and D on T , conditional on X and f(L) as shown by Hahn et al. (2001).
While β has all the usual properties of an IV estimator, it reflects only a
Local Average Effect (LATE) of the MADB scheme for farmers around the
threshold. Therefore, the estimated treatment effects to smaller and larger
farmers is needed to satisfy the required external validity assumptions. For
example, smaller and larger farmers are not expected to face the same degree if
credit rationing, which would imply heterogeneous marginal effects of credit on
productivity. Nonetheless, this threshold is the land size of the 60th centile farm
household in our sample and located between the firm size of the average (11.6)
acre and median 8 (acre) households. This suggest that the LATE estimates
are relevant at least for the “average farm” in the distribution of rice holding.
However, the test for validity of the regression discontinuity (RD) design
approach should begin with a graphical presentation and provide evidence of
whether or not there is a discontinuity at the cut-off point. This study uses
graphs to examine the discontinuity of treatment and outcome variables at
the threshold. This study then confirms the visual examination using reduced
form estimates which are the effects of the treatment binary indicator D on the
treatment and outcome variables. Figure 3.1 illustrates the first-stage relation-
ship between the amount of credit per acre received by farm households from
the MADB and their landholding size. The actual cultivated land size is not
appropriate to use for determining credit per acre, as it might be endogenous
to the treatment. For example, the availability of credit allows farmers to use
more inputs and hire more labour and, therefore, can allocate a larger share of
their available land to rice cultivation. In this study, household’s landholding
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size, which is exogenous to the credit scheme, is used to estimate the impact of
credit on rice production.
The graph clearly presents the evidence of a discontinuity at the cut-off
point (10 acres of land size) between households that have more than 10 acres
of land and households that have less than or equal to 10 acres of land. In par-
ticular, the gap between the polynomial fitted lines present the Local Average
Treatment Effect (LATE). As can be seen in the graph, there is an apparent
increase in the amount of credit per acre before the cut-off point. However, it
consistently drops down beyond the cut-off point when the land sizes become
large. This graph, however, clearly demonstrates a non-linear relationship
between credit per acre and land size on each side of the cut-off point, and the
evidence of discontinuity at the cut-off point. Specifically, the amount of credit
per acre significantly decreases from 80,000 Kyat per acre at the discontinuity
to below 20,000 Kyat per acre at 70 acres of cultivated land size.
Fig. 3.1 Relations between credit per acre and land size
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
14
0
Cr
ed
it 
pe
r a
cr
e 
(U
SD
)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Rice land holding (acre)
Figure 3.2 (a) and (b) present rice output against landholding size of farm
households, and rice output per acre against landholding size respectively.
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As illustrated in Figure 3.2 (a), there is a positive relationship between rice
output and landholding size. There is a clear discontinuity at the cut-off point
or 10 acres of land size. Figure 3.2 (b) also shows that rice production increases
dramatically in accordance with increased land size until 10 acres of land is
reached. Rice production, however, increases with the decreasing rate beyond
the cut-off point. Consistent with Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 (a), Figure 3.2 (b)
shows a clear discontinuity at the cut-off point.
The baseline characteristics of the participants in the treated group and
control group is used to satisfy the key assumption of using the RD approach
6. Under this assumption, there is not much difference in the characteristics
between those groups at the baseline (Ikenwilo et al., 2016). In this study,
household characteristics including age, gender, farming experience, educational
level of household head, the number of household labours and the dependency
ratio, the irrigation system, the agricultural extension services, the effect of
regions and the distance from village to township are tested for balancing.
Table 3.3 presents the results of mean values, standard deviation, mean
difference and statistical significance of the difference of each variable for farm
households between less than 10 acres of land holding and more than 10 acres
of land holding. For household characteristics, the variables for age, gender,
educational level of the household head, farming experience and number of
household labours are not statistically significant differences between a group
with holding more than 10 acres of land and a group with holding less than 10
acres of land. In contrast, the differences in mean value for dependency ratio
of each household is statistically significant at 5 per cent level.
The dependency ratios are 43 per cent and 48 per cent for households with
holdings of land up to 10 acres and larger than 10 acres respectively. Likewise,
the differences in mean values for other variables such as irrigation, region and
the distance to a township’s bank branch are also statistically significant at the
1 per cent level, but agricultural extension services is not significant. Accord-
ingly, these variables might explain the effects of heterogeneity in the treatment
variable, and they should be controlled for the estimation of regression analysis.
Therefore, the baseline characteristics of farm households in a group of larger
land size are likely to be compared with those in a group of smaller land size.
6In this study, farms with holdings of larger than 10 acres are categorised as the treated
group, whereas farms with holdings of less than 10 acres are defined as the control group.
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Table 3.3 Baseline characteristics of the farm household with holdings of land
size
Variable Household
with
holdings of
(≤10 acre)
Household
with
holdings of
(>10 acre)
Test statis-
tics
Mean Std.
Dev
Mean Std.
Dev
Diff P
value
Output (kg) 8117.25 297.22 30247.03 1400.16 22129 0.000∗∗∗
Rice output per acre (kg) 1055.77 21.81 1146.86 24.74 91.09 0.009∗∗∗
Rice income (000 kyat) 1670.22 1143.52 6344.00 4621.03 4673.79 0.000∗∗∗
Total income (000 kyat) 2503.04 1426.83 7671.96 5480.56 5168.92 0.000∗∗∗
Landholding size (acre) 7.21 0.19 25.86 1.01 18.65 0.000∗∗∗
Credit per acre (000 kyat) 86.00 42.48 57.48 27.18 28.53 0.000∗∗∗
Household head
Age 50.73 0.61 51.76 0.74 1.03 0.294
Gender 1.04 0.01 1.05 0.01 0.01 0.975
At most primary 0.64 0.48 0.57 0.50 0.07 0.089
Secondary education 0.25 0.43 0.27 0.44 -0.02 0.582
High school 0.11 0.32 0.16 0.37 -0.05 0.081
(or) higher education
Farming experience 27.36 0.65 28.93 0.77 1.56 0.139
Number of household labours 2.90 1.45 2.92 1.65 0.02 0.863
Dependency ratio 0.43 0.01 0.48 0.02 0.05 0.015∗∗
Irrigation service 0.78 0.02 0.90 0.02 0.13 0.000∗∗∗
Agricultural extension 0.58 0.02 0.58 0.33 0.002 0.963
services
Region 0.57 0.02 0.86 0.02 0.28 0.000∗∗∗
Distance to township’s 18.54 1.10 14.20 0.87 4.34 0.008∗∗∗
bank branch
Total farm households (N) 413 221
Notes : *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively.
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3.5.3 Selection of the appropriate model specification
for the RD approach
As discussed earlier, it is best to begin with a graphical presentation to provide
the visual patterns for both the relationship between land size and credit per
acre, and the relationship between land size and rice output. In general, there
are two approaches for the regression discontinuity, namely the parametric
approach and non-parametric approach. Due to the small sample size and there
being no critical large number of data around the cut-off point, the parametric
approach should be used for the primary estimation in this study (Jacob et al.,
2012). Accordingly, the parametric approach is applied to the estimation of
the treatment effect on a functional form for that relationship, and selection of
an appropriate model. The equation of functional form is as follows:
Yi =
3∑
j=1
βjL
j
i + δTi +Xiα + λ1IRRIi + λ2REGIONi + λ3DISTi + εi (3.3)
Where Yi is the outcome variable (rice output and measure in kg), Ti is the
amount of credit per acre received by an individual farm household. House-
hold’s landholding size is used to measure the amount of credit per acre, as the
loan approval is made based on the acreage of holding paddy land size. The
actual cultivated land size might be different due to weather conditions, irriga-
tion, and the self-selection of households. Xi is a vector of farm i household
characteristics (age, gender, educational level of household head, household size
and dependency ratio, and agricultural extension services), irrigation service,
the effect of regions (Delta Region and Dry Zone), access to a township’s bank
branch, and Li represents household’s holdings of land acreage with third-degree
polynomial and εi is an unobserved error term.
If farm households mainly depend on land size for receiving loans, the
relationship between the treatment status (T) and assignment rule might be
deterministic. As mentioned previously, the sharp design is appropriate to
apply for the analysis if the deterministic relationship exists. However, there
is no finding for this relationship between treatment status and assignment
variable in this study. Specifically, some farm households receive more than the
maximum eligible amount, although their land sizes are below the cut-off point
(Li ≤ 10). In contrast, some farm households that own more than 10 acres of
land or above the cut-off point (Li >10) do not receive the eligible amount of
3.5 Methodology 98
the credit scheme.
Table 3.4 shows the treatment status of the credit scheme and farm’s land-
holding size. Of 413 farm households with holdings less than 10 acres of land,
nearly 57 per cent applied and received credits, while 8 per cent did not apply
for the credits from the MADB. Likewise, 33 per cent of farms having more
than 10 acres applied and received credits, while 1 per cent of households
did not apply for the credits. In this connection, the assignment variable to
treatment status mainly relies on the farm’s holding land size in a stochastic
manner that suggests the FRD approach.
Table 3.4 Treatment status of credit by farm households
Application of credit Status Total
Treated Group Control Group
Applied 364 213 577
(57%) (33%) (91%)
Not applied 49 8 57
(8%) (1%) (9%)
Total 413 221 634
(65%) (35%) (100%)
Notes : household with holding of land (≤10) acre is under treated group, while household
with holding of land (>10 acre) is under control group.
In order to analyse the impact of credit policy on rice production, an
instrumental variable (IV) approach is appropriate in the fuzzy regression
discontinuity design (Hahn et al., 2001). Theoretically, the discontinuity can be
used as an instrument variable for the treatment effect. Additionally, the local
linear regression or the polynomial regression is suitable to use for estimation of
the value of discontinuity for a continuous assignment variable in the regression
(Lee and Lemieux, 2009). The OLS regression estimates the first-stage equation
(reduced form) and predicts the coefficient of treatment Tˆi . This value is placed
at (Ti) in the second-stage equation (structured form) for the estimation of the
coefficient of treatment. Accordingly, a farm household’s land size is applied
as an instrument variable to estimate the effect of the credit policy. In the
reduced form, the credit per acre is a function of an instrument variable (Zi),
a third–degree polynomial of land holding size at the cut-off point (Li), and
controls household level covariates (Xi).
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The reduced form of credit per acre as a function of land size is as follows
at the first stage:
Ti =
3∑
j=1
βjL
j
i + γZi +Xiα + λ1IRRIi + λ2REGIONi + λ3DISTi + νi (3.4)
where Ti is the amount of credit per acre received by an individual farm house-
hold, Zi is the instrument variable, and it takes the value of 1 if farm household
has a maximum of 10 acres of land and Zi is 0 if otherwise. Li is land size
owned by an individual farm household and νi is the residual. The predicted
coefficient of Tˆi is taken into the second-stage equation for its effect on rice
output. However, the unobserved characteristics that capture rice production
are uncorrelated with the instrument variable, and that is required to identify
the assumption as E(Zi µi \ Xi, Li)=0. Under this assumption, the credit
program is estimated in the second stage (structured form) as
Yi =
3∑
j=1
βjL
j
i + δTˆi +Xiα + λ1IRRIi + λ2REGIONi + λ3DISTi + εi (3.5)
This study analyses the full sample, sub-samples with holdings of land (0-20)
acres, (5-15) acres and (8-12) acres to estimate the impact of credit on rice
production. To identify the power of the instrumental variable, the regression
of the threshold indicator variable D and land holding size polynomial on the
X variables is as
Xi = λ0 + λDi + λ1Li + λ2L2i + λ3L3i + ui (3.6)
Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), the balancing tests on observables X for the
full sample and sub-samples controlling for a third polynomial landholding size
are presented in Table 3.5. The estimates of this study are obtained using data
in intervals c ± h around the threshold c where c=10 acre and h is a bandwidth
suitable for comparing the ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups. A relatively small
interval around the household will reduce estimation precision due to having
too few observations. Taking a wide interval may resolve this but also introduce
bias from farms that are far from the threshold and unsuitable comparisons for
the farms below the threshold.
To address this trade-off, this study selects an interval such that it facil-
itates both balancing feature of the sample and the identifying power of the
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instrumental variable, but limits the loss of observations and precision of the
estimates. This study, therefore, analyses several intervals around the threshold,
the largest being 0-20 acres with the biggest sample size. However, the existing
literature suggests that small farmers tend to use MADB credit for subsistence
(LIFT, 2012), and it is, therefore, hard to disentangle the impact of credit on
rice production from subsistence consumption. Taking a smaller interval, at
5-15 acres and 8-12 acres of land, would avoid this problem by excluding the
smallest farmers but also reduce the sample size. For intervals closer around the
threshold, the instrument loses statistical power, presumably due to sample size.
Balancing test results are presented in Table 3.5. Controlling for a third
order polynomial of land size, the full sample shows a few statistically significant
differences between households below and above the threshold in X. Farmers
above the threshold report on average lower quality irrigation systems, are
more likely to live in the Dry Zone and less likely to live in Delta Region. When
we focus on the symmetric intervals around the 10-acre threshold, then the
statistical significance disappears, except for 5-15 and 8-12 acre intervals. These
results suggest that the factors that matter for the outcome are continuous
in the assignment variable, Di. There is little significant difference between
households below and above the threshold in X, suggesting that the landholding
size is appropriate for an instrument variable in this case.
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Table 3.5 Balancing tests of household characteristics
VARIABLES Full
sample
0-20 5-15 8-12
Household head
Age 1.29 -1.20 -2.16 0.97
(1.65) (2.56) (2.82) (3.06)
Gender (1=male) 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.02
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
At most primary -0.05 -0.11 -0.04 0.15
education (1=yes) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.18)
Secondary education 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.01
(1=yes) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15)
High school/ -0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.16∗
higher education (1=yes) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
Farming experience 0.21 -1.90 -2.34 1.82
(1.96) (2.98) (2.82) (3.38)
Household labour 0.02 -0.06 0.04 0.75
(0.24) (0.32) (0.42) (0.42)
Dependency ratio -0.003 0.01 0.01 -0.06
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
Irrigation deemed good -0.14∗∗∗ -0.13∗ -0.17 -0.21∗∗
/very good (1=yes) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11)
Agricultural extension services -0.01 -0.14 0.16∗ 0.12
(1=yes) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.17)
Distance to market (km) 1.14 2.86 5.23 14.07
(2.93) (3.55) (6.08) (12.37)
Delta Region (1=yes) -0.16∗∗ -0.17 -0.23 -0.46∗∗
(0.07) (0.11) (0.15) (0.21)
Observations 634 537 293 149
Notes : 1) *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively. 2)Standard errors are presented by number in parentheses.
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3.6 Results
3.6.1 Estimates of the full sample specification
Credit policy in Myanmar focuses mainly on small farm holders; therefore, the
provision of credit cannot be assumed to be random under this policy. Unob-
served characteristics such as soil quality, weather conditions and loan amounts
from other sources may generate positive effects on the yield of rice paddy;
therefore, OLS estimates of credit received are likely to lead an overestimate.
In order to control for those factors, the instrumental variable (IV) is created
to estimate the effects of the credit program on rice production. As mentioned
earlier, the status of land ownership is used as an IV, and takes the value of 1
for farms with holdings of at most 10 acres of land or the value of 0 for those
with holdings of more than 10 acres.
Firstly, this study analyses the impact of credit per acre on rice production,
rice output per acre, rice income and total income for the whole sample size.
Table 3.6 shows the results for the first stage regression and reduced form
regression. The result of the first stage regression shows a negative correlation
between the amount of credit per acre and the threshold indicator variable
(Z) (holdings larger than 10 acres of land). However, the coefficient is not
significant. Similarly, there is no effect of landholding size on rice output as
the coefficient of threshold indicator (Z) is not significant.
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Table 3.6 First stage and reduced form regressions of full sample
Variable First stage Reduced form
CONS 119.02*** 5000.14
(14.27) (5497.47)
Acres landholding > 10 -6.41 -143.20
(Z) (5.70) (1134.96)
Acres landholding -2.14 1024.84***
(LAND) (1.59) (176.95)
Acres landholding squared 0.02 18.75*
(LAND2) (0.05) (10.61)
Acres landholding cubed 0.0001 -0.30**
(LAND3 ) (0.0005) (0.14)
AGE 0.03 1.04
(0.14) (35.77)
GENDER -1.99 -2319.71
(5.66) (2256.62)
HHLAB 0.24 -668.54
(1.17) (441.94)
DEPENDENCY 0.21 -5083.33*
(8.43) (2930.26)
SECONDARY EDUCATION 2.87 503.25
(2.65) (1121.88)
HIGHER EDUCATION 6.10 -469.88
(6.14) (1939.83)
AES -2.83 886.47
(3.22) (1078.89)
IRRI -3.63 -11.18
(4.53) (693.52)
DIST -0.81*** -34.21
(0.24) (57.07)
REGION -5.58 5238.10***
(6.62) (1399.48)
R2 0.34 0.72
N 634 634
Notes:1) *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively. 2)Standard errors are presented by number in parentheses.
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Table 3.7 Instrumental variable regressions of full sample
Variable Rice output Rice output Rice income Total income
(kg) (acre) (Kyat) (000 Kyat)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CON 2341.12 -625.65 -1072.88 -6744.86
(21848.74) (1945.84) (4650.98) (10941.18)
Acres landholding > 10 22.34 12.59 20.59 77.98
(Z) (179.33) (15.05) (38.47) (86.36)
Acres landholding 1072.66** 35.47 283.27** 416.17
(LAND) (501.76) (54.74) (117.87) (322.12)
Acres landholding squared 18.39* -0.31 3.30 5.88
(LAND2) (10.77) (0.96) (2.56) (6.73)
Acres landholding cubed -0.30** -0.001 -0.05** -0.11**
(LAND3) (0.14) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06)
AGE 0.39 -1.82 -8.76 -12.25
(36.64) (2.89) (9.43) (17.02)
GENDER -2275.26 -1.28 2.62 -200.41
(2387.94) (178.35) (409.43) (720.39)
HHLAB -673.94 -12.90 -172.28** 20.23
(455.16) (25.63) (80.60) (135.24)
DEP -5088.05* -112.99 -927.91 -1028.77
(3039.34) (194.18) (694.30) (1136.19)
EDU3 439.08 7.70 118.75 162.59
(1223.53) (67.95) (222.19) (445.04)
EDU45 -606.22 -89.61 -217.42 -404.89
(2358.49) (154.37) (470.97) (875.12)
AES 949.61 81.27 310.29 343.29
(1194.44) (86.88) (279.58) (468.67)
IRRI 69.99 201.88* 501.57* 644.76
(922.99) (111.94) (262.69) (521.89)
DIST -16.06 8.42 5.91 39.97
(160.22) (14.97) (36.24) (77.62)
REGION 5362.66*** 402.75** -248.01 -547.64
(1833.63) (192.53) (683.94) (1014.44)
R2 0.71 0.56 0.69 0.26
N 634 634 634 634
Notes : 1) *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively. 2)Standard errors are presented by number in parentheses.
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The IV estimator of credit on rice output in Equation 3.5 is provided in
Table 3.7, column 2. The result does not provide any evidence of the effect
of credit per acre on rice production. Column 4 and column 5 of Table 3.7
show the effect of credit per acre on rice income, and total income respectively.
However, there is no impact of credit per acre on both rice income and total
income of rural households in the selected regions. The possibility might be
the effect of a large difference in landholding sizes among farm households and
larger standard errors that drive the weak instrument for the full sample.
Under the MADB’s credit scheme, farm households are eligible to apply
for paddy loans from the MADB for up to 10 acres of land. However, the
actual cultivated land size might differ from the landholding size, as farm
households could make decisions based on irrigation, weather and plant dis-
ease. Most farmers in the Dry Zone are more interested in the other non-rice
crops, such as pulses, beans, peanuts and sugarcane because of less demand
for water and increased demand of these crops. In this connection, the credit
per acre received by some farm households is more than 100,000 Kyat. Of
577 farm households that applied for credits from the MADB, nearly 32 per
cent of those farmers had more than 100,000 Kyat of credit per acre in this study.
3.6.2 The results for farm households with various land-
holding sizes
This section discusses the sub-sample of farm households with different land-
holding sizes, as the threshold variable has no strong evidence of its impact on
the amount of credit per acre for the full sample. To minimize the cofounding
effects associated with small and large rice output, farm households with hold-
ings 0-20 acres of land, 5-15 acres of land and 8-12 acres of land are analysed
to estimate the effect of credit policy.
Table 3.8 shows the results of the first stage form of Equation 3.4 for land-
holding size of 0-20 acres, 5-15 acres and 8-12 acres. There is a clear effect of the
threshold variable on the credit amount per acre at different intervals around
the discontinuity. If the farms owned more than 10 acres of the cultivated
land, they would receive 100,000 Kyat (USD 100) less per acre on the average
amount of credit. The correlation between the treatment (credit per acre) and
instrument (landholding size) is negative and significant at 5 per cent for 5-15
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Table 3.8 First stage regressions for credit per acre at different intervals
Variables Land size (acre)
(0− 20) (5− 15) (8− 12)
Constant 124.33*** 196.99** 3368.14*
(24.06) (88.32) (2032.41)
Acres landholding > 10 -21.20*** -16.96** -26.63***
(Z) (5.22) (6.71) (12.74)
Acres landholding (LAND) -15.29* -43.54 -1012.00*
(9.04) (30.10) (618.95)
Acres landholding squared 1.67* 5.19* 102.32*
(LAND2) (0.94) (3.15) (61.77)
Acres landholding cubed -0.05* -0.19* -3.39*
(LAND3) (0.02) (0.10) (2.02)
Observations 537 293 149
R2 0.04 0.05 0.07
F 5.47 8.16 3.74
Notes : 1) *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively. 2)Standard errors are presented by number in parentheses.
acres, and 1 per cent for 0-20 acres and 8-12 acres.
The results are consistent with Figure 3.1, and state that the farm house-
holds with holdings of more than 10 acres of land are associated with a decline
in the average amount of credit per acre from 7,000 Kyat (USD 7) up to 10,000
Kyat (USD 10). These results strongly indicate that the status of landholding
size is relevant as an instrumental variable in analysing the impact of credit
policy on rice production in Myanmar.
Table 3.9 shows the reduced form regressions of the threshold indicator
(landholding size) on rice output, rice output per acre, rice income and total
income for farm households with holdings small interval at 8-12 acres of land.
The coefficient of threshold variable (Z) is not statistically significant for
rice output, rice output per acre, rice income and total income. For this
small interval around the threshold, there is no significance in reduced form,
presumably due to a few observations.
3.6 Results 107
Table 3.9 Reduced form regressions (8-12 acres)
Variables
Rice output Rice output Rice income Total income
(kg) per acre (kg) (000 Kyat) (000 Kyat)
Constant -22632.44 3397.60 -65698.46 2490.08
(415133.30) (21811.87) (91703.53) (76312.37)
Acres landholding >10 -2476.20 -244.37 32.78 -377.35
(Z) (2943.32) (179.27) (742.97) (637.72)
Acres landholding 12629.46 -592.89 20401.70 -102.98
(LAND) (125917.60) (6504.27) (27685.02) (23163.94)
Acres landholding -1583.41 45.41 -2020.73 37.60
squared (LAND2) (12568.22) (637.60) ( 2743.59) (2316.71)
Acres landholding 68.30 -0.86 66.53 -1.35
cubed (LAND3) (412.47) (20.53) (89.26) (76.31)
Observations 149 149 149 149
R2 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01
F 1.87 0.63 2.07 0.89
Notes : 1) *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively. 2)Standard errors are presented by number in parentheses.
Table 3.10 provides the estimates of the effect of credit amount per acre on
rice production, rice output per acre, rice income and total income by control-
ling third polynomial land size. The IV estimates of MADB credit do not have
any significant effect on all outcomes. The possible reason is no significance
in the reduced form regression due to a few number of farm households at an
interval of 8-12 acres of land.
The IV estimate of the credit program on rice production can be manually
calculated as the ratio of the value of the reduced form coefficient to the value
of first stage regression coefficient from column 2 of Table 3.9 and column 2 of
Table 3.8 (-2,476.20/-26.63 =92.96). The result of this estimate is consistent
with the estimate of local average treatment effect (LATE) from the 2SLS
approach that is displayed in column 2 of Table 3.10. When the 2SLS approach
is used, the result shows little evidence of relationship between credit per acre
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Table 3.10 Instrumental variable estimates without control variables (8-12 acres)
Variable Rice output Rice output Rice income Total income
(kg) per acre (kg) (000 Kyat) (000 Kyat)
CONS -335736.3 -27501.06 -61553.45 -45222.66
(384296.80) (19402.63) (79011.28) (80413.93)
Credit per acre 92.96 9.17 -1.23 14.17
(106.93) (6.84) (28.12) (21.80)
LAND 106705.6 8691.01 19156.27 14232.94
(117343.6) (5843.86) (24229.30) (24710.15)
LAND2 -11094.67 -893.21 -1894.81 -1411.78
(11933.67) (589.91) ( 2482.72) (2535.81)
LAND3 383.27 30.22 62.37 46.65
(400.48) (19.68) (4.85) (85.96)
N 149 149 149 149
F 1.81 0.71 2.08 0.88
Notes : 1) *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%,5% and 1% levels
respectively. 2)Standard errors are presented by number in parentheses.
and rice production.
Table 3.11 shows the estimates with controlling for household characteris-
tics, agricultural extension services and irrigation, and regional characteristics.
Similar to the estimates with controlling for a third degree polynomial of acres
land holding, the results show no evidence of MADB credit impacts on rice
output, rice output per acre, rice income and total income for those who have
8 to 12 acres of land size.
The reduced form regressions for the 0-20 and 5-15 acre landholding interval
is presented in Table A3. Similar to the result of 8-12 acres of land size, there is
no statistically significance in difference for farms on either side of the threshold.
However, the coefficients for total income for both the interval of 0-20 and 5-15
acres are statistically significant at 5 per cent level.
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Table 3.11 Instrumental variable estimates with control variables (8-12 acres)
Variable Rice output Rice output Rice income Total income
(kg) per acre (kg) (000 Kyat) (000 Kyat)
Credit per acre -46.66 6.49 14.94 51.77
(191.04) (12.75) (50.42) (73.56)
Control variables
Land size polynomiala Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics b Yes Yes Yes Yes
Irrigation c Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional characteristics d Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 149 149 149 149
R2 0.50 0.06 0.49 0.41
F 50.68 4.99 38.38 41.75
Notes: (a) Cultivated land size polynomial: a third degree polynomial of cultivated land size
(acres); (b) Farm and personal characteristics: Household head’s age, gender, education
levels, number of household labours, dependency ratio. (c) availability of extension services
and Irrigation: access to very good/good irrigation. (d) Regional characteristics: Distance to
the market and regional dummy variables for Sagaing (Dry Zone), Bago (Delta Region) and
Ayeyarwady (Delta Region). Standard errors are presented by number in parentheses.
*, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
The results of credit on the sub-sample of 0-20 and 5-15 acres of landhold-
ing size (with or without controls) are presented in Table A4 and Table A5
respectively. Tables show a little impact of credit per acre on rice production,
rice yield, income from rice and total income for all sub-sample of around the
discontinuity point.
In general, this study finds no convincing evidence of MADB credit impacts
on yield. The lack of impact on rice yield is the possible focus of rice farmers
on producing high-quality rice. As described in Chapter 2, Ayeyarwaddy and
Sagaing are the two largest regions producing Paw San rice, which is recognized
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as one of the world’s most high-quality rice. The adoption of this variety
remains relatively limited, however, since it requires more input and is more
labour intensive while having a lower yield than other varieties (Myint and
Napasintuwong, 2016). Meanwhile, Paw San rice is priced about 33-36 percent
higher and enjoys more demand than other rice (Myint and Napasintuwong,
2016). In this situation, it is the rice income rather than rice output or rice
yield that is relevant for farmers. Having said that, there is no evidence of
MADB credit impacts on rice income. Again, this result is robust regardless of
whether controls are included or not.
Table A6 presents the relationship between credit per acre and household’s
total income. This study finds statistically significant effects of MADB credit
on total income for 0-20 and 5-15 acres with or without control variables. The
estimates are larger in magnitude for the 5-15 acres land holding interval as
compared to that of 0-20 acres. The results remain robust although control
variables for farm characteristics, irrigation and regional characteristics are
included.
As is seen in Table A6, there is a positive effect of credit on total farm
income for an interval of 0-20 or 5-15 acres, possibly reflecting the fungibility
of money. Farms plant rice because they are not in a position to make an
alternative crop choice when it comes to rice land, at least not in the short
term, since their crop choices are bounded by their land use certificates which
require them to plant rice in at least one season. They, therefore, optimize
their total farm income, not rice income or output specifically. They could
have used the option of cheap credit for rice production to fund other activities
that generate more profit.
3.6.3 Robustness checks
In the FRD design, the non-parametric regression approach is used to estimate
the local average treatment effect (LATE) choosing a small neighbourhood
(bandwidth) on both sides of the cut-off point. In addition, this design uses the
data within the bandwidths to estimate the ratio of two differences between
the treated group and the non-treated group at that cut-off point for both the
outcome and treatment regressions (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). The ratio of
the two discontinuities can be estimated as
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βRDD =
E(Yi\l¯ ≥ Li > l¯ − ψ)− E(Yi\l¯ < Li ≤ l¯ + ψ)
E(Ti\l¯ ≥ Li > l¯ − ψ)− E(Ti\l¯ < Li ≤ l¯ + ψ)
(3.7)
Where Y is the output variable (rice output), T is the treatment variable (credit
per acre), Li is the total holding land size of an individual household, and l is
the rating variable or the land size (10 acres) at the cut-off point. According
to Lee and Lemieux (2010), the results of the sensitivity of IV estimation
allow for the changes in the interval of assigned land size because different
bandwidth might show the different estimates. Following Lee and Lemieux for
the FRD with varying interval, Table A7 in Appendices displays the results
of IV-2SLS regressions including the covariates. Meng (2013) explained that
the instrumental variable should produce insignificant 2SLS estimates between
the treated group and non-treated group if there were no differential trends
around the cut-off point. In this study, the robustness checks are estimated
with different intervals of land size with (±0.5 acre, ±0.1 acre and ±1.5 acre),
specifically, the IV estimates of land size for 9.5-10.5, 9-11, and 8.5-11.5 by de-
termining with covariates. The covariates used in the robustness checks are the
same variables of the main specification model. The specifications for different
intervals of acre for (±0.5 acre, ±0.1 acre and ±1.5 acre) are shown in columns
2, 3 and 4 in Table A7 respectively. None of those coefficients of β with band-
widths between 8.5 and 11.5 are statistically significant, suggesting that there is
no difference in farm households with holdings land size around the cut-off point.
3.7 Conclusion
In an attempt to promote the development of agricultural sector and rural areas
in Myanmar, the MADB is the main financial institution providing agricultural
loans throughout the country. Due to the lack of sufficient capital, there are
some limitations on loans provided by the MADB. In recent years, the MADB
bi-annually has lent 100,000 Kyat per acre for paddy for a maximum of 10
acres at an interest rate of 8.5 per cent per year. Under this framework, farm
households with holdings of up to 10 acres can benefit from the policy as they
receive an amount of credit in accordance with their landholding size. In other
words, the MADB mainly supports smallholder farmers compared to farmers
with medium or large holdings. Large farm holders, therefore, can receive only
loan amounts for up to 10 acres of their land. In order to address the impact of
credit on rice production, this study has investigated how the credit program
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might help increase rice production in the selected households.
Since the provision of credit is based on the landholding size of a farm
household, a fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD) approach has been applied
to investigate the effect of credit policy on rice production in this study. The
graphs clearly present the discontinuity points between rice output and land
size, as well as between credit per acre and land size. Findings show that
farmers who have a maximum 10 acres of land are likely to have comparable
baseline characteristics with farmers who have more than 10 acres. Furthermore,
the results of robustness checks confirm the validity of regression discontinuity.
The status of land size is constructed as an instrumental variable to estimate
its effect on the amount of credit per acre. The results for full sample do not
show any impact on credit per acre on rice output and rice income.
This study takes the symmetric intervals around the thresholds, especially
8-12 acres, 5-15 acres and 0-20 acres of land to analyse the impact of credit on
rice production. The results from the first stage regression for landholding size
of 5-15 acres is significant at the 5 per cent level, and 0-20 acres and 8-12 acres
are significant at 1 per cent levels, suggesting that the status of land size seems
to be appropriate to use as an instrumental variable in this research. the result
for an interval of 8-12 acres of land show no statistically significant the effect
of MADB on rice output, rice income and total income with or without con-
trol for agricultural extension services, irrigation, and regional characteristics.
Nonetheless, there is an impact of the program on total household income for
landholding sizes of 0-20 and 5-15 acres with and without control covariates,
suggesting its positive spillover effects on other farm income activities.
Although different methodologies were used to analyse the impact of credit
on rice productivity, the result of this study was contrary to those found by
Aktaruzzaman (2013) and Nan Wutyi et al. (2013) who found evidence of the
impact of credit on the small farm size group. All in all, this study finds little
evidence of MADB credit impacts on rice output and rice income in the selected
regions. On the other hand, a production cost of approximately 150,000 Kyat
(USD 150) to 400,000 Kyat (USD 400) per acre in this study confirms that the
current availability for loans provided by MADB covers half of the production
cost per acre. Due to an insufficient amount of credit for production cost per
acre, farmers cannot use quality seeds and the required amount of fertilizers,
and many of them decided to borrow money from local money lenders at much
higher interest rates. As a result, farmers cannot improve rice productivity or
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increase their income. The MADB, therefore, should take into account the cost
of production and provision of the amount of loans to help increase productivity,
reduce poverty and develop rural areas.
Based on insights from this paper, the MADB should take full responsibility
of the process for credit screening and loan-making decisions. Importantly,
the MADB should provide agricultural loans without limits on land size and
encourage large farm holders to improve their productivity. For farmers who
have more than 10 acres of agricultural land size should receive more credit with
respect to their landholding size to cover the cost of rice production. Under
the limited farm size policy of the MADB results in having burden to get more
lenders who charge 5 to 20 per cent interest per month for loans. With regards
to the repayment of loans, the MADB should reconsider the loan collection
period as the full repayment is expected during harvest time.
According to the current repayment rule, farmers are not able to keep and
sell the rice output until the price of rice increases. The income of farmers may
increase if they can sell their product at higher prices. The longer the farm
households can hold rice output, the higher the income and the more profit
they have. On the other hand, the government should allow the MADB to
have some relief from the rule that the MADB has to transfer 75 per cent of its
profits to the state, and help raise sustainable capital for the MADB. In doing
so, the MADB is likely to release its constraints, such as provision of loans for
limited crops, the amount of credit per acre and land size in the near future.
More importantly, the government should re-establish village banks that might
help farmers to save travelling time and transportation costs for access to credit.
However, there are some limitations in this study that should be accounted
for future research. Although the status of land size is used as an instrument
variable to investigate the effect of credit programs, there is a need for the
analysis of effects of regional characteristics. By understanding the role of
credit in rice production, therefore, the estimates of performance of firms in
different regions should be separately considered for achieving higher levels of
rice production in the selected regions.
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3.8 Appendices
Table A1: Summary statistics for farm households with landholding of ≤ 10
acres
Variable Units Mean Std.
Dev
Min Max
Output(kg) (Y) kg 8117.25 6040.17 209.00 35530
Output per acre kg 1055.77 443.31 104.50 2299
Landholding size (LAND) acre 5.85 2.50 1.00 10
Age of household head (AGE) years 50.73 12.29 22.00 86
Gender of household head (GENDER) male=1 1.04 0.20 1 2
At most primary education (EDU12) yes=1 0.64 0.48 0 1
Secondary education (EDU3) yes=1 0.25 0.43 0 1
High school/ higher education yes=1 0.11 0.32 0 1
(EDU45)
Experience of household head (EXP) years 27.37 13.25 2.00 65
Household labour (HHLAB) number 2.91 1.45 1 10
Dependency ratio (DEP) ratio 0.43 0.23 0 0.86
Irrigation services (IRRI) rank 0.78 0.42 0 1
Agricultural extension services yes=1 0.58 0.49 0 1
(AES)
Region (REGION) Delta=1 0.57 0.49 0 1
Distance to township’s bank km 18.54 22.32 1.61 96.60
branch (DIST)
Rice_income 000 Kyat 1670.22 1143.53 50.00 6620
Total_income 000 Kyat 2503.04 1426.84 120.00 13250
Credit per acre from MADB 000 Kyat 109.08 59.58 0.00 285.71
Total farm households (N) number 413
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Table A2: Summary Statistics for farm households with landholding of >10
acres
Variable Units Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Output(kg) (Y) kg 30247.03 20814.91 564 129580
Output per acre kg 1146.86 367.75 31 2382.60
Landholding size (LAND) acre 22.45 13.27 10 70
Age of household head (AGE) years 52 11 27 83
Gender of household head (GENDER) male=1 1.05 0.21 1 2
At most primary education (EDU12) yes=1 0.57 0.50 0 1
Secondary education (EDU3) yes=1 0.27 0.44 0 1
High school/ higher education yes=1 0.16 0.37 0 1
(EDU45)
Experience of household head (EXP) years 29 11 4 60
Household labour (HHLAB) number 2.92 1.65 1 9
Dependency ratio (DEP) ratio 0.48 0.24 0 0.9
Irrigation services (IRRI) rank 0.90 0.29 0 1
Agricultural extension services yes=1 0.58 0.49 0 1
(AES)
Region (REGION) Delta=1 0.86 0.35 0 1
Distance to township’s bank km 214.20 12.90 2 97
branch (DIST)
Rice_income 000 Kyat 6344.00 4621.03 162 24750
Total_income 000 Kyat 7671.97 5480.57 855 38190
Credit per acre from MADB 000 Kyat 71.54 36.82 0 193.61
Total farm households (N) number 221
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Table A4: Instrumental variable estimates with different sets of control variables
(0-20 acres)
Variable Rice
Out-
put
(kg)
Output
per
acre
(kg)
Rice
Income
(USD)
Rice
Out-
put
(kg)
Output
per
acre
(kg)
Rice
income
(USD)
Credit per acre 34.29 4.48 8.27 -5.90 1.03 8.73
(82.34) (4.63) (14.54) (65.86) (3.27) (13.76)
Control variables
Land size polynomiala Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics b No No No Yes Yes Yes
Irrigation c No No No Yes Yes Yes
Regional charateristics d No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 537 537 537 537 537 537
Notes: (a) Cultivated land size polynomial: a third degree polynomial of cultivated land size
(acres); (b) Farm and personal characteristics: Household head’s age, gender, education
levels, number of household labours, dependency ratio. (c) availability of extension services
and Irrigation: access to very good/good irrigation. (d) Regional characteristics: Distance to
the market and regional dummy variables for Sagaing (Dry Zone), Bago (Delta Region) and
Ayeyarwady (Delta Region). Standard errors are presented by number in parentheses.
*, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table A5: Instrumental variable estimates with different sets of control variables
(5-15 acres)
Variable Rice
Out-
put
(kg)
Output
per
acre
(kg)
Rice
Income
(USD)
Rice
Out-
put
(kg)
Output
per
acre
(kg)
Rice
income
(USD)
Credit per acre 120.41 9.87 15.55 62.65 6.67 19.57
(112.56) (13.39) (23.06) (118.94) (6.93) (30.02)
Control variables
Land size polynomiala Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics b No No No Yes Yes Yes
Irrigation c No No No Yes Yes Yes
Regional characteristics d No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 293 293 293 293 293 293
Notes: (a) Cultivated land size polynomial: a third degree polynomial of cultivated land size
(acres); (b) Farm and personal characteristics: Household head’s age, gender, education
levels, number of household labours, dependency ratio. (c) availability of extension services
and Irrigation: access to very good/good irrigation. (d) Regional characteristics: Distance to
the market and regional dummy variables for Sagaing (Dry Zone), Bago (Delta Region) and
Ayeyarwady (Delta Region). Standard errors are presented by number in parentheses.
*, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table A6: Instrumental variable estimates with different sets of control variables
(0-20 acres) and (5-15) acres acres
Variable Total Income (000 Kyat)
(0-20) (5-15) (0-20) (5-15)
Credit per acre 26.47* 36.14* 22.29* 57.57*
(14.14) (22.19) (21.80) (35.71)
Control variables
Land size polynomiala Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics b No No Yes Yes
Irrigation c No No Yes Yes
Regional characteristics d No No Yes Yes
Observations 537 537 293 293
Notes: (a) Cultivated land size polynomial: a third degree polynomial of cultivated land size
(acres); (b) Farm and personal characteristics: Household head’s age, gender, education
levels, number of household labours, dependency ratio. (c) availability of extension services
and Irrigation: access to very good/good irrigation. (d) Regional characteristics: Distance to
the market and regional dummy variables for Sagaing (Dry Zone), Bago (Delta Region) and
Ayeyarwady (Delta Region). Standard errors are presented by number in parentheses.
*, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 10% 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table A7: Instrumental variable estimates of the various specifications with
covariates
Variable Different interval of land size
±0.5 acre ±1 acre ±1.5 acre
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit per acre -135.33 -286.25 -431.82
(636.61) (484.24) (1647.22)
Control variables
Land size polynomiala Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics b Yes Yes Yes
Irrigation c Yes Yes Yes
Regional characteristics d Yes Yes Yes
Observations 68 93 103
Notes: (a) Cultivated land size polynomial: a third degree polynomial of culti-
vated land size (acres); (b) Farm and personal characteristics: Household head’s age, gender,
farming experience, education level, household size, dependency ratio. (c) availability
of extension services and Irrigation: access to very good/good irrigation. (d) Regional
characteristics: Distance to the market and regional dummy variables for Sagaing (Dry
Zone), Bago (Delta Region) and Ayeyarwady (Delta Region).
Standard errors are presented by number in parentheses. *, ** and *** correspond to
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Chapter 4
An analysis of the determinants
of income diversification and
income inequality in rural
economy in Myanmar
4.1 Introduction
Rural households in many developing countries are increasingly diversifying
their sources of income. In recent years, rural households have no longer
engaged in the agricultural sector alone, and they instead combine a wide
range of activities to construct a diversified livelihood portfolio (Ellis, 2000b).
Through diversification, households can increase their aggregate income level
from farming activities, off-farm wage employment, non-farming activities and
remittances from family members who are working in urban areas and abroad.
Diversifying incomes from both farm and non-farm activities has become a
widespread strategy for reducing environmental risks, alleviating poverty, de-
veloping rural areas, and improving the living standards of rural households
(Zhao and Barry, 2014).
Given the important role of income diversification, much of the literature
has demonstrated the factors determining income diversification among rural
households. Income diversification is mostly determined by ‘seasonality, risk,
labour markets, credit markets, asset strategies and coping farming activities’
(Ellis, 2000a, p.299). For example, Adebayo et al. (2012) have examined the
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educational level of household head, farm size, membership of cooperatives and
non-farm income that determine income diversification in Nigeria’s Kaduna
State. Similarly, a recent study by Agyeman et al. (2014) has found that the
main factors relating to income diversification in Ghana are age, the gender of
the head of household, educational level of household head, income per capita
of household, and access to roads.
Income diversification, however, is associated with a higher risk of income
failure for higher income households, and a lower risk of income failure for
lower income households (Ellis, 2000b). Income diversification, therefore, can
have either a positive or negative effect on the income of household. Barrett
et al. (2001) showed a positive effect of income diversification on living stan-
dards of rural households in Africa. In a recent study, for example, Zhao and
Barry (2014) have also found a positive impact of income diversification on
lower income households in China. In contrast, Katchova (2005) investigated a
negative impact of income diversification on households in the United States.
In addition, a number of studies have paid attention to the impact of
non-farm income and its contribution to income inequality among households.
However, the findings from these studies show different results for the effect
of non-farm income on household income inequality. For example, empirical
studies by Elbers and Lanjouw (2001), and Senadza (2011) found that increased
income from non-farm sources may raise income inequality among rural house-
holds in Ecuador and Ghana respectively. In contrast, Adepoju and Oyewole
(2014) argued that an increased income in rural households in Ghana from
non-farm income activity can reduce inequality.
In the case of Myanmar, 75 per cent of people living in rural areas are
engaged in the agriculture sector. Most rural farm households have become a
focus of the diversification of agricultural activities for their income sources
since the late 1980s. During the socialist period (between 1962 and 1988),
Myanmar’s economic policy heavily emphasised rice production (Soe and Fisher,
1990). Under this policy framework, the government took over all activities
of production, distribution, transportation and exporting. However, market
reforms in 1987 and 2003, removed the quota of compulsorily procured paddy,
and released the restrictions on seven varieties of pulses and beans (Thein, 2004)
As a result of these reforms, farm households could freely decide to cultivate
a variety of cash crops. Production of pulses and beans, therefore, has expanded
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greatly since the early 1990s. The reasons for the expansion in pulse production
include an increased demand for pulses, the increased price of pulses, less de-
mand for water, and especially less government regulation of exports of pulses
while rice exports are still under government’s control. Farmers, therefore, grow
more commercial crops of pulses and beans in the summer season.
Although the rural economy has to some extent diversified, participation
in crop diversification, off-farm activities and non-farm activities depends on
rainfall and irrigated water, the condition of the soil, labour availability, dis-
tance to market, and access to credit. The degree of diversification is driven by
regional specialization, as production of some crops is essentially dependent on
soil quality and availability of water.
The literature on the determinants of income diversification and its effect on
rural households in Myanmar is limited. Okamoto (2008) investigated the be-
haviour and welfare of rural households in Myanmar under the transition-period
to a market economy. Her findings showed that farmers who concentrated
on rice production had lower incomes than those who grow both rice and
pulses. Kurosaki (2008) also investigated crop choices, farm income and po-
litical relations in Myanmar and found that there was a negative relationship
between paddy acreage share and per-acre crop income. In the case of Myanmar,
however, the previous literature has not paid attention to the factors determin-
ing income diversification from different sources of rural household incomes.
Moreover, studies of livelihood strategies and their contribution to income
inequality among farm households in Myanmar have received little attention in
the literature. To fill this gap in the literature, this chapter contributes to the
understanding of income diversification and its impact on rural households.
This study attempts to investigate specific patterns of rural income di-
versification and their effects on farm households in different rural areas in
Myanmar. A better understanding of the link between income diversification
and overall income inequality will guide rural households in the selected regions
to increase their income in more efficient ways. The research questions that
guide this paper are: ‘What are the factors influencing income diversification
in Myanmar’s rural economy?’, and ‘Does income diversification contribute
to income inequality among rural households?’. The remaining part of this
chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 provides a brief background to
Myanmar agriculture. Section 4.3 explains the patterns of diversification in
rural areas in Myanmar. Section 4.4 discuss the literature on income diver-
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sification. Section 4.5 describes the data sources and variables, and Section
4.6 presents the patterns of diversification in the selected areas. Section 4.7
discusses the methodologies used in this study and reports the empirical results.
Section 4.8 analyse the income inequality and discusses the results of the Gini
coefficient. Section 4.9 presents the conclusion of findings.
4.2 Background to Myanmar agriculture
4.2.1 Myanmar’s agricultural policies
Rice is Myanmar’s most dominant crop as it is not only a staple food for
the Myanmar people but also the main foreign exchange earner. During the
socialist period (1962-1988), the government controlled all food production
activities to ensure food security. Myanmar had a state monopoly over both
domestic and international in agricultural products until the late 1990s. In
1963, the government began exercising greater controls over agriculture. It
started specifying what crops should be grown in particular regions. Especially
for rice production, it introduced a compulsory procurement scheme whereby
farmers had to deliver a defined percentage of their produce to the government
at a fixed procurement price by the government.
Farmers in Myanmar’s main rice-growing areas had to deliver approxi-
mately 20 per cent of their gross output. However, the quota proportion was
relatively lower in other rice-growing regions. Farmers who failed either to
contribute the quota determined by the government or to cultivate the planned
crops lost their land tillage rights for the next year. More strictly, the state
owned all farm lands and prohibited farmers to transfer, sell or mortgage their
land tillage rights to others. Under this framework, there was little incentive
for farmers to invest in land productivity, which resulted in no significant im-
provement in the agriculture sector during the socialist period (Okamoto, 2008).
This changed after 1987, when the government started to move towards
a market economy and began to lift trade restrictions on paddy, and seven
varieties of pulses and beans, and maize. In 1988, the government reduced
the quota of monsoon paddy that was compulsorily procured from farmers.
According to the reform, farmers were now free to choose the cultivation of
all crops and to sell their output in domestic markets. The government also
lifted the restrictions on the private export of some agricultural crops such as
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black gram, green gram, maize and pigeon pea. However, rice exports remained
under state control through the Association of Myanmar Agricultural Produce
Trading (MAPT).
In 1992-1993, the government initiated the Summer Paddy Production
(SPP) program with the expansion of land and a huge investment in irrigation
projects in an attempt to promote rice production. The total sown acreage
under summer paddy increased significantly from 0.8 million acres in 1992–1993
to 2 million acres in 1999–2000. Between 1988 and 1999, the Ministry of
Agriculture and Irrigation completed 108 irrigation projects. According to the
SPP program, farmers could freely grow commercial pulses and beans in the
summer season unless those farmers were included in the planned areas.
In 2003, the government implemented a second phase of market reforms
and finally abolished the procurement system (Okamoto, 2005). Due to less
government regulation given in the production of pulses, these products have
been freely sold in domestic markets and exported to international market1.
In this connection, rural farm households had been given more incentives to
diversify the cultivation of crops. Indeed, the production of pulses increased
significantly after the agricultural reform in 1987.
Similar to the expansion of sown acreage for summer paddy, the cultivated
land for pulses has been increased both in Lower Myanmar and in Upper
Myanmar. More specifically, Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay regions in Upper
Myanmar, and Yangon, Bago and Ayeyarwaddy regions in Lower Myanmar are
the major regions for the production of pulses. The total sown acreage of pulse
and paddy has increased by 310 per cent and 33 per cent production respec-
tively between 1988-1989 and 2000-2001 (Okamoto, 2008). The expansion of
sown acreage for pulse production and increased domestic and international de-
mand for pulses were the main factors behind the increase in pulse production2 .
Due to less demand for water and fewer expenses in production costs, pulses
and beans are cultivated as a second crop in the dry season by using leftover
moisture in the land after the cultivation of monsoon paddy. The increase in
pulse production means that Myanmar is the second largest pulse producer in
1The export tax on pulse and bean products was 10% of export income for exporters
between 1988 and 2010. This export tax was reduced to 2% in 2011.
2In 2014, the production of pulses was 5,947,363 metric tonnes with sown acreage of
4,534,000 hectares (Department of Agricultural Planning, 2014a)
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the world market accounting for 7.3 per cent of world production in 2011-2013
(Joshi et al., 2004). Pulse and bean exports, therefore, have become an impor-
tant source of foreign exchange earnings from agricultural produce in Myanmar.
Among the 17 different varieties of pulses, black gram, green gram and pigeon
pea contribute to over 80 per cent of the total pulse export value.
4.3 Patterns of diversification in rural areas in
Myanmar
As mentioned in Chapter 1, 75 per cent of the Myanmar people living in rural
areas are engaged in farming activities including crops, livestock, fishery or
forestry. Apart from forestry, agricultural practices vary across the country
based on seasons and agro-ecological zones. Generally, Myanmar has a tropical
climate with monsoon, cold and hot seasons. The monsoon season occurs from
May to October followed by the cold season from October to February, and
the hot season from February to mid-May. Monsoon is the main season for rice
cultivation all over the country. More specifically, monsoon paddy is grown
from May to October, and summer paddy is grown from November to March.
In terms of agro-ecological zones, the Delta Region, the Central Dry Zone
Region, the Coastal Region and the Hilly and Mountainous Region are cate-
gorised on the basis of topography, designation of land type3, rainfall, sown
crops and availability of irrigated water, and administrative state/regions. Due
to the different agro-ecological zones and seasons, farming systems are highly
diversified across the country. Figure 4.1 shows the major agro-ecological zones
of Myanmar.
Among crops, rice paddy is cultivated almost everywhere in the country.
Traditionally, monoculture rice cultivation or monsoon paddy was practised
in the Delta region before 1991-1992. Since the introduction of the Summer
Paddy Program (SPP) in 1992-1993, many farmers have begun double-cropping
rice, namely, monsoon paddy and summer paddy, especially in the planned
areas (Thein, 2004). Among the agro-ecological zones, the Delta Region is the
heartland of rice production in Myanmar due to its rich alluvial soil, suitable
3Under the 2012 Farmland law, land type is designated as paddy land (le), ya land, kaing
land, perennial plant land, dhani land, garden land, for growing vegetables and alluvial
island. Y a land is mostly used for crops and mainly located in the central dry zone area.
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climatic conditions and availability of sufficient water. The delta region con-
sists of three regions, namely, Ayeyarwaddy, Yangon and Bago. Among these
three regions, the Ayeyarwaddy Region is known as ‘Myanmar’s rice bowl’,
contributing over 30 per cent of the national rice paddy output (Zaw et al., 2011).
Moreover, this region, which has more than 25 per cent of the total sown
area under paddy cultivation, produces approximately 53 per cent of the to-
tal summer paddy output and 21 per cent of the total monsoon paddy, and
highlights a higher degree of specialisation in rice production (Agricultural
Extension Division, 2013). Although rice is the major crop, other non-rice
crops, in particular, cereal crops, oilseed crops, industrial crops, pulses and
beans are cultivated in this region. For example, Yangon and Bago in the Delta
Region cultivate both paddy and different kinds of pulses and beans such as
green gram (pedisein), black gram and pigeon pea (pesingon).
The Dry Zone contains lower part of Sagaing Region, western and central
parts of Mandalay Region, and Magway Region. In the Dry Zone Region,
most farmers intercrop pigeon pea with peanut or sesame or other pulses. The
cropping pattern of paddy-paddy or paddy-pulse or paddy-pulse-paddy domi-
nates in the irrigated areas. The cultivation of monsoon rice is under irrigation
in these regions. However, a wide range of rain–fed crops such as oilseed,
maize, sugarcane, various pulses and beans, and cotton are cultivated in the hot
season. The Dry Zone Region produces groundnut, sesame, sunflower, black
gram, green gram (pedisein), garden pea (sadawpe), pigeon pea (pesingon)
and chick pea (kalapea), which make up the largest share of the total pulse
and bean output in Myanmar (Robinson et al., 2008).
In the Hilly Area, most farmers grow sunflower, sugarcane, coffee, tea and
a variety of horticulture products such as vegetables, fruits, onions, garlic and
potatoes. Especially, farmers grow rice and wheat, which are their staple food,
in the valley, and on the hills where terrace cultivation is practised. In the
Coastal Region, farmers grow rice, sesame groundnut, sugar cane, and maize.
This area mainly produces perennial crops such as oil palm, rubber and coconut.
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Fig. 4.1 Agro-ecological zones of Myanmar
Source: Redrawn from Myanmar Rice Sector Development Strategy (Ministry of Agricultural
and Irrigation, 2015)
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4.4 Literature review
Traditionally, the income of rural households in developing countries primarily
comes from traditional farming activities. Increased farm productivity might
be used as a major tool for reducing rural poverty in many countries (Escobal,
2001). However, Oluwatayo (2009) has argued that farm households in many
developing countries cannot earn sufficient income from farming source alone,
and so must rely on other business activities for their livelihood. A number
of empirical studies has shown rural households that use a diverse portfolio of
activities to generate income. Most rural households are engaged in different
activities to ensure their livelihood and improve their living standards (Ellis,
1998). A definition of income diversification among rural household has been
described in various ways. Goletti and Rich (1998) have identified that income
diversification of rural people can be from both agricultural activities (farm
and off-farm) and non-agricultural activities.
More specifically, farmers can generate their income from farming activities,
such as crop production, livestock and fishery. Off-farm income includes wages
of labour on other farms, and income from other natural resource extraction,
such as charcoal, firewood and wild plants. Non-farm income consists of income
from non-agricultural sources, such as salary, non-farm self-employment4 or
non-farm household business (such as grocery shop, and workshop) and rental
income received from land and other property such as farmland, tractors and
draught animals, and remittances from family members who work either in
urban areas or abroad (David et al., 2010). On the other hand, Mishra et al.
(2010) have discussed the pattern of income diversification, which is categorized
by pull factors and push factors in a number of studies in developing countries.
Improved infrastructure and better market access, accumulation of income and
wealth are identified as pull factors. Winters et al. (2009) and Barrett et al.
(2001) also demonstrated that access to markets was one of the main factors
leading to subsequently raise farm productivity and living standards of rural
area in their studies.
Farm households frequently move to non-farm business activities to reduce
the risk of environmental factors affecting farm productivity, and to avoid crop
failure, and seasonal income variability. These factors are defined as push
factors. Ellis (2000b) explained that the main reasons for diversification in
agricultural activity were associated with spreading risk on the basis of mixed
4Non-farm rural self-employment is referred to as business income in some sources.
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crops, different soil types, and changes in climate. ‘The returns to production
factors, market failures, and risk management are major reasons households
participate in income diversification (Barrett et al., 2001; Davis, 2003).
Some rural households, therefore, take into account the opportunity of work-
ing in non-farm activities because of wage rates and security of employment.
Most rural households might participate in multiple activities to reduce risk
in response to market failure, or to raise their living standards (Barrett et al.,
2001; Davis, 2003). Due to weather or other factors, some rural households
try to reduce the variation in their income and move from crop production
to non–farm activities, which are less likely to be affected by climate (Minot,
2006). Most rural households rely on other business activities to supplement
their livelihood, as farming activities are typically seasonal (Kuwornu et al.,
2014).
Moreover, the character of income diversification shows a relationship be-
tween people’s assets and options that encourages alternative activities to
generate the required income level of households. The nature of diversification
includes the movement of resources from the cultivation of one crop to other
crops; farming activities to non-farm activities; the transfer of resources to
higher value agricultural products from the production of crops, livestock, and
fishery; and the use of resources in a mix of different activities to achieve
the optimum level of household income. The strategy of crop diversification
has played an important role in improving household income in developing
countries (Joshi et al., 2004). For example, in most South Asian countries,
the diversity of crop production has been increasing since 1980. Pellegrini
and Tasciotti (2014) found a positive relationship between crop diversification
and income in rural households from eight developing countries, in particular,
Albania, Indonesia, Malawi, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama and Vietnam.
The share of income is mainly derived from a farm household’s endowment
such as ownership of land, and land size and quality, self-employment, non-farm
labour income, human capital (such as the age of the household head, gender,
educational level of household head and family size), draught animals (such as
cows and buffaloes), and fixed capital (such as tractors and other machines)
(Adebayo et al., 2012). In general, households with greater human capital
endowments are more likely to participate in non-agricultural activities. If farm
households have more and better quality land, sufficient available labour and
fixed assets, they are most likely to focus on agricultural activities to generate
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their income. Farming activities, however, heavily depend on the availability of
cultivated land acreage, provision of agricultural loans, access to agricultural
extension services and infrastructure development.
Limited land, lack of irrigation facilities, and application of fertilizer are the
main constraints to the potential development of the agricultural economy in
most developing countries (Mehta, 2002). The expansion of non-farm activities,
therefore, has become the alternative option to diversify household income and
achieve the sustainable income for family survival in rural areas. A number of
empirical studies emphasizes the determinants of income diversification and
their impact on households. Adebayo et al. (2012) applied Tobit regression
analysis to examine the determinants of income diversification of farm house-
holds in Kaduna State, Nigeria. Farm size, the household head’s education,
membership of cooperatives and income from non-farm activities were the
significant factors among households in their findings.
Similarly, Agyeman et al. (2014) studied the determinants of income di-
versification of farm households in Ghana. They used the Simpson Index of
Diversity (SID) to measure the degree of diversification. The age and educa-
tion level of household heads, female household heads, number of extension
visits, assets of production, and access to roads were the factors contributing
to income diversification in their findings. Akaakohol and Aye (2014) also
investigated how socioeconomic characteristics influenced decisions of farm
households and the effect of diversification on household income in Nigeria.
Consistent with the previous literature, the coefficients of age, education and
credits had significant and positive effects on diversification. In their findings,
a male household head played an important role in making decision as regards
whether to participate in different activities. However, an unexpected find-
ing was that household size had a negative effect on diversification in their study.
Moreover, the impact of different patterns of farm-level diversification on
rural household income in China was studied by Zhao and Barry (2014). They
showed that non-farm diversification and mixed diversification could generate
more household income, especially for low-income rural households. Addi-
tionally, they found that low-income households were likely to participate in
different business activities and increased their income if they had a larger
portion of family workers. The assets of farm production were positively related
to the income diversification of rural households. Consistent with Adebayo
et al. (2012), Zhao and Barry also reported a significant and positive effect
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of education on rural income. In another study, by Sujithkumar (2007), the
inverse Simpson Diversity Index (SID) was also used to measure livelihood
diversification. The results showed that the higher income group had the
highest degree of diversification. Moreover, richer households could generate a
higher portion of their income from non-farm sources than poor households.
Some empirical studies give attention to the determinants of income diversi-
fication, while the other studies investigate the effect of non-farm income and its
contribution to household income inequality. For example, Elbers and Lanjouw
(2001) studied the impact of intersectoral transfer on the income distribution
in Ecuador. They found evidence of a positive relationship between a rise in
non-farm income and rural income inequality. Similarly, Adepoju and Oyewole
(2014) found that income from non-farm activities was the major source of
increasing income inequality compared to income from farming activities in
Oyo state. In their study, livelihood diversification and its contribution to
income inequality of rural households was analysed by applying the generalized
entropy inequality indices.
To investigate the impact of income diversification on rural income inequal-
ity, Adams Jr (2002) used the standard decomposition of Gini coefficient. His
estimates showed that income from non-farm sources could reduce inequality
among households in rural areas in Egypt. Unexpectedly, income from agri-
cultural activities contributed most to income inequality among the different
income sources. Similar to Adams Jr (2002), Zhao and Barry (2014) also
studied the distribution of non-farm income in rural China and confirmed that
income from non-farm sources could help reduce income inequality among
poor farm households. They also found that improved infrastructure and
basic education level were crucial factors determining participation in non-farm
activities. Moreover, Weldegebriel et al. (2015) demonstrated a negative impact
of non-farm activities on income inequality in rural Ethiopia. In their findings,
wealthier households had more incentive to diversify than poor households.
The contribution of income from non-farm sources to total household income
might be relatively low even if small farm holders were engaged in different
business activities.
Although much of the literature shows the relationship between the deter-
minants of diversification and rural household income, little is known about the
effect of diversification on farm returns and its contribution to farm household
income inequality in Myanmar. Okamoto et al. (2003) investigated the welfare
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of rural households under the transition to a market economy in selected areas
in Myanmar, and found that farmers who concentrate on rice production had
lower incomes than others. Kurosaki (2008) applied regression analysis to
examine political control and its impacts on crop choice and farm income in
Myanmar. Consistent with Okamoto et al. (2003), Kurosaki (2008) found that
farmers might have low income if they are forced to grow paddy by the local
administrator.
Neither Okamoto nor Kurosaki focused on the determinants of income
diversification and income inequality among rural households in Myanmar. In
an attempt to fill the gaps in the previous literature, the current study uses the
inverse Herfindahl index to investigate the degree of income diversification, and
the Gini decomposition coefficient to measure income equality in the selected
regions in Myanmar.
4.5 Data source and variables
This study uses the primary field survey data collected in 2014 to analyse the
determinants of income diversification and income inequality among rural farm
households. The number of households totalled 634 farms across 30 villages in 6
townships. Specifically, 215 farm households, 212 farm households and 207 farm
households were selected from Ayeyarwaddy, Bago and Sagaing respectively.
As mentioned in the previous section, this paper has two tasks. The first is
to analyse the factors determining why farm households participate in farm
activities and non-farm activities. Indeed, farm activities imply the production
of mono-rice cropping, double-rice cropping, pulses and beans, other crops
(sesame, maize, and corn), horticulture products (tomato, fruits, and vegeta-
bles), livestock (pigs, goats, ducks, and chicken) and fishery (fish and prawn).
The second is to explore the impact of income from different sources on income
inequality among rural farm households.
To analyse the first task, the variables of interest in this study are total
agricultural land (both rice and non-rice crops), the demographic characteristics
of households (such as household head’s age and education), number of house-
hold labours, and number of dependent members. Moreover, the ownership of
capital, in particular draught animals (cows and buffaloes) and tractors, are
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included to estimate their influence on the diversified activities. The other
variables, such as access to agricultural extension services, the irrigation system,
access to credit from both formal and informal sources, the distance from a
village to a market, and geographical location, are also taken into account in
the analysis.
For both tasks, the income sources of an individual household are divided
into six categories: i) income from rice, ii) income from non-rice crops, iii)
income from horticulture, iv) income from livestock, v) income from fishery,
and vi) income from non-farm activities 5. Total output including rice, non-rice
crops is used to compute total income from rice and non-rice crops for each farm
household. Income from non-farm activities is generated from the other sources,
including trade, wages from non-farm sources, rental fees and remittances
from household members living in urban areas and abroad. The patterns of
diversification in the selected rural areas are briefly discussed in the next section.
4.6 The patterns of diversification in the se-
lected areas
The distribution of income diversification activities by households in the se-
lected regions is summarised in Table 4.1. All the selected 634 households are
located in major rice-growing regions: 99 per cent and 30 per cent are engaged
in monsoon paddy production and summer paddy production respectively. In
particular, farm households in Ayeyarwaddy are mainly engaged in mono-rice
production. However, Sagaing, which has the lowest number of households
producing summer paddy, accounts for only 0.5 per cent of the total farm
households among these regions. Due to insufficient irrigated water, most
farmers in Sagaing lack motivation to grow summer paddy.
Farm households in Bago and Sagaing are increasingly diversifying their
income by producing a variety of cash crops. Of the 212 farm households in
Bago, 157 (approximately 70 per cent) grow a variety of pulses and beans.
Similarly, of the 207 farm households in Sagaing, 141 (approximately 66 per
cent) cultivate a variety of pulses and beans, and other crops. In Bago, the
5The income in this paper was actually revenues from the six different sources for each of
sample farm household. There has been lack of precise estimate of household income due to
the challenges in estimating farm costs.
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chief crops are peanut, green gram (pedisein), black gram (matpe), white
kidney bean (pephyulay) and pigeon pea (pesingon). In contrast, black gram
(matpe), pigeon pea (pesingon), chick pea (kalapea), garden pea (sadawpe),
lentil (penilay), wheat, peanut, sesame, corn, sugar cane and maize are the
dominant crops in Sagaing.
Table 4.1 The distribution of income diversification activities by farm households
Region\Business activities Ayeyarwaddy Bago Sagaing Number of
farm house-
holds
Monsoon rice 210 212 207 629
(33.1%) (33.4%) (32.7%) (99.2%)
Summer rice 152 31 3 186
(24%) (5%) (0.5%) (29.3%)
Non-rice crops 1 157 141 299
(0.2%) (24.7%) (22.2%) (47.2%)
Horticulture products 39 20 1 60
(6.2%) (3.2%) (0.2%) (9.5%)
Livestock 88 84 86 258
(13.9%) (13.2%) (13.6%) (40.7%)
Fishery 6 4 0 10
(0.95%) (0.63%) (0%) (1.6%)
Non-farm 18 42 35 95
(2.9%) (6.6%) (5.5%) (15.0%)
Number of farm households 215 212 207 634
As shown in Table 4.1, approximately 10 per cent of farm households grow
horticulture products such as tomatoes, other fruits and vegetables. Livestock
production is an important income source, although paddy contributes most to
total household income followed by pulses and beans. There is little difference
in participation in livestock production across regions. Approximately 41 per
cent of farm households in these three regions derive income from livestock.
However, nearly 2 per cent of 634 farm households are involved in fishery, in-
dicating that this source is not a major contributor to diversification of farming
income. Only a small portion of households participate in non-farm activities:
3 per cent, 7 per cent and 6 per cent of farm households in Ayeyarwaddy, Bago
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and Sagaing respectively. The farm households in the selected areas, therefore,
are less engaged in non-farm activities for their livelihood compared to farming
activities.
4.7 The analysis of determinants of income di-
versification
4.7.1 Methodology
Many empirical studies have focused mainly on estimating the share of farm
incomes derived from different sources. Others have used non-farm income
share in the total household income to identify the level of income diversification
(Ersado, 2006). The share of income from different sources is mainly used to
measure the degree of diversification (Barrett et al., 2001). In comparison,
David et al. (2010) and Reardon et al. (1992) used the share of non-farm income
to determine the level of income diversification.
A number of studies has used different indicators to estimate the determi-
nants of income diversification. For example, Khatun et al. (2012) used the
Simpson index in their study of West Bengal, India. Other studies, conducted
by Ersado (2006), Sarah (2012) and Adebayo et al. (2012) used the inverse
Herfindahl Index to investigate the factors determining the income diversifica-
tion in Zimbabwe, Kenya and Nigeria respectively.
Of these indices, the inverse of the Herfindahl Index is commonly used to
estimate the degree of industry concentration due to its consideration of the
number of income sources and their weight, and the consistency of share of
income (Ersado, 2006). This measurement is more appropriate than the other
indices as, unlike them, it does not group farm households by income source
category (Dimova and Sen, 2010) and Ellis (2000b). Most previous empirical
research has used the diversification index following Hannah and Kay (1977)
as follows:
D = [
n∑
j=1
Sαj=1]1/(1−α) (4.1)
where D is the diversification index, Sj is the share of the jth income source
with respect to the total income (i.e., Sj=Yj/Y , J=1,2,3,..,n), Yj is total in-
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come from source j, Y=Σnj=1 Yj is total household income from all sources;
j=1,2,3,...,n, and α presents the parameter of diversity, such as α ≥ 0 and α ≠
1. The value of α= 0 shows the number of income sources that a household
earn for their livelihood. However, a lower value of α suggests that a given
household has only one source of income.
In general, the diversification index with the parameter α measures the
weight of a number of income sources and the balance of the distribution
of income shares. A larger value in the diversification index value indicates
a higher number of different income sources and a greater emphasis on the
distribution of income shares.
While the value of α approaches 1, the calculation of the index becomes
[− Σ Si log Si ] where log refers to the natural log. This index is known as
the Entropy index. For the value of α=2, the index becomes the inverse of the
Herfindahl Index as follows:
D = 1Σnj=1S2j
(4.2)
To investigate the determinants of income diversification at the household
level, this study uses the inverse of the Herfindahl Index to measure the degree
of diversification by taking α=2. As discussed above, rural household income
is generated from the six different sources (j=1,2,3,...,n,), in particular, income
from rice sales, income from non-rice crops sales, income from horticulture,
income from livestock, income from fishery, and income from non-farm activi-
ties. Following Ersado (2006), the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is
applied in this paper.
4.7.2 Econometric model specification
The OLS specification of household income diversification is as follows:
Di = β0 + β1AGEi + β2AGE2i + β3EDU2i + β4EDU3i + β5HHLABi+
β6DEPi + β7LANDi + β8IRRIi + β9AESi + β10ANIMALSi+
β11TRACTORSi + β12CREDITi + β13DISTi + β14REGIONi + µi
(4.3)
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where D is the dependent variable representing the diversification index,
AGE is age of the household head, AGE2 is squared age of household head,
EDU2 is a dummy variable of the household head’s education (1= at most
secondary education level and 0 for otherwise), EDU3 is a dummy variable of
the household head’s education (1= high school (or) higher education level and
0 for otherwise), HHLAB is number of family members who are engaged in any
business activities, and DEP is the dependency ratio. LAND is household’s
total agricultural land (including le land for paddy cultivation and yar land
for non-rice crop cultivation) measured in acres.
The farm households were asked to self-asses water availability from both
natural and irrigated sources such as creeks/rivers, dams and reservoirs, and
private channels that is defined as 1= very good/good and 0=not good. Agri-
cultural extension services (AES) is defined as a binary variable if a farm
household receives services from different institutions for farming activities (=1)
or otherwise (=0). The ownership of cows and buffaloes (ANIMALS) or/and
tractors (TRACTOR) is also defined as a binary variable: if the household
owns them (=1) or otherwise (=0).
Although MADB is the main provider of agricultural loans for rice and
non-rice crops, the amount of credit is insufficient for production cost. Farm
household, therefore, borrow money from other sources including formal finan-
cial sources, such as UNDP, Co-operatives and LIFT, and informal sources,
such as private money lender, relatives and friends. If a household could receive
credit from either MADB or any other sources, dummy variable of access to
credit is defined as 1=yes and 0=no. The access to market (DIST) is defined
as the distance from each village to a market in the nearest township measured
in kilometres. The dummy variable for location (REGION) is identified as 1 if
a farm household is located in the Delta Region; otherwise it is 0.
Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics of the explanatory variables used
for the analysis.
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Table 4.2 Summary statistics for the selected farm households
Variable Unit Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Age of household head (AGE) year 51.09 11.87 22 86
At most primary education (EDU1) yes=1 0.62 0.49 0 1
Secondary education (EDU2) yes=1 0.25 0.44 0 1
High school/higher education (EDU3) yes=1 0.13 0.34 0 1
Household labours (HHLAB) number 2.91 1.52 1 10
Dependency ratio (DEP) ratio 0.45 0.23 0 0.9
Rice cultivated land (LAND) acre 13.71 12.96 1 84
Non-rice crops cultivated land (YA) acre 3.69 6.08 0 40
Total agricultural landholding (LAND) acre 13.47 11.56 1 78
Irrigation service good/very good yes=1 0.82 0.38 0 1
(IRRI)
Agricultural extension services yes=1 0.58 0.49 0 1
(AES)
Draught animals (ANIMALS) yes=1 0.63 0.48 0 1
Tractor (TRACTOR) yes=1 0.35 0.48 0 1
Access to credit (CREDIT) yes=1 0.92 0.27 0 1
Distance to market (DIST) km 17.02 19.65 1.61 96.6
Region (REGION) Delta=1 0.67 0.47 0 1
Rice_income 000 kyat 3299.41 3638.79 50 24750
Non-rice crops_income 000 kyat 631.25 1192.32 0 13440
Horticulture_income 000 kyat 147.94 1208.11 0 20000
Livestock_income 000 kyat 147.62 314.70 0 3150
Fishery_income 000 kyat 23.31 317.42 0 7000
Non-farm_income 000 kyat 203.24 885.46 0 10000
Herfindahl Index (D) index 1.59 0.56 1 3.47
Number of observations 634
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Household heads are on average about 50 years of age, indicating that they
are mostly in their active years. The average labours of each household is 3
persons, and the mean value of the dependency ratio is 0.45. The educational
level of household heads is 0.62 on average at most primary, showing that most
have completed primary school. The average cultivated land for paddy is 13.71
acres, while the average cultivated land for non-rice crops is 3.69 acres. Total
agricultural land is the total landholding area both le and yar for each of the
household. The average land size of agricultural land is 13.47 acres, and the
maximum area is 78 acres.
Approximately 63 per cent of farm households own cows or/and buffaloes,
while 35 per cent have tractors for the production of rice and non-rice crops.
Nearly 60 per cent of farm households have access to agricultural extension
services. The mean value of irrigation is 0.82 in this study showing that the
response of the irrigation system is relatively good. Similarly, the mean value
of access to credit is significantly high showing that most farm households are
likely to have easy access to credit. The distance from a village to the nearest
market is 17 km on average. Approximately 67 per cent of farm households are
located in the Delta Region, while 33 per cent of households are located in the
Dry Zone Region.
The summary of indexes is presented in Table 4.3. The value of the inverse
Herfindahl Index (D) takes into account the variation in income shares to mea-
sure the degree of income diversification. A value of 1 suggests that households
depend on a single source of income for their livelihood. Approximately 24 per
cent of households are solely engaged in rice production, while 25 per cent and
32 percent of households have moderately diversified income. Nearly 19 per
cent of households derive their income from multiple income sources, suggesting
that those households with the most diversified income are likely to have higher
value of D.
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Table 4.3 Summary statistics of the inverse Herfindahl index
Index Value Number of
farmers
Mean Std.Dev Percentage
=1 151 1.00 0.00 23.82
>1 to ≤ 1.5 159 1.24 0.15 25.08
>1.5 to ≤ 2 201 1.79 0.15 31.70
>2 to ≤ 2.5 74 2.24 0.14 11.67
>2.5 to ≤3 41 2.72 0.16 6.47
>3 8 3.24 0.14 1.26
634 100.00
The inverse of the Herfindahl Index across the three regions is illustrated in
Figure 4.1.
Fig. 4.2 Inverse Herfindahl index by region
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As expected, Ayeyarwaddy has the lowest diversification index compared
to Bago and Sagaing. This is not surprising, as farm household-income in
this region has been traditionally dominated by double-rice cropping followed
by livestock income. The income diversification index in Bago is the highest,
suggesting that farm households in Bago generate their income from various
sources. On the other hand, the larger value of the Herfindahl Index confirms
that farm households in Sagaing have a significantly higher level of diversifica-
tion.
The share of income from different business activities is presented in Table
4.4. The proportion of income from rice production contributes the largest
share of households compared to other business activities in each of the region.
Ayeyarwaddy, which is the rice bowl of Myanmar, has the highest share of
income from rice production followed by Bago and Sagaing, accounting for
nearly 92 per cent, 65 per cent and 59 per cent respectively. For income from
non-rice crops, Sagaing occupies the highest percentage followed by Bago. Most
farm households, especially in Sagaing, grow non-rice crops or pulses and beans
in summer season due to the lack of access to sufficient water. In contrast,
income from non-rice crops contributes the lowest share of household’s total
income in Ayeyarwaddy.
Table 4.4 The share of income by different business activities
Income source Ayeyarwaddy Bago Sagaing
(%) (%) (%)
Rice 92.05 65.42 58.68
Non-rice crops 0.07 22.10 27.95
Horticulture 1.72 2.87 0.03
Livestock 4.20 3.61 7.89
Aquaculture 0.44 0.72 0.00
Non-farm 1.52 5.28 5.44
Among income sources, income from livestock is also one of the major
sources for households in each of the region, nearly 8 per cent in Sgaing followed
by 4 per cent in Ayeyarwaddy and Bago. There is no contribution of income
from the source of aquaculture in Sagaing due to its geographical condition in
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the selected areas. Income from non-farm activities is seen as an important
income source in Sagaing and Bago as its contribution of household’s income is
relatively larger among different activities.
4.7.3 Results
Results of the full sample
Table 4.5 presents the results of the regression analysis to estimate the deter-
minants of income diversification. The household head usually decides whether
or not to participate in different activities. The positive and significant result
of age suggests that older household heads are likely to diversify their income
sources. To study the effect of age on income diversification, the square of
age is also taken into account in this analysis. Although the magnitude of
squared age of household is relatively small, the coefficient is negatively and
statistically significant at 1 per cent level. The results of age and squared age
variables together explain the relationship between age and income diversifica-
tion. Income diversification index increases in line with the age of household
head participating in different activities. However, the negative value of age
squared presents that old aged household heads become less interested in par-
ticipating other business activities compared to household heads at younger age.
The secondary education (EDU2) has been found to have a positive and
significant effect on income diversification at the 10 per cent level, indicating
that education plays an important role in decisions to participate in both farm
and non-farm activities. The household head who attained secondary educa-
tion increases the likelihood that they will engage in their income generating
activities. Similarly, the coefficient of household head with high school (or)
higher education shows the positive and significant impact on the decision of
participation in diversification. Higher income diversification is associated with
better educated household heads. Household heads with better education are
more likely to diversify their livelihood through participation in off-farm and
non-farm business activities. The results of education impact on diversification
are consistent with the findings of Adebayo et al. (2012), Khatun et al. (2012)
and Akaakohol and Aye (2014).
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Table 4.5 OLS estimation result of the determinants of income diversification
Variable Coefficient Std.Dev t statistics
Constant 1.2800∗∗∗ 0.2878 4.45
Age of household head (AGE) 0.0253∗∗∗ 0.0096 2.63
Age squared of household head (AGE2) -0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001 -2.58
Secondary Education (EDU2) 0.1063∗ 0.0606 1.75
High school/ higher Education (EDU3) 0.1776∗∗∗ 0.0663 2.68
Household Labour(HHLAB) 0.0179 0.0214 0.84
Dependency ratio (DEP) -0.2536∗ 0.1366 -1.86
Total agricultural land (LAND) -0.0067∗∗∗ 0.0025 -2.74
Irrigation services (IRRI) -0.1114∗ 0.0671 -1.66
Agricultural extension services (AES) -0.1071 0.0715 -1.50
Draught animals (ANIMALS) 0.2998∗∗∗ 0.0831 3.60
Tractors (TRACTORS) 0.0290 0.0661 0.44
Access to credit (1=yes) -0.1525 0.1134 -1.35
Distance to market (DIST) -0.0022 0.0023 -0.92
Region (REGION) -0.1229 0.1466 -0.84
Number of observation (N) 634
R2 0.203
Note:***, ** and * denotes the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses.
In general, household labour is also an important factor influencing income
diversification. A household is more likely to participate in farming and non-
farming activities due to the availability of the number of household labours.
However, there is little evidence of its impact on diversification as the coefficient
of HHLAB is not statistically significant in this case.
The coefficient of dependency ratio (DEP) is negatively significant at the 10
per cent level as expected. An increase in the dependency ratio reflects a higher
portion of dependants who are unable to contribute to income diversification.
Households with larger number of dependants have less diversified income than
households with few number of dependent members.
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The size of total agricultural landholding size (LAND) appeared to be the
major factor affecting income diversification. The coefficient of agricultural
land was negative and significant at 1 per cent level. The income diversification
decreased with increase in total agricultural landholding size as farm households
with larger size of agricultural land are much interested in growing more number
of crops to increase their income compared to those with smaller land size.
Total agricultural land strongly confirms that one acre increase in land size will
reduce the level of participation in other activities by 0.007.
For farm households, better access to irrigation and extension services can
generally help increase farm productivity and discourage farm households from
participating in other business activities. The effect of irrigation (IRRI) on the
level of income diversification is negatively and statistically significant at 10
per cent level. The result explains that farm households are likely to specialize
in crop production rather than participation in other business activities if they
can get better access to irrigation. The coefficient of access to agricultural
extension services (AES) shows little impact on income diversification.
Ownership of working capital, including draught animals and/ or tractors
plays an important role in influencing farm production. The ownership of
draught animals (ANIMALS) has a positive and statistically significant effect
on the level of income diversification at the 1 per cent level. Farm households
with working capital have more diversified income sources and are probably
more involved in other crop cultivation and non-farm business activities. This
result is contrary to Sarah (2012), who found a negative relationship between
access to animal ploughs and income diversification in Kenya. There is no
evidence of impact of tractor ownership (TRACTOR) on income diversification
as its coefficient is not statistically significant.
To analyse the response of farm households on access to credit, the variable
of access to credit captures the relationship between access to credit and income
diversification. Households with access to credit are more likely to have capital
to invest in on-farm and off-farm activities, which can generate income for
farm households. However, the coefficient of access to credit is not statistically
significant showing that there is little impact of credit on diversification for
sampled households in this study.
The distance from a village to market nearby a township is also an im-
portant determinant of rural income diversification. Farm households with
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easy access to markets are more likely to sell their products in markets and
participate in other non-farm activities in nearby townships or other urban
areas. Demissie and Legesse (2013), Khatun et al. (2012), and Asmah (2011)
found a negative relationship between distance to market and participation in
off-farm and non-farm activities. The coefficient of distance (DIST) is negative
but not significant. This result, therefore, would not be able to highlight the
impact of distance to market on the diversification in the selected regions.
Similarly, the coefficient of the dummy variable for regions is also not sta-
tistically significant, suggesting that there is little influence of region on the
level of income diversification in this study.
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the Herfindahl index for Sagaing is similar to
that for Bago, but higher than that for Ayeyarwaddy. The insignificant regional
effect indicates that income diversification among regions is likely due to other
factors. This study, therefore, investigates the factors that are more important
in explaining income diversification for each of the region in the next section.
Summary results of Ayeyarwaddy, Bago and Sagaing
Table 4.6 summarises the OLS estimation result of the determinants of income
diversification for each region. The coefficient for the age the household head
is significantly and positively related to income diversification in Bago and
Sagaing. The coefficient of squared age of the household head has a significant
and negative effect on diversification. These results imply that older household
heads become less likely to participate in income diversifying activities com-
pared to younger household heads. However, the coefficients of Ayeyarwaddy
are not significant.
In Table 4.5, the results of education in the full sample show the important
role of both secondary education and higher education on income diversification
Contrary to the main results, the coefficients for secondary education or higher
education are not statistically significant in each of the regions.
The variable of HHLAB represents the number of working family members.
A household with more family labours is more likely to participate in farm-
ing and non-farm activities due to the availability of labour. The result of
Ayeyarwaddy confirms the positive and significant effect of the available family
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workers on income diversification. However, the results show an insignificant
impact of household labours on diversification in Bago and Sagaing.
The coefficient of dependency ratio (DEP) should be negative and sig-
nificant as the increase in the dependency ratio reflects a higher portion of
dependents who are unable to contribute to income diversification. Households
with larger numbers of dependents have less diversification than households
without any dependent members. The coefficients for each of the regions, how-
ever, do not show the effect of dependency ration on diversification in this study.
The total agricultural land (LAND) has a significant and negative effect on
diversification at the 5 per cent level in Ayeyarwaddy and Bago, but insignificant
effect in Sagaing. The results suggest that farm households with having more
land available for rice and non-rice crop production have less motivation to
participate in other business activities.
The coefficient of access to agricultural extension services has an insignificant
effect on income diversification in each of the region. Similarly, the coefficient
of irrigation (IRRI) has little influence on income diversification in Ayearwaddy
and Sagaing. However, the coefficient of access to irrigation positively and
significantly associated with income diversification in Bago. Approximately
86 per cent of 212 farm households participate in different business activities
although the irrigation system is relatively good in Bago.
With regard to the ownership of working capital including draft animals
and tractors, the results are different between Ayeyarwaddy and Bago. The
coefficients of ownership for both draft animals and tractors in Ayeyarwaddy
are negative and significant at 10 per cent level. The possible explanation for
this is because it is the most rice growing region. Nearly 70 per cent of 215 farm
households are mainly engaged in double-rice cropping, compared to Bago and
Sagaing. The coefficient of ownership of assets suggest that households with
owing both draft animals and tractors are likely to use land more efficiency to
improve rice productivity. The degree of income diversification will decrease by
0.08 and 0.05 if a farm household owns draught animals and tractors respectively.
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Table 4.6 OLS estimation results of the determinants of income diversification
for Ayeyarwaddy, Bago and Sagaing
Variable Ayeyarwaddy Bago Sagaing
Constant 1.647∗∗∗ 1.219∗∗ 0.200
(0.496) (0.335) (0.382)
Age of household head (AGE) 0.001 0.021∗ 0.040∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.017)
Squared age of household head (AGE2) -0.00003 -0.0003∗∗ -0.0003∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Secondary education (EDU3) 0.037 0.112 -0.128
(0.028) (0.087) (0.109)
High school/ Higher education(EDU45) -0.042 0.155 -0.044
(0.054) (0.106) (0.082)
Household Labour (HHLAB) 0.047∗∗ -0.002 -0.001
(0.019) (0.032) (0.032)
Dependency ratio(DEP) 0.035 -0.302 0.136
(0.066) (0.211) (0.133)
Total agricultural land (LAND) -0.002∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.006
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Irrigation services (IRRI) -0.072 0.276∗∗∗ -0.090
(0.156) (0.085) (0.058)
Agricultural extension services (AES) -0.037 0.040 -0.222
(0.048) (0.063) (0.177)
Draught animals (ANIMALS) -0.078∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.054) (0.132)
Tractors (TRACTORS) -0.053∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.026
(0.030) (0.069) (0.130)
Access to credit (CREDIT) -0.307 0.202∗∗ 0.156
(0.372) (0.082) (0.109)
Distance to market (DIST) -0.004∗∗ -0.021∗ 0.003
(0.002) (0.012) (0.003)
Number of observation (N) 215 212 207
R2 0.15 0.25 0.22
Note:***, ** and * denotes the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses.
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In contrast, the results for Bago region is significantly different from that
of Ayeyarwaddy. The ownership of draft animals and tractor is positively and
significantly related to income diversification in Bago. Nearly 35 per cent
and 40 per cent of households owned tractors and draft animals respectively.
Those households are likely to use production assets in other business activities
compare to other households who do not have the property of assets that leads
farm households to diversify their incomes. Similar to Bago, the ownership of
draft animal could encourage farm households to diverse other business activi-
ties in Sagaing. The coefficient of tractor, however, is not statistically significant.
The significant coefficient of access to credit in Bago shows a positive re-
lationship between availability of credit and household’s income-diversifying
activities. Households have more motivation to start other business if they
can borrow more credit from different sources. However, household’s participa-
tion in other business activities does not strongly rely on the access to credit
in Ayeyarwaddy and Sagaing as their coefficients are not statistically significant.
The effect of distance to market on income diversification differs between
regions. In the Delta region (Ayeyarwaddy and Bago), the negative effect
of distance to market on the diversification level is found at the 5 per cent
and 10 per cent significance level respectively. The result suggests that farm
households far from markets are less likely to participate in income-diversifying
activities due to higher transaction costs. However, the result is not significant
in the Dry region (Sagaing).
Due to the geographical region, the determinants of diversification vary
among the regions. Total agricultural land and the ownership of draft animals
are main determinants in the participation of diversification. The age of house-
hold heads and distance to market are important factors determining income
diversification in Ayeyarwaddy and Bago regions.
4.8 The analysis of income inequality
4.8.1 Methodology
A number of empirical studies, for example those conducted by Nugent and
Walther (1982) and Pyatt et al. (1980), have used various methods to identify
the contribution of different sources of income to total income inequality, espe-
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cially in developing countries. There are several measures of inequality, such as
‘Theil’s entropy index T, Theil’s second measure L, the coefficient of variation
and the Gini coefficient’ (Adams, 1993, p.1188). It is noteworthy that a rule
of the decomposition procedure requires no restrictions for non-overlapping
groups of income source when inequality can be allocated over the regions.
However, the two Theil measures are not appropriate for decomposition when
household incomes from different sources overlap.
On the other hand, Shorrocks (1982) demonstrated that the results of the
decomposition of inequality rely on the rule of the decomposition procedure.
He showed that there were many ways to measure income inequality by allo-
cating the components of total income if there is no restrictive rule. The two
remaining measures, therefore, are more appropriate for the decomposition
analysis because many households in developing countries utilise different busi-
ness activities for their income (Adams, 1993).
The decomposition of the Gini coefficient measures the contribution of an
income source to overall income inequality, and whether each particular income
source increases or decreases income inequality. It is the most widely used
measure of the contribution of income sources to overall income, distribution
of consumption and other purposes (López-Feldman et al., 2006). Adams Jr
(2002) demonstrated how the decomposition of the Gini coefficient can identify
how much of each income source contributes to overall inequality, and whether
this inequality increases or decreases overall income inequality.
Following Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) and Shorrocks (1982), the Gini coef-
ficient for total income can be represented by decomposing the total household
income as
G = ΣKk=1RkGkSk (4.4)
The study conducted by Stark et al. (1986) found that a relationship between
three terms in Equation (4.4) explained the influence of any income source on
overall income inequality depending on the importance of that component of
income source relative to total income (Sk), the distribution of income from
source k (Gk) and the correlation between the income source and the distribu-
tion of total household income (Rk).
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A larger share of total household income from an income source is likely to
have a larger impact on overall inequality. However, an equal distribution of
each income source (Gk=0) has no influence on inequality, even if the share of
the particular income source is large. On the other hand, larger values of both
Sk and Gk indicate that the contribution of an income source contributes to
increasing or decreasing overall income inequality. A positive and large value
of Rk implies an unequal distribution of income source and its contribution to
income inequality.
Adams (1993) defined the relative concentration coefficient of income source
k in the total household inequality as
gk = Rk
Gk
G
(4.5)
The contribution of income source to total inequality depends on whether the
value of relative concentration coefficient (gk) is greater than or less than unity.
If the value of gk is greater than 1 (gk>1), the income source of k is defined as
increasing inequality. In contrast, if the value of gk is less than 1 (gk<1), the
income source of k is defined as decreasing inequality.
4.8.2 Results of decomposition of the Gini coefficient
In this study, the decomposition of the Gini coefficient is used to examine the
contribution of income from each of the six sources (rice, other crops, horticul-
ture, livestock, fishery and non-farm) to overall income inequality among farm
households. Due to their geographical locations, farm households are not likely
to be involved in all of these six income sources. For example, most farm house-
holds in the Ayeyarwaddy region were not engaged in other crop production,
while farm households in Sagaing did not participate in fishing. However, these
income sources have different effects on income inequality. Therefore, incomes
from all sources are taken into account for the analysis of the Gini coefficient.
Table 4.7 presents income per capita and income share of total income.
Most farm households derive their income from rice production, which accounts
for about 72 per cent of total household income. Production of crops is the next
most important source, followed by livestock, contributing about 17 per cent
and 5 percent respectively to total household income. However, the contribution
of incomes from horticulture and fishery to total income is relatively very low in
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this study. Non-farm income is a less important source in this study, accounting
for 4 per cent of total income.
Table 4.7 Income per capita and income share of total income
Income source Mean income per capita Mean share of total income
(thousand kyat) (%)
Rice 682.555 72.25
Non-rice crops 127.140 16.54
Horticulture 26.171 1.55
Livestock 28.856 5.21
Fishery 4.485 0.39
Non-farm 36.708 4.06
Tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 show the results of the decomposition of income
inequality for the Ayeyarwaddy, Bago, and Saging regions respectively. As these
are Myanmar’s major rice growing regions, the share of rice income is expected
to be relatively high. However, the contribution of rice production to income
inequality is less equally distributed among these regions. The contribution of
rice income on income inequality is fairly distributed in the Ayeyarwaddy as
the value of the concentration ratio is around 1 (gk=1.028) (Table 4.8, column 6).
In Bago, the value of the concentration coefficient gk reveals that income
from rice production represents an inequality-decreasing source of income be-
cause its relative concentration coefficient is less than 1 (gk=0.960) (Table 4.9,
column 6). However, the value of the coefficient of rice in Sagaing is larger
than 1 (gk=1.130) (Table 4.10, column 6), which implies that the contribution
of rice income to income inequality is relatively unequal in Sagaing. Increasing
inequality of rice income source might be associated with the varieties of seed
and selling price of rice among farm households in this region.
As previously mentioned, Lanjouw et al. (2013) and Mishra et al. (2009)
have demonstrated how income from non-farm activities plays a significant
role in reducing income inequality among rural households. Contrary to their
findings, this study argues that the contribution of income from non-farm
activities is the second major source of income inequality with the contribution
of 1.8 per cent in Ayeyarwaddy (Table 4.8, column 7), 6.2 per cent in Bago
(Table 4.9, column 7) and 5.6 per cent in Sagaing (Table 4.10, column 7).
However, the result is consistent with Adger (1999) and Senadza (2011) who
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Table 4.8 Inequality decomposition by income sources in the Ayeyarwaddy
Region
Income source Share in
total
income
Gini co-
efficient
Gini cor-
relation
with
total
income
Absolute
contribu-
tion to
overall in-
equality
Relative
concen-
tration
coeffi-
cient
percentage
contribu-
tion to
overall
inequal-
ity
(Sk) (Gk) (Rk) (Gk) (gk)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rice 0.939 0.457 0.989 0.424 1.028 96.50
Non-rice crops 0.000 0.995 -0.869 0.000 -1.966 0.00
Horticulture 0.014 0.934 0.355 0.005 0.754 1.00
Livestock 0.028 0.809 0.172 0.004 0.316 0.90
Fishery 0.002 0.981 -0.399 -0.001 -0.890 -0.20
Non-farm 0.016 0.965 0.494 0.008 1.083 1.80
Total 1.000 0.440 0.440 100.00
Note: Estimation of the Gini coefficient is based on per capita income for farm households.
found that non-farm income has less impact on income equality.
It is interesting to note that income equality is mainly explained by livestock
income, i.e. 0.9 per cent in Ayeyarwaddy (Table 4.8, column 7), 0.7 per cent in
Bago (Table 4.9, column 7) and 0.8 per cent in Sagaing (Table 4.10, column
7). In addition, the concentration coefficient of income from livestock (gk) is
smaller than 1, accounting for 0.32, 0.26 and 0.14 in Ayeyarwaddy, Bago and
Sagaing respectively (see column 6 of Tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10). These results
strongly confirm that livestock income is a major source of reducing income
inequality among farm households.
Production of non-rice crops plays an important role in income diversifi-
cation in Bago and Sagaing. As mentioned earlier, farm households in these
two regions practise the rice-crop cultivation pattern, whereas most farmers in
Ayeyarwaddy cultivate the rice-rice cropping pattern. In this study, about 70
per cent of farm households in Bago and Sagaing are engaged in the production
of pulses and beans and a variety of other non-rice crops.
The concentration coefficient of income from non-rice crops (gk) is relatively
smaller than 1 in both regions, i.e. 0.93 in Bago (Table 4.9, column 6) and 0.84
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Table 4.9 Inequality decomposition by income sources in the Bago Region
Income source Share in
total
income
Gini co-
efficient
Gini cor-
relation
with
total
income
Absolute
contribu-
tion to
overall in-
equality
Relative
concen-
tration
coeffi-
cient
percentage
contribu-
tion to
overall
inequal-
ity
(Sk) (Gk) (Rk) (Gk) (gk)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rice 0.635 0.454 0.918 0.265 0.960 61.00
Non-rice crops 0.213 0.597 0.675 0.086 0.929 19.70
Horticulture 0.060 0.967 0.814 0.047 1.814 10.80
Livestock 0.025 0.805 0.139 0.003 0.258 0.70
Fishery 0.011 0.989 0.628 0.007 1.431 1.60
Non-farm 0.056 0.902 0.527 0.027 1.095 6.20
Total 1.000 0.434 0.434 100.00
Note: Estimation of the Gini coefficient is based on per capita income for farm households.
in Sagaing (Table 4.10, column 6). Income from non-rice crops represents an
inequality-decreasing source of income, because the percentage contribution to
overall inequality (19.8 in Bago and 21.8 in Sagaing) (column 7 of Tables 4.9
and 4.10) is lower than that share of total income (Sk =21.3 in Bago and Sk
=25.9 in Sagaing)(column 1 of Tables 4.9 and 4.10).
More importantly, farmers in Sagaing are likely to take advantage of crop
cultivation due to less demand for irrigated water. In addition, a higher price
for pulses and beans provides more incentive for farm households to derive
their income from non-rice crops.
The effect of fishery income shows different results in Ayeyarwaddy and
Bago. The contribution of fishery income to income inequality is found to
be relatively unequal (gk= 1.43) in Bago. In contrast, the rank correlation
between fishery income source and total income (Rk=−0.40) shows that there is
a significant decline in importance of fishery income relative to total household
income in Ayeyarwaddy. The effect of fishery income is not analysed in the
Sagaing region, as no farm households are involved in fish production due to
the nature of geographical location.
Overall, there is little difference in the value of Gini coefficient (Gk) among
three regions. However, the Gini coefficient (Gk) is the lowest in Bago with
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Table 4.10 Inequality decomposition by income sources in the Sagaing Region
Income source Share in
total
income
Gini co-
efficient
Gini cor-
relation
with
total
income
Absolute
contribu-
tion to
overall in-
equality
Relative
concen-
tration
coeffi-
cient
percentage
contribu-
tion to
overall
inequal-
ity
(Sk) (Gk) (Rk) (Gk) (gk)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rice 0.636 0.576 0.892 0.327 1.130 71.80
Non-rice crops 0.259 0.656 0.585 0.099 0.844 21.80
Horticulture 0.000 0.995 0.175 0.000 0.383 0.00
Livestock 0.050 0.756 0.086 0.003 0.143 0.80
Non-farm 0.055 0.922 0.500 0.025 1.013 5.60
Total 1.000 0.455 0.455 100.00
Note: Estimation of the Gini coefficient is based on per capita income for farm households.
a value of 0.43. This implies that the equal distribution of income is due to
inequality-decreasing sources of income from both rice and non-rice crops in
Bago.
4.9 Conclusion
In developing counties, including Myanmar, most rural households seek to
diversify their sources of income to increase their earnings. Since the intro-
duction of agricultural reforms in 1987 and 2003, there has been a remarkable
increase in diversification in Myanmar’s rural areas. The purpose of this study
has been to highlight the factors influencing income diversification in rural
areas in Myanmar. This paper has also examined the impact of six income
sources on rural income inequality. Three major rice growing regions, namely,
Ayeyarwaddy, Bago and Saging were selected for analysing due to their different
agro-ecological environments.
The inverse of the Herfindahl index is applied to investigate overall diversi-
fication. Based on the ordinary least regression (OLS) results, the educational
level of the household head is found to have a positive and significant influence
on the decision to undertake income diversifying activities, which implies that
more educated farm households are likely to diversify their income-earning
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activities that can improve their income. Households with more dependants
are found to have a lower level of participation in other business activities.
The more the dependants in a family, the less participation in other business
activities. Also, households with large farm areas have a better chance to
increase their production and income from rice and non-rice crops compared to
those who have smaller size of agricultural land.
Another important determinant is the ownership of working capital. Farm-
ers who raised draught animals have a greater working capital, and affords to
cultivate other non-rice crops, such as pulses, beans and maize. In general, bet-
ter access to irrigation can encourage households to specialize on rice, non-rice
crop, horticulture production. However, in the Delta Region, rain in monsoon
season provides enough rain to grow rice successfully. Farmers in the Delta area,
therefore, do not participate much in other business activities. The negatively
significant result confirms the reason that farmers are less likely to participate
in other non-rice business activities. In contrast, farmers in Sagaing Region get
less rain and lack of good irrigation facilities. They produce non-rice crop, raise
livestocks, and participate in non-farm activities to raise their household income.
Based on the results of income diversification for each region, total agricul-
tural land available for rice and non-rice crops, ownership of draft animals, and
better access to irrigation are important factors for a household’s decision to
participate in both farm and non-farm activities. However, factors affecting
income diversification vary across the region.
It is surprising to find that travel distance from a village to the market
in the nearest township is not a factor influencing a household’s decision as
regards whether or not to participate in the income diversifying activities in
the full sample. However, there is a negative impact of distance to the nearest
market in Ayeyarwaddy and Bago, where there is a positive effect in Sagaing.
Most farm households in Sagaing are engaged in rice-crop production and
other activities although their villages are quite distant from township markets.
Unfortunately, the result of Sagaing is not statistically significant. A better
explanation is that farm households in Ayeyarwaddy and Bago are less likely to
participate in income-diversifying activities if their villages far from markets.
Overall, in the three regions, income inequality is mainly explained by
rice income source. However, the contribution of rice income to inequality of
earnings differs between the regions. Income from rice contributes decreasingly
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to income inequality in Bago, but it is a factor explaining increasing income-
inequality in Sagaing.
Non-rice crops are the second-most important factor explaining income in-
equality. In Ayeyarwaddy, farmers can grow rice two times per year. Therefore,
non-rice crops are less important in explaining income inequality there, but it
is a factor explaining the increasing income inequality in Bago and Sagaing.
It is interesting to note that income from livestock consistently increases
income equality of the six sources of rural income among farm households. Farm
households can generate higher income through diversifying their activities
in livestock in three regions. This finding suggests a need to promote better
access to livestock in villages by providing farmers with greater credits.
This study indicates that there is a high correlation between non-farm in-
come and income inequality in all regions. However, the results cannot provide
the confirmation of the causality effect of non-farm activities in these regions.
There are many reasons for rural households to diversify their income.
Based on the findings in this study, larger size of agricultural land, ownership
or either draft animals or tractors, and better irrigation in rural areas help
improve diversifying crop cultivation. Although the effect of the distance to
market on income diversification is not well confirmed in this study, access to
better transport is one of the important determinants in relations to greater
education to farmers, better irrigation and agricultural extension services, and
opportunities for both farm and non-farm income activities.
There are, however, some limitations in this chapter that should be taken
into account in further research. Although crop income helps reduce income
inequality in Bago and Sagaing, only gross income from both rice and other
crop is included in this study. The cost and benefit analysis, therefore, should
be conducted to estimate the net income from both stated income sources. By
doing this, the net return from both income sources can clearly provide a better
understanding of why farmers are more likely to participate in rice and other
crops, especially in Bago and Sagaing. In addition, a further research needs to
estimate labour wages from farm activities in the Gini decomposition analysis
and to investigate the impact of this sources of earning on income inequality in
Myanmar’s rural areas.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis has described the background and current situation concerning
the Government of Myanmar policies that affect rice production in the country.
This study has summarised the existing literature on Myanmar rice production
and rural income inequality, and identified gaps in our knowledge. The study
has also analysed the credit policy of the Myanmar Agricultural Development
Bank (MADB) and how it has affected rice production, rice productivity and
rice income. The thesis has examined rice production and its implications
for income inequality in Myanmar’s rural areas. This thesis provided some
policy recommendations to increase Myanmar’s rice production and improve
rural income equality, drawing upon the research findings and with a particular
reference to the experience of another major rice-producing country that shares
many features in common with Myanmar: Vietnam.
Successive governments in Myanmar have sought to develop the country’s
agriculture sector, with a particular focus on increasing rice production. In
1987, the government implemented the first agricultural reform by introduc-
ing advanced technology, reducing the amount of quota and removing the
restrictions on the export of some agricultural crops. In 2003, the government
launched another reform, the so-called ‘second agricultural reform’, removing
the procurement system and liberalizing both domestic and export markets for
agricultural products. The government also implemented the other programs to
boost rice production including the provision of extension services, agricultural
loans and the expansion of irrigation. Due to the successive reforms and pro-
grams, there has been a significant increase in rice, pulse and beans production.
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In 2012, the civilian government enacted the Farmland Law to fulfil the
objective of securing access to land for rural development. Under this policy,
farmers have more freedom to choose the appropriate crops to sell or transfer,
or they can mortgage or rent their land use rights to other people. Although
not enough time has passed since the introduction of Myanmar’s land reforms
in 2012 to assess that effect on rice production, it is expected to deliver the
same outcomes. Despite these efforts, Myanmar has not managed to develop
its rice production to the same extent as other countries in the region. Most
farms still use low-quality and low-quantity agricultural inputs, especially fer-
tilizer and seed that deliver low yields, which results in lower income for farmers.
There have been several studies on rice production and efficiency in Myan-
mar. Although there were some differences in their findings, in aggregate,
these studies found the positive effect of average years in school of household
members who work in farming activities and agricultural extension services on
rice production efficiency. However, the previous literature has not addressed
certain important factors including landholding sizes with a number of plots,
the distance from a village to a market nearby a township, the impact of credit
policy on rice production and rural income inequality in Myanmar, a deficiency
which this thesis has sought to fill. More importantly, this study gives attention
to the endogenity problems for credit and agricultural extension services, and
uses the fitting endogeneous stochastic frontier models with township fixed-
effects to handle those problems.
The study’s key findings suggest that larger farms with better irrigation
systems, and those with access to agricultural extension services and more
credit, are more efficient. Well-educated farmers with holdings of large farm
sizes are more likely to increase their productivity and output than those who
only have a primary school education. With regard to the effect of distance to
market on rice production, the longer distance to a market nearby a township
has a negative effect on production efficiency. Although there has been an
increase in rice production, rice yield in Myanmar is relatively low compared to
Vietnam, which has similar sown acreage and harvested areas to Myanmar. The
performance of Vietnamese’s rice production suggests that application of better
quality seeds, effective use of fertilizers, irrigation facilities, and investment in re-
search and development are important factors to improve Myanmar’s rice sector.
The analysis of the second essay shows the importance of access to agri-
cultural credit on farmers to improve their productivity by enabling them to
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improve the quality and volume of their inputs. Under the credit policy of the
MADB, it provides only a limited amount of credit per acre for a maximum of
10 acres of land. This is partly due to inadequate resourcing. The Myanmar
Agricultural Development Bank (MADB) has to ration its loans at a level
below that farmers need to apply agricultural inputs effectively. The research
found that the existing Government of Myanmar’s agriculture programs are less
effective in promoting efficient rice production, especially for larger-scale farms,
in the three regions selected for the study. The findings for farm households
with holdings 8-12 acres of land, however, strongly argue for the impact of
subsidized credit scheme on rice production and rice income and total income.
The results for the interval between 0-20 and 5-15 acres show the positive
spillover effect on farm other income activities. The key results suggest that the
MADB could not meet its objectives, which is to help improve rice productivity,
particularly for large farm households.
The findings of the third essay show the effect of household demographic
characteristics, cultivated land size and asset ownership on income diversifica-
tion in the selected regions. This essay found that many farmers, particularly
those from lower-income households, would be more productive if they had
better skills and knowledge of farming practices. Due to the insignificant
impact of regional effects, this study also analysed the determinants of income
diversification in each region. The findings for the total agricultural land size
are significantly robust in Ayeyarwaddy and Bago Regions. Farm households
with holdings of large amounts of land have less motivation to diversify their
income by participating in different activities. The effect of distance to market
on income diversification differs between regions. The results for the Delta
Region (Ayeyarwaddy and Bago) show the negative effect of distance to market
on diversification, while the findings for the Dry Zone show little impact on
diversifying income. The results of the Gini coefficient reveal that diversifying
crops in Bago and Sagaing, and engaging in breeding livestock in the three
regions, are important factors in decreasing income inequality. The income
from non-farm activities has little impact on income inequality in the three
regions.
Based on the findings in this study, the Department of Agriculture (DOA)
should deliver better training to farmers, so that farmers can use their resources
more efficiently and effectively. Funding constraints also likely contribute to
inadequate irrigation and other support infrastructure that could improve farm
yields, and reduce transportation cost. The government should improve its
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planning and investment in agricultural infrastructure, in particular, rural road
construction and the development of irrigation facilities. These recommenda-
tions are supported by the experience of Vietnam’s efforts to boost its own
rice production, which show that using better quality seed, effective use of
fertilizer and better irrigation facilities can lead to a dramatic improvement in
rice production. There is a need for the Department of Agricultural Research
(DAR) and the Department of Agriculture (DOA) to implement improved
research that helps develop the production and distribution of better quality
seed. The government should also encourage the private sector to invest in
the agriculture sector, especially in the rural credit market, where the MADB
mainly provides credits at a subsidized interest rate.
Unfortunately for this study, not enough time has lapsed since the introduc-
tion of Myanmar’s 2012 Farmland Law to evaluate its effect on rice production.
In particular, the land use certificates were only partially implemented at the
time the field research was undertaken. These reforms are expected to provide
farmers in Myanmar with more incentive to improve rice productivity. It is
recommended that the effect of these reforms on agricultural productivity
be studied after sufficient time has passed for these effects to be measurable.
Furthermore, the importance of a cost and benefit analysis for both rice and
non-rice crops should be interest for further research, which can provide a clear
pattern of the profits from both rice and other cash crops that can help improve
rural income in the selected regions.
Appendix A
Sampling Frame
A.1 Sampling procedure for the Myanmar Rice
Farm Survey 2014
This appendix describes the sampling procedure used for the Myanmar Rice
Farm Survey (MRFS) in 2014. In this survey, 634 farms were interviewed in 30
villages which are located in six townships in three most rice producing regions.
A.1.1 Background
The administrative structure of Myanmar should be taken into account to set
up the sampling framework. The structure of country includes five levels as:.
• The first level: Myanmar is divided into 15 States and Regions.
• The second level: these states and divisions are divided into 67 districts.
• The third level: the districts are divided into 330 townships.
• The fourth level: the townships are divided into 3,183 wards in urban
areas and 13,602 village tracks in rural areas.
• The fifth level: village tracts are divided into 70,838 villages.
The 2014 population census in Myanmar indicates that the country has
about 51.5 million people, or 10.9 million households, of which about 70 percent
live in rural areas.
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A.1.2 MRFS 2014 sampling
A stratified multistage cluster sampling method was used for MRFS 2014 to save
costs while targeting the population of interest. The three major rice growing
regions, in particular, Ayeyarwaddy, Bago and Sagaing, were selected on the
basis of regions that produce the most rice, the nature of farming conditions,
soil types, types of irrigation systems and crop intensity. The cultivated acres
in Ayeyarwaddy, Bago and Sagaing account for 27 per cent, 11 per cent and 10
per cent of the whole country respectively. Ayeyarwaddy, Bago and Sagaing
produce roughly 26 percent, 17 percent and 12 percent, respectively, of the
total rice output in Myanmar in 2012-2013 (Agricultural Extension Division,
2013). Apart from the similarity of being key rice producing regions, these
three regions differ in soil type which in turn affects their rice production and
crop diversity. In particular, while both in the delta, the soil in Ayeyarwady
is gley and gley swampy while that in Bago is meadow and meadow alluvial.
On the other hand, one township in Sagaing has meadow and meadow alluvial
soils while the other has red-brown forest soils.
Ayeyarwady and Bago are located in the Delta Region whereas Sagaing
is located in the Central Dry Zone. Regarding population size, Ayeyarwady
has about 6 million people while the other regions have, about 5 million each.
Regarding administrative divisions, Ayeyarwady consists of six districts, Bago
has four, while Sagaing has eight. The district with the highest rice output in
each region was selected in the first stage of our sample scheme. The districts
include Pyapon in Ayeyarwady, Bago in Bago and Shwebo in Sagaing, being
identified as strata in our sample.
In the second stage, two townships were randomly selected from each dis-
trict. They include Bogalay and Pyapon in Pyapon, Ayeyarwady; Daik-U and
Nyaung Lay Pin in Bago; and Wetlet and Kyunhla in Sagaing. A township
sampling frame was set up using the Myanmar Health Profile (DHP, 2009).
The rural population (’000) was identified as a population variable for township
selection. Likewise, in the third stage, five villages were randomly selected in
each township. The sampling frame of a village was developed with township-
level agricultural officials.
Farm households interviewed in each village in the final stage were chosen
using a circular systematic sample method with the probability of being selected
proportional to the village’s number of farm households. Finally, the sample
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size was calculated taking into account two factors. The first one was the
design effect which has resulted in the loss of sample effectiveness by the use of
cluster sampling instead of simple random sampling (Kalton, 1983). With no
better information about how big or small this effect is due to the similarity
among households being sampled in the same cluster, we use the rule of thumb
suggested by the literature to set it equal to 1.5 (e.g. ICF International, 2012;
UN, 2008). The second factor is the possible non-response. Following Barlett
et al. (2001), our sample size is calculated follows
n = 1
RR
×DEFF × (tα/2)
2 × p× q
d2
= 10.90 × 1.5×
(1.96)2 × 0.5× 0.5
0.052 ≈ 640
(A.1)
where RR is the response rate, assumed to be 90%; DEFF is the design
effect, set at equal to 1.5; p× q is the estimate of variance, assuming is equal
to 0.5× 0.5 = 0.25; tα/2 = 1.96 is the statistical value for the level of α equal
to 5 percent–the risk the survey accepts in the study that the true margin
of error may exceed the acceptable margin of error, and the population size
being millions of households in three regions of interest; and d is the acceptable
margin of error, set at equal to 0.05 being within the usual range of 0.05-0.1
(Suresh and Chandrashekara, 2012).
Based on the above sample frame and desirable size, I successfully inter-
viewed 634 farms in total in three regions, six townships and 30 villages. The
sub-samples for each region are 215 farms in Ayeyarwady, 212 farms in Bago
and 207 in Sagaing. Map A.1 illustrates the selected regions and townships.
Map A.2, Map A.3 and Map A.4 demonstrate Ayeyarwaddy, Bago and Sagaing
regions respectively.
A.1.3 Information in questionnaire
The questionnaire in this survey consisted of five sections. Section A includes
the demographic characteristics of farm households such as number of family
members, and their gender, age, education level, numbers of years of schooling,
marital status, and types of business activity and occupation that they engaged
in. In Section B, information regarding the cultivation of rice paddy and other
crops for each parcel of land were collected in detail. These include farming
experience of the head of household, total areas of plot and the characteristics
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of each plot, the irrigation facilities and their quality, the status of land tenure
and holding land use right certificate. In addition, the details of harvesting for
crops, uses of productive resources such as seed, use of fertilizers and pesticides
and their prices, and costs of production including family and hired labours,
animals, tools, other equipment and machinery during the past 12 months were
also included in the survey. The costs of transportation and different types of
sales of rice paddy were also added in this section.
In Section C, the provision of agricultural credit form the Myanmar Agri-
cultural Development Bank and other organizations such as UNDP, NGO,
PACT, co-operatives and private money lenders, and their interest rates on
farm activities were collected. Farmers were also asked the detailed informa-
tion relating to access to credit. This information included the purpose of
borrowing, availability of loans, different types of providers such as formal and
informal financial institutions, and interest rates on loans. Section D consists
of other expenditures related to farming activities and transportation costs
for travelling from home to farmland. The sources of a household’s incomes
from on-farm activities (cultivation of other crops, livestock and fishery) and
non-farm activities (other non-agricultural business activities) are observed in
Section E.
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Fig. A.2 Ayeyarwaddy Region
Source: Redrawn from Myanmar Information Management Unit 2016
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Fig. A.3 Bago Region
Source: Redrawn from Myanmar Information Management Unit 2016
A.1 Sampling procedure for the Myanmar Rice Farm Survey 2014 169
Fig. A.4 Sagaing Region
Source: Redrawn from Myanmar Information Management Unit 2016
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